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Introduction
The relationship between states, societies, and individuals in Central and Eastern
Europe has been characterised by periods of change and redefinition. The current
political, economic, social and cultural climate necessitates a discussion of these
issues, both past and present. It is this theme which the proposed publication intends
to discuss using a selection of papers given at the 5
th Annual Postgraduate Conference
on Central and Eastern Europe held at the UCL School of Slavonic and East European
Studies (SSEES) in 2003. The papers represent work from young international
scholars from Europe and North America writing on Central and Eastern Europe.
The book consists of seven papers and develops an interdisciplinary framework
reflecting the range of topics discussed during the conference. It embraces the
regional breadth of Central and Eastern Europe containing analyses of Russia, the
former Soviet Republics, Central Europe and South Eastern Europe. The papers
chosen cover a variety of fields and adopt a corresponding range of approaches with a
view to assessing from a multidisciplinary perspective the relationship between state,
society and individuals.
The papers in the book have been ordered chronologically. The volume starts with
an analysis by Julia Mannherz of social conflict in late imperial Russia and moves on
to Sergei Zhuk’s discussion of the Stundist movement in Ukraine. The third paper
from Stefan Detchev is a discussion of the late-nineteenth-century politics of
commemoration surrounding the Bulgarian war of independence. The theme of the
politics of commemoration is also present in Andrzej Michalczyk’s analysis of the
commemoration of the plebiscite in Silesia by Germans and Poles during the interwar
period. Michalczyk examines how a shared event is commemorated and interpreted
differently by the two national groups. The idea of common and shared histories is
further developed by Rüdiger Ritter in his study of the history and the historiography
of post-Communist Poland, Belarus and Lithuania. The move into the contemporary
period is completed in the final two papers. The use of historical imagery for political
purposes is explored in Markus Wien’s study of the King Simeon II Party in Bulgaria
as well as the way in which the historical image of the monarchy has been changed
for political purposes during the transition from communism to democracy. The final
paper by Maria Aluchna continues the discussion of the process of transition by
examining the economic transformation from a communist command economic
system to a modern capitalist economy.
The editors of the book would like to thank the following people for their support
during the development of the conference and of this book. We would like to thank
our co-organisers Dr Emma Minns, Sara Cohen, Gonso Pozo-Martin and Caroline
Tower. We would also like to thank our academic advisor Professor Alena Ledeneva
for her support and guidance. Our gratitude goes to Professor George Kolankiewicz
and Dr Robin Aizlewood, Directors of SSEES, for their willingness to help this
project, and to Christine Fernandes for her practical advice. Finally we wish to thank
the referees, who provided advice and comments on the papers: Professor Faith
Wigzell, Professor Janet Hartley, the late Professor John Klier, Dr Heather Coleman,
Professor Dennis Deletant, Dr Dimitrina Mihaylova, Dr Richard Butterwick, Dr
Wojciech Janik, Professor Timothy Snyder, Dr Piotr Jaworski and Professor Tomasz
Mickiewicz.1
Mysterious knocks, flying potatoes and rebellious servants: Spiritualism
and social conflict in late Imperial Russia
Julia Mannherz
1
(Oriel College Oxford)
Strange things occurred in the night of 13 December, 1884, in the city of Kazan on the
river Volga. As Volzhskii vestnik (The Volga Herald) reported, unidentifiable raps
were heard in the flat rented by the retired officer Florentsov on Srednaia Iamskaia
Street. Before the newspaper described what had actually been observed, it made it
clear that ‘all descriptions here are true facts, as has been ascertained by a member of
our newspaper’s editorial board’. This assertion was deemed necessary because the
phenomena were of a kind ‘regarded as “inexplicable”‘. On the evening of 13
December:
Mr. Florentsov was just about to go to bed, when a loud rap on his
apartment’s ceiling was heard, which caused worry even to the
neighbours. At about the same time, potatoes and bricks began to fly out
of the oven pipe and smashed the kitchen window. On the 14
th the
‘phenomena’ continued all day long and were accompanied by many
comical episodes. About 10 well-known officers came to Mr. Florentsov’s
apartment. They put a heavy pole against the oven-door, but the shaft was
not strong enough and it soon flew to one side. [After this] potatoes rolled
out beneath the furniture, fell from the walls, rained down from the
ceiling; sometimes a brick appeared at the scene of action. One officer
was hit by a potato on his head, another one on his nose, some were hit by
the bullets of this invisible foe at their backs, shoulders and so on. The
aide of the district police officer showed up at the battlefield; the flat was
thoroughly searched but no explanation could be found. […] The potato
bombardment continued and one of the rank and file received such a
severe blow, that he was beaten off his feet by fear. However, the soldiers
endured the potato fire and calmly collected the shells eating some of
them on the battlefield, thus making the most of the fact that many of
them were cooked. […] On the 15
th many Kazaners visited Florentsov’s
apartment, quite a few of them spiritualist amateurs or simply fascinated
by some kind of devilry or other.
2
Volzhskii Vestnik and other newspapers and journals subsequently published follow-
up stories of this case, and it emerged that Florentsov’s landlords tried to put an end to
the mysterious potato-throwing by holding a public prayer (moleben). They came with
an icon, holy water, spices and frankincense. But as they were fumigating the
apartment, fourteen potatoes fell down from the ceiling. Indeed, the prayer seems to
have aggravated the unknown cause even more: the maid Sasha had to evade a knife
that was thrown with such force that half of the blade made its way into the kitchen
wall. After this incident, Florentsov’s son-in-law
1 I am grateful to the Studienstiftung des deutschen Volkes and the Deutscher Akademischer
Austauschdienst (DAAD), whose financial support has made this research possible. I would also like to
thank the two anonymous referees for their valuable comments.
2 ‘Kartofel’naia kolonada,’ Volzhskii vestnik, 16 December 1884: 3.2
told the girl to lie down on the [kitchen-] bench and to think as well as to
wish for something to fall down and break to pieces. Suddenly and in
front of the captain’s and the batman’s eyes, a tray came down from the
wall. Immediately afterwards the girl, too, fell from the bench and
regained consciousness only after she hit her head against the table.
3
Florentsov and his family soon came to terms with their new situation and made the
most of it: they held a séance, inviting their acquaintances, among them the chief of
the city police and a police officer. The message from the other world was ‘very
unclear’, but promised the continuation of the baffling manifestations.
4 Judging from
the newspaper Volzhskii vestnik and from the spiritualist journal Rebus, the spirits
kept their promise. Although no further news emerged about Florentsov and his
potatoes, before a week had passed, the mysterious events had spread to other
apartments in Kazan and to an estate in the Kazan guberniia.
5
Newspaper accounts such as these were very common during the last decades of the
Russian empire, a time marked by economic change, social upheaval and cultural
transformation. They were in no way restricted to a few geographic areas, but
remained a common feature in the pages of elite and low-brow newspapers, illustrated
journals and cheap publications until the revolution of 1917. These reports were part
of a broader fascination with the supernatural that gripped fin-de-siècle society in
Russia as it did in the rest of Europe. In Russia, notions of the occult were
considerably influenced by spiritualism, a spiritual practice which emerged in the
mid-nineteenth century. The fascination with the occult in general and spiritualism in
particular is not only mirrored by newspaper accounts about haunted houses, but also
by literary or philosophical works of the Silver Age, some of which very overtly
incorporated occult notions and on a much broader scale by popular entertainment
such as early Russian cinema, popular theatre and circus acts.
6
Despite its ubiquity, urban occultism and the reception of spiritualism in fin-de-
siècle Russia has only recently attracted the attention of historians. Soviet publications
on the matter have frequently maintained that the mysterious only fascinated the
cultural elites of the tsarist empire, thereby illustrating the intelligentsia’s decadence,
its otherworldly concerns and its ultimate inability to govern the country. That
ordinary Russians or even workers were also intrigued by the occult, did not fit into
the ideological framework. This view has crept into many non-Soviet publications as
well.
7 In the last decade, however, several studies have dealt with diverse popular
3 M. B., ‘Mediumicheskie iavleniia v Kazani (Korrespondentsiia ‘Rebusa’),’ Rebus, 1885 4: 30. In this
account, the name of the affected is given as Florenskii instead of Florentsov.
4 Ibid.
5 ‘Chto za chertovshchina?’ Volzhskii vestnik, 21 December 1884: 2; Nik. Ivanov, ‘Mediumicheskie
iavleniia (pis’mo iz Kazani),’ Rebus, 1885 4: 16; ‘Novye mediumicheskie iavleniia v Kazani,’ Rebus,
1885, 4, p. 48; ‘Novoe proiavlenie mediumicheskoi siloi v Kazani,’ Rebus, 1885 4: 203; M. Sukhanov,
‘Mediumicheskie iavleniia,’ Rebus, 1885 4: 59; ‘Vnimanie “Rebusa” i vsekh spiritov,’ Volzhskii
vestnik , 2 March 1885, p. 2; ‘Kratkie zametki,’ Rebus 1885 4: 115.
6 For the occult in Silver Age literature see for example V. E. Aleksandrov, ‘Unicorn impaling a knight:
the transcendent and man in Bely’s Petersburg,’ Canadian-American Slavonic Studies, 16, 1982: 1-44;
David M. Bethea, ‘Aspects of the apocalyptic plot in the age of Symbolism: Blok, Bely and the poetics
of revelation,’ in Christianity and the Eastern Slavs: Russian Literature in Modern Times, ed. Boris
Gasparov, Berkeley 1995; Bogomolov, Nikolai Alekseevich. Russkaia literatura nachala XX veka i
okkul’tizm: Issledovaniia i materialy, Moscow 1999; Magnus Ljunggren, The Russian Mephisto: A
Study of the Life and Works of Emilii Medtner, Stockholm 1994
7 See for example Beer, Daniel. ‘The Medicalization of Religious Deviance in the Russian Orthodox
Church (1880-1905).’ Kritika. 5, 3, 2004: 451-82 (p. 479).3
aspects of supernatural practice in imperial Russia’s urban centres, while others have
focused on the folkloric traditions of the rural population. Maria Carlson’s study on
the theosophical movement, for example, examines the history and cultural
significance of Helena Blavatskaia’s teachings, while Faith Wigzell’s book on
fortune-telling traces traditional influences on divinatory and printing practices.
Christine D. Worobec’s work on demon possession focuses on the peasantry.
8 Other
publications have been concerned with stock-taking of the many occult practices. The
volume edited by Bernice Glatzer Rosenthal on the occult in Russian and Soviet
culture thus presents essays that address the issue from a broad range of perspectives
and provide a general overview. Last but not least, W.F. Ryan’s seminal and
encyclopaedic study on magic in Russian history is a treasure trove for those eager to
learn about the myriad facets of magical practices and beliefs.
9
The popular fascination with the occult can reveal a lot about pre-revolutionary
urban Russia. Historians of Russia have long analysed the late imperial period in the
light of social antagonism and economic development. We know about the political
conclusions that contemporaries drew from the cultural changes and social upheavals
that they experienced. But the other cultural and spiritual implications that these
transformations had for Russians at the turn of the century have been neglected for a
long time. In the past decade, cultural history has addressed some of these issues.
More recently, enquiries into consumerism have analysed attitudes towards the self,
national identity, society and culture from new perspectives.
10 Finally, a few
publications have drawn our attention to questions of belief and religion.
11 My work is
indebted to these studies for initiating new thinking about the old empire. In the
picture that emerges from an inquiry into the fascination with the occult, social
antagonism, although still present, shifts from the public to the private, from open
demands for emancipation to covert defiance with supernatural support, while at the
same time common ground appears on which members of different social
backgrounds could assemble. Late imperial society emerges highly complicated and
ambivalent, extremely contradictory and less clear-cut.
Among the groups that addressed supernatural and mystical matters in late imperial
Russia, spiritualists were culturally the most influential. The movement was originally
born in 1848 in the United States, in a climate of spiritual and political crisis and
religious quest.
12 It soon spread to Western Europe, especially to Britain from where it
8 Maria Carlson, ‘No Religion Higher than Truth’: A History of the Theosophical Movement in Russia
1875-1922, Princeton 1993; Christine D. Worobec, Possessed: Women, Witches, and Demons in
Imperial Russia, DeKalb, Il 2001; Faith Wigzell, Reading Russian Fortunes: Print Culture, Gender
and Divination in Russia from 1765, Cambridge 1998.
9 Bernice Glatzer Rosenthal (ed.), The Occult in Russian and Soviet Culture, Ithaca, NY, and London,
1997; W.F. Ryan, The Bathhouse at Midnight: An Historical Survey of Magic and Divination in
Russia, Stroud 1999.
10 See for example Joan Neuberger, Hooliganism: Crime, Culture, and Power in St. Petersburg, 1900-
1914, Berkeley and London 1993; Stephen P Frank and Mark D. Steinberg (eds.), Cultures in flux:
lower-class values, practices, and resistance in late imperial Russia, Princeton 1994; Laura Engelstein,
The Keys to Happiness: Sex and the Search for Modernity in Fin-de-Siècle Russia, 2 ed. Ithaca 1996;
Louise McReynolds, Russia at Play: Leisure Activities at the End of the Tsarist Era, Ithaca and
London 2003.
11 See for example Laura Engelstein, Castration and the Heavenly Kingdom: A Russian Folktale, Ithaca
and London 1999; Heather J. Coleman, ‘Becoming a Russian Baptist: Conversion Narratives and
Social Experience,’ The Russian Review 61 2002: 94-112.
12 Bret E. Carroll, Spiritualism in Antebellum America, Bloomington 1997. On spiritualism see Janet
Oppenheim, The Other World: Spiritualism and Psychical Research in England, 1850-1914,
Cambridge 1985; Logie Barrow, Independent Spirits: Spiritualism and English Plebeians, 1850-1910,4
reached Russia. After a slow start but a few high-flown scandals in tsarist society, it
gained notoriety and a considerable following in the mid-1870s and 1880s. The basic
assumption of spiritualism is the belief in man’s continuative existence after death as
a spirit and the notion that communication between the living and the deceased is
possible. This can be achieved through a medium, a person sensitive enough to
encourage spirit activity and thus to convey messages. Initial spirit activity is assumed
to consist of blows and raps to the walls, ceilings or furniture. Once such phenomena
are observed, a code can be agreed between the living and the ghostly visitor and
messages can be exchanged. Usually, this involved the holding of a séance. For this
purpose, sitters gathered around a table in a darkened room. They held hands, thumbs
and little fingers touching, to form a chain of energy believed to assist spirit activity.
Often, prayers or psalms were recited or the group engaged in joint singing. Although
this did not guarantee supernatural occurrences – in some cases nothing might happen
– at other instances, knocks would be heard, messages conveyed or, if one were
particularly lucky, a spirit could materialise as a radiant white figure.
This, apart from the materialisation, is what happened in Florentsov’s apartment in
1884. Florentsov’s case conforms to the general pattern of events in haunted houses: it
began with mysterious knocks, which gradually grew louder as the spirits became
more assertive. The raps were then supplemented by flying objects, broken glass and
smashed dishes. An unsuccessful moleben further aggravated the situation and a
member of the household was slightly injured, before a séance confirmed the
involvement of spirits.
Rumours and gossip, which unfortunately did not survive to be used by historians,
newspapers and popular publications were the main means which spread the news of
such mysterious events and popularised spiritualist beliefs. In tsarist Russia, elite and
low-brow periodicals took up the subject of spiritualism and ensured that it became a
prominent part of fin-de-siècle culture. The first publications about ghostly
communications appeared in the thick journals that were so influential in turn-of-the-
century Russian culture: in particular, articles in Vestnik Evropy (The Herald of
Europe) and Russkii vestnik (The Russian Herald) initiated debate about mediumistic
phenomena.
13 The subject immediately made it into upper-class newspapers such as
Novosti i birzhevaia gazeta (The News and Stock-Exchange Gazette),
Sanktpeterburgskie vedomosti (The Saint Petersburg News) and Novoe vremia (The
New Times). It was also taken up by provincial publications such as Volzhskii vestnik
and by newspapers that catered for the needs of low clerks and literate workers, such
as Peterburgskaia gazeta (The Petersburg Gazette), Peterburgskii listok (The
Petersburg Flyer), and Gazeta kopeika (The Kopeck Gazette).
14 Since 1881, with the
London 1986; Alex Owen, The Darkened Room: Women, Power, and Spiritualism in Late Nineteenth
Century England, London 1989; R. Laurence Moore, In Search of White Crows: Spiritualism,
Parapsychology, and American Culture, New York 1977. There is no monograph about spiritualism in
Russia, but it is addressed in Maria Carlson, ‘Fashionable Occultism: Spiritualism, Theosophy,
Freemasonry, and Hermeticism in Fin-de-Siècle Russia,’ in Bernice Glatzer Rosenthal ed. The Occult
in Soviet and Russian Culture, Ithaca 1997; Michael D. Gordin, ‘Loose and Baggy Spirits: Reading
Dostoevskii and Mendeleev,’ Slavic Review 60 2001:756-780; Michael D. Gordin, A Well-Ordered
Thing: Dmitrii Mendeleev and the Shadow of the Periodic Table, New York 2004.
13 The article that let loose the public debate on spiritualism in Russia was N. P. Vagner, ‘Pis΄mo k 
redaktoru: po povodu spiritizma,’ Vestnik Evropy , 1875, pp. 855-75. It was followed by A.M.
Butlerov, ‘Mediumicheskiie iavleniia,’ Russkii vestnik 120 1875: 300-48.
14 On the other organs see for example ‘O privideniiakh,’ Novosti i birzhevaia gazeta , 25 June and 16
July 1902, p. 2, p. 2; G. N., ‘Voskresnye negativy: Prividenie v *** departamente,’ Sanktpeterburgskie
vedomosti , 8 (20) May 1888: 2-3; M. Bern, ‘Na seanse u spiritov,’ Novoe vremia , 1 (13) August 1883:
2; V. S. P., ‘Pochemu teper’ zagovorili o prizrakakh,’ Novoe vremia, No. 5704, 1892: 2-3; ‘Nevedomoe5
first appearance of Rebus, Russians could subscribe to a journal devoted entirely to
spiritualism. Moreover, readers were overwhelmed by a flood of cheap how-to
instruction manuals devoted to occult matters: how to become a medium, how to
summon a ghost, how to have prophetic dreams, or how to anticipate and predict the
future.
15 Although spiritualist notions and other occult traditions were regularly
confused in these publications, the general popularity and appeal of such beliefs is
beyond doubt.
Despite the large number of accounts about haunted houses, what really happened
that December night in Florentsov’s apartment cannot be ascertained. However, many
reports suggest that these events were taken seriously and seemed plausible to
contemporaries. Other accounts are highly ironical and this seems to imply that some
journalists and/or readers were amused by alleged hauntings. The frequent appearance
of reports about haunted houses, however, indicates that these texts brought up urgent
questions.
The séance and social experimentation
Why was spiritualism so appealing to diverse groups that included subscribers of
thick journals and readers of kopeck newspapers, ranging from aristocrats, members
of the intelligentsia, professionals, and workers to some peasants? There is no single
answer to this question; the reasons for the popularity of spiritualism are various and
multi-layered. The charm of spiritualism was partly due to the fact that its practices
were entertaining and thrilling, but they also offered individualised religious practice
outside or alongside the seemingly rigid and authoritarian Orthodox Church.
Spiritualism sought rational explanations for transcendental phenomena and thus
pledged to straddle the divide between traditional society and modernity. It also
provided space for alternative visions of empire. The dramatis personae of
spiritualism, the spirits, could provide justice where the authorities of this world acted
unfairly or arbitrarily. At the same time, spiritualism was highly diverse: no one
agreed on what caused the phenomena in darkened rooms and as a consequence these
occurrences were open to different interpretations. Spiritualism and especially
hauntings also provided space for the expression of social conflict. The reasons for the
popularity of séances and associated beliefs were thus both spiritual and religious but
also social and political. In this paper, I shall concentrate on the space spiritualism
provided for the enacting of social tensions.
Séances not only provided space for individual experience of the transcendent, they
also held out the hope of a new society. In spiritualist writings, belief in spirits was
equated with civilisation and modernity, while Orthodox anathema, scepticism or the
unwillingness to acknowledge spirit activities were linked to conservatism.
16 The
hostile treatment of spiritualism by representatives of the state church bestowed the
i neob-iasnimoe v chelovecheskoi zhizni,’ Peterburgskaia gazeta, 24 December 1900: 3. Peterburgskii
listok ran a weekly series from 1899 until 1907 entitled “Iz mira tainstvennogo”. See also ‘Iz mira
tainstvennogo: Fotografiia dukha,’ Moskovskaia gazeta kopeika, 2 August 1910: 4; ‘Poslednyi debiut
artistki M. Ia. Puare,’ Gazeta kopeika, 22 September 1916: 3.
15 See for example A. I. Litvinov, Prakticheskoe rukovodstvo k uznavaniiu chelovecheskoi sud’by s
ukazaniem pravil chteniia chuzhikh myslei, byt’ schastlivym i liubimim vsemi, Khar΄kov, 1887; Zerkalo
tainykh nauk ili otrazhenie sud’by cheloveka: Polnyi kurs gipnotizma, Moscow 1914.
16 ‘Aleksandr Nikolaevich Aksakov,’ Rebus 22, 1903, pp. 25-7, 45-6; Vagner, ‘Pis΄mo k redaktoru: po 
povodu spiritizma.’; V. Pribytkov, ‘Vopros o spiritizme v Rossii,’ Rebus, 19 1900: 126-9, 135-6, 143-
4, 151-3, 174-5, 191-2, 200-1, 206-8, 223-5, 230, 237-8, 248-9, 259, 387-8, 393-5, 405-6, 455-6.6
movement with a liberal and an almost rebellious character vis-à-vis officialdom. And
indeed, séances realised some liberal ideals. For example, they frequently turned
tsarist society upside-down. Although mediumistic powers were thought to be
bestowed upon members of all social strata, most professional mediums and
especially those whose names appeared on the pages of newspapers and journals,
were from the disadvantaged groups of society: they were women, members of ethnic
minorities or representatives of the working classes. Spiritualist investigators, i.e.
those who could afford to employ the services of a professional medium, were most
frequently members of the aristocracy or of the privileged educated elite. Ordinary
Russians, of course, also engaged in spiritualist activities. But in these cases too,
mediums were often socially inferior to other séance participants. In the countryside,
for example, where patriarchal structures dominated society, mediums were
frequently women, young girls or female wards. Séances thus offered a carnivalesque
mirror image of the late empire and its social make-up. Socially disadvantaged
mediums were in charge of the event. They demanded the room be lit according to
their wishes and commanded the sitters to sing, pray or be silent. ‘What the séance
promised’, Alex Owen has observed for the English context, ‘was the ritualised
violation of cultural norms.’
17 This, too, was the case in Russia. Spirits dishevelled the
hair-dos of well-to-do Petersburgers and also frequently hit them. The medium Jan
Guzik, a former tanner from the empire’s Polish region, offered séances that were
both highly popular and especially feared among Petersburgers: sometimes chairs
were dragged from beneath affluent sitters, punches were severe and in 1913 one of
the attendants was seriously injured. Such physical attacks on representatives of the
privileged strata would not have been sanctioned outside the séance room, but within
the spiritualist context they were accepted even by those who got a bloody nose from
spirit communications.
Despite spiritualism’s ability to assemble men and women of different backgrounds
around a séance-table, the rituals associated with the movement provided ample room
for rebellious acts. This was most conspicuous in the cases of haunted houses, where
women servants seemed to be rising against their superiors.
Haunted houses and social conflict
Houses troubled with banging spirits, rapping ghosts and haunting apparitions have a
long history in Russia. Russian folklore most frequently attributed strange noises,
groans and knockings in the peasant hut to the domovoi, the spirit of the house. In the
late nineteenth century, however, belief in traditional and folkloric spirits was in
decline and this is mirrored in newspaper reports about haunted houses.
18 In urban
centres, spiritualism became the fashionable and appropriate framework within which
haunted houses were interpreted, while reference to the domovoi became regarded as a
sign for rural backwardness.
19
17 Owen, Darkened Room, p. 203. See also I. L. Smolenskii, ‘Interessnyi iuridicheskii vopros,’ Rebus,
32, 1913: 5-6; ‘O chlenovreditel’nykh seansakh: k zametke g-na Smolenskogo,’ Rebus, 32, 1913: 5.
18 On the decline, see Vladimir Dal’, O poveriiakh, sueveriiakh i predrassudkakh russkogo narod., St.
Petersburg, 1996; Linda Ivanits, Russian Folk Belief, New York 1992; N. Kh., ‘K voprosu o
religiosnykh vozzreniakh krest’ian Kaluzhskoi gubernii,’ Etnograficheskoe obozrenie, 4, 1892: 210-5.
19 This development also relegated the devil, the explanation favoured by the Orthodox Church, into the
background.7
What was believed to have caused events in haunted houses and how did newspaper
accounts make sense of such phenomena as those reported of Florentsov’s apartment?
While neither the domovoi nor the devil were regarded as plausible explanations for
a haunted house by urban observers, the presence of a female servant provided a first
suspect for future investigations. As we have seen, Florentsov’s son-in-law suspected
the servant Sasha of having some special relation to the cause of their troubles (he had
her lie on the bench to see whether she could provoke some of the inexplicable
phenomena). The reporter of the Kazan case was also able to establish that ‘she was a
very nervous and sensitive person, liable to suffer from hallucinations.’
20
Other accounts were much more explicit in placing sole responsibility for the sudden
blows and raps on the newly hired niania (nursemaid). In a case from St. Petersburg
region, the peasant Feodos’ia Spiridonova was eager to inform a journalist that they
had taken on ‘the 11- or 12-year-old Mariia Semenova, a peasant girl from the village
of Berezniaki to serve as niania. About a week later the events started: blows to the
windows, which originated apparently from inside the frames.’
21 The Spiridonovs
followed their neighbours’ advice and placed an icon against the windows, but the
holy picture was soon thrown to the floor. Events took on a more threatening turn
when knives began to move by themselves; one of the knives even drove itself into
the wooden floor. Wherever Mariia was, some supernatural event was bound to take
place:
When, for example, she approached the oven […] all the utensils [near it]
began to move and fall over. Logs that lay on the oven fell to the ground
without any obvious reason and in one instance a loose brick was thrown
from the top of the oven at the girl. […] When the girl sat on a bed, the
bed began to move beneath her, and when she sat on a bench, an unknown
force tried to lift the bench. The bench shook and knocks were heard
inside it.
22
The Spiridonovs asked the local priest to hold a prayer and an exorcism but when
these failed to end the disturbances, they saw no other option than to dismiss Mariia.
All supernatural events ceased after she left.
23
These reports and many more shared the assumption that if inexplicable or
supernatural events occurred in someone’s living quarters, a female domestic servant
was a plausible suspect. This is not to say that female servants were openly suspected
of fraud or of witchcraft. Instead loosely defined and rarely voiced mediumistic
abilities of the housemaid in question were considered a potential cause of
supernatural events. In short, maids were frequently suspected of being mediums and
thus of facilitating spirit activity. How the maids themselves might have explained
these events was irrelevant to the newspaper reporters. In their accounts, the female
servants were clearly seen as the prerequisite, without whose presence none of the
mysterious phenomena would have occurred. After inexplicable phenomena were
recorded, a maidservant was brought into direct relation with them. Journalists usually
mentioned that she suffered from a nervous illness. It was upon the departure of the
maidservant that the inexplicable phenomena suddenly ceased.
20 B., ‘Mediumicheskie iavleniia v Kazani (Korrespondentsiia ‘Rebusa’),’ : 30.
21 Bar. A. Pritvits, ‘Samoproizvol’nye mediumicheskie iavleniia v derevne Iugantovo Luzhskoi volosti,
Iamburskogo uezda, S.-Peterburgskoi gubernii,’ Rebus, 15 1896: 88-9.
22 Ibid. 88-9.
23 Ibid.8
The prominent role of servants is one peculiarity of Russian hauntings. Although there
were reports of haunted houses in late nineteenth-century Britain as well, these were
of a very different quality. British ghosts were far less violent than their Russian
counterparts. They usually appeared to the landlord and his family as shady figures,
but neither did they break dishes nor did they physically harm members of the
household. Moreover, in Victorian Britain, servants were not seen as having any
special relation to the unusual phenomena. Instead, suicides or ‘terrible crimes’ were
thought to be their source.
24
The Russian cases raise several questions. What role was attributed to gender in
these hauntings and in the tsarist empire more broadly? After all, servants with
suspected mediumistic abilities were inevitably female. What was the status of
maidservants in the late tsarist household? How can these events be interpreted as a
social phenomenon? What is the importance of servants’ hysterical disposition?
The women question (zhenskii vopros) had concerned Russian intellectuals since the
era of the Great Reforms in the 1860s and 1870s.
25 After the emancipation of the serfs
in 1861, patriarchy and the subjugation of women were regarded as a leftover of
serfdom, and wives and daughters, especially of the lower classes, became symbols of
this oppressive system.
26
Servants epitomised the downtrodden lower-class woman for many observers in fin-
de-siècle Russia. The exemplary domestic servant was characterised by her
unobtrusiveness, submissiveness and her devotion. In the post-reform years, domestic
service became predominantly female: preference was given to women, because they
were the more easily governable and physically controllable.
27 Observers agreed that
the conditions of domestic service were extremely harsh. Maids led the most
degrading life of all working women. They were totally subjugated to their employers
and often experienced sexual abuse by their masters. Female servants ‘were permitted
neither visitors, including legal husbands, nor holidays.’
28
Despite or because of the strenuous life of their maids, employers increasingly saw
the lower stratum in general and domestic servants in particular, as a latent but
constant threat. Historical research has shown how discourses on thieving servants,
uncontrollable hooligans and sexually immoral paupers both mirrored and fed these
fears.
29 The spectre of the maid who governed the country haunted well-to-do
Petersburgers and found its way into satirical drawings.
24 W. F. Barrett et al., ‘First Report of the Committee on Haunted Houses,’ Proceedings of the Society
for Psychical Research, I, 1883, pp. 101-5; R. C. Morton, ‘Record of a Haunted House,’ Proceedings
of the Society for Psychical Research VIII, 1892: 311-32.
25 On the women question, see Richard Stites, The Women’s Liberation Movement in Russia:
Feminism, Nihilism and Bolshevism, 1860-1930, Princeton 1978; Linda Harriet Edmondson, Feminism
in Russia, 1900-1917, London 1984;. Barbara Evans Clements, Barbara Alpern Engel, and Christine D.
Worobec (eds.), Russia’s Women: Accommodation, Resistance, Transformation, Berkeley and Oxford
1991.
26 Christine D. Worobec, Peasant Russia: Family and Community in the Post-Emancipation Period,
Princeton 1991.
27 Angela Rustemeyer, Dienstboten in Petersburg und Moskau 1861-1917: Hintergrund, Alltag, Soziale
Rolle, Stuttgart 1996: 94.
28 L. N. Lenskaia, O prisluge, Moscow 1908:11. Cited in Rose L. Glickman, Russian Factory Women:
Workplace and Society, 1880-1914, 2 ed., Berkeley and London 1986: 62.
29 Engelstein, The Keys to Happiness; Neuberger, Hooliganism; Rustemeyer, Dienstboten.9
Figure 1
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The image of the wayward and sexually permissive lower-class woman, moreover,
echoed older traditions of Russian culture. In seventeenth- and eighteenth-century
rural communities, women believed to be in contact with demons or to be witches
were usually widows, wives of soldiers or, in the nineteenth century, wives of migrant
workers, i.e. women whose spouses were absent. Similarly, in fin-de-siècle Russia,
klikushestvo (demon possession) was explained with sexual frustration.
31
Maidservants in cities suspected of causing supernatural phenomena had much in
common with rural witches or klikushi. They were outsiders and they lacked male
companionship. This did not prevent young women from becoming a potentially
disruptive element within the household. In the 1880s, sexual relations between
employers and servants were a common topic in Russian literature.
32 Female servants
were thus associated with issues of sexuality.
33 The uneasiness with regard to migrant
30 The drawing is entitled ‘What the job agency will soon turn into’. The central sign in the picture
reads ‘City bureau for the selection of “mistresses”‘. On the table lies the Directory of Mistresses in St.
Petersburg. The employers hand reference letters (attestaty) to the servants. ‘Na zlobu dnia: Vo chto
skoro prevratitsia “biuro dlia naima prislugi”,’ Peterburgskaia gazeta: Illiustrirovannoe prilozhenie ,
14 December 1900: 409.
31 Worobec, Possessed : 94, 170-1.
32 Rustemeyer, Dienstboten : 144.
33 On upper class anxieties regarding lower-class girls and their sexuality in fin-de-siècle Russia, see
Laurie Bernstein, Sonia’s Daughters: Prostitutes and their Regulation in Imperial Russia, Berkeley and
London 1995; Engelstein, The Keys to Happiness.10
women of allegedly loose morals was mirrored in reports about haunted houses. In
these reports, the girls that allegedly caused supernatural phenomena were always
young, from a lower-class background and caused havoc in the houses of their
respectable employers.
34
Well-to-do Russians, however, also feared that domestics would become thieves, and
stories of servants who – in some cases successfully – plotted to assassinate their
employers also tormented the country’s elites.
35 The prominent role of knives in these
accounts needs to be viewed in the context of such fears.
Employers’ fears about dangerous servants are illustrated by stories of haunted
houses which sometimes echoed criminal cases. Mysterious raps were thus associated
with crime and rebellion. In a prominent court case from 1870, the civil servant
Gorodetskii and his wife sued their former cook Marfa Zakharova. The Gorodetskiis
had been out on Christmas Eve. When they returned home, they found their youngest
child maltreated and severely injured.
36 In 1892, a newspaper report in Novoe vremia
resembled Gorodetskii’s case to an astonishing degree. On New Year’s Eve, Professor
L. and his wife returned home from a party to find their servants upset, the furniture in
the living room smashed to pieces and their little daughter slightly injured. According
to one servant’s account, she was feeding the little girl when suddenly a supernatural
power broke the lamp, shattered the furniture and suspended the daughter in the air.
37
Suspecting servants of causing blows to walls and raps on window frames can thus
be seen as an expression of the anxiety about lower-class rebelliousness. This was
such a common fear that it was not only employers who suspected their servants of
causing mischief with the help of supernatural powers. Similar suspicions were also
often voiced by outsiders such as policemen, reporters and curious visitors.
However, a Russian maid who allegedly caused supernatural events in her master’s
apartment was far from practising open mutiny. Her rebellion took place within the
cultural context that was restricted both by the prevalent notions of spiritualist belief
and by fin-de-siècle notions about female illness and nervous disorder. The hysterical
illness from which these servants allegedly suffered played an important part in
haunted houses.
Fin-de-siècle culture throughout Europe and beyond was obsessed with uncovering
the secrets of the mind and bringing hidden wishes and desires to light. It was the
‘golden age of hysteria’.
38 Numerous investigations into the power of the mind were
conducted and fostered an increased interest in hysteria, hypnosis and, of course, such
psychic phenomena as spirit communication and telepathy. Hysteria and mediumistic
abilities were closely linked in that hysteria was regarded as an essential
predisposition for developing abilities that would enable communication with the
spirits of the departed. Like mediums, hysterics were thought to possess heightened
sensory abilities, hyperaesthesia, which facilitated thought-reading, telepathy, spirit
communication and prophecy. Hauntings often coincided with altered states of mind
among servants of the afflicted house. Sasha in Kazan for example lost consciousness
when the mysterious events unfolded around her. Similarly, Pelageia Arbuzova, a
maid in St. Petersburg, suffered from fits and fell into a trance-like state when the
spirit of her deceased master allegedly smashed dishes and ‘the heavy dining table
34 As Alex Owen has observed, trance mediumship oozed sexuality. The same was true for spiritualist
practices in Russia. Owen, Darkened Room: 218; Bogomolov, Russkaia literature: 284.
35 Rustemeyer, Dienstboten:. 50-2.
36 Ibid, 142.
37 Peterburzhets, ‘S nekotorykh por,’ Novoe vremia, 15 January 1892: 3.
38 Mark S. Micale, Approaching Hysteria: Disease and its Interpretations, Princeton, 1995: 15.11
turned around and around with ease.’
39 So common was the assumption that women,
who suffered from nervous illnesses were the cause of supernatural events that the
author of one article commented with bewilderment that the maidservant in question
did not seem to suffer from any nervous conditions and was apparently healthy.
40
Hysteria has been interpreted as an expression of cultural crisis, as an instance in
which the desires, aspirations and ailments of a whole society are brought into the
foreground.
41 This claim, if accepted, can illuminate the cases of haunted houses,
which so fascinated readers in late tsarist Russia. These newspaper reports imply that
when a maid entered the trance like state of mind, her innermost characteristics were
brought into the open: rebellious acts were carried out and the downtrodden servant
suddenly stood at centre stage. These cases are reflections of wide-spread fears and
changing social values.
At the same time, however, servants with mediumistic powers did not bear
responsibility for the threatening phenomena they allegedly incited. They were part of
a cultural performance, which granted servants a restricted space for acts of
rebelliousness but without threatening accountability.
42
Maidservants, permitted to protest solely under the influence of supernatural
guidance, were thus – unlike male strike-protestors – deprived of autonomous agency.
They acted only through and within a cultural pattern of hysteria and mediumistic
phenomena, which removed accountability. This corresponded to the prevalent notion
that lower-class women were, unlike their socially and politically conscious and
skilled brothers or husbands, not outspoken but ‘backward’.
43 Like klikushi, peasant
women believed to be possessed by demons, maidservants in haunted houses
symbolised the ‘out-of-control women.’ Their condition was the ‘female form of
hooliganism’.
44 In contrast, to regard a man as the possible cause of supernatural
events seemed totally implausible. Preternatural events in apartments and houses
usually originated in what was generally regarded as female space: the kitchen.
Kitchens and ovens figured most prominently in haunted houses. As another affected
landlady put it, the supernatural events took place ‘only in the kitchen, under the roof
and in the bathhouse. We have never noticed anything of this kind in the master’s
cabinet.’
45
The relationship of maids with the supernatural powers remained as unclear as that
of klikushi with demons: both groups were neither clearly active nor obviously
passive, neither good nor evil, neither innocent nor evidently guilty.
The Russian fascination with the supernatural at the turn of the century thus
incorporated aspects of traditional rural culture, but adapted these to current fashions
and to the urban setting in which they expressed contemporary anxieties.
39 Vas. B., ‘Nepokoinye doma v Peterburge i Moskve,’ Rebus, 27, 1908: 7-8.
40 V. Khlopitskii, ‘Samoproizvol’nye mediumicheskie iavleniia v Varshave,’ Rebus, 16, 1897: 335. P.
Ch., ‘O Vladikavkazskom mediume,’ Rebus, 23, 1904,: 1-2.
41 Elisabeth Bronfen, ‘Die Vorführung der Hysterie,’ in Aleida Assmann and Heidrun Friese (eds.),
Identitäten: Erinnerung, Geschichte, Identität 3, Frankfurt/Main, 1999: 243.
42 On spirit possession, see Worobec, Possessed. On the cultural significance of narrative patterns see
Davis, Natalie Zemon. Fiction in the Archives: Pardon Tales and Their Tellers in 16th-Century France,
Stanford 1987; Mannherz, Julia. ‘Geistererscheinungen und ihre Zeugen: Geschichtenerzählen zwischen
Positivismus und Spiritismus im ausgehenden Zarenreich.’ WerkstattGeschichte, 1, 2007: 79-93.
43 Glickman, Factory Women.
44 Worobec, Possessed, pp. xii, 186.
45 ‘Nepokoinyi Dom: Pis’ma iz Lanshevskogo uezda,’ Rebus 18, 1899: 279-80, 289-90, 296-7, 303-4.
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However, it is important to remember that most of the news on haunted houses was
published in the popular press and therefore met the demands of a wide readership.
The alleged supernatural involvement in these ‘real’ reports reached a readership that
wished to be thrilled and entertained. Masters and mistresses of servants might have
found their fears about unruly maids expressed in these reports, a literary technique
that until today is a potent reason for a topic’s appeal. These reports, however, were
not only an expression of the anxieties caused by female servants. We can assume that
stories about landlords who had become powerless in their own homes were a popular
read among those who could not afford to live in a spacious apartment, let alone hire a
servant. Apart from providing entertaining stories about knockings, raps and
misbehaving kitchen utensils, spirits in these newspaper articles also mocked the
authorities of church and state. As we have seen, molebny were interrupted by flying
objects and carnivalesque acts ridiculed sacred objects such as icons. The soldiers in
Kazan were ridiculed by being drawn into a battle with potatoes, while the retired
officer Florentsov and his friends from the police corps were unable to assert their
authority. Spiritualists might have been interested in these reports because they
depicted manifestations of their beliefs. However, it is likely that readers with or
without spiritualist convictions simply relished stories in which priests and other
representatives of officialdom struggled to assert their authority. This appeal of an
unruly element is especially noteworthy in Florentsov’s case from Kazan, in which a
representative of the military, closely associated with the disliked police, his officer
friends, his landlords and the clergyman are depicted as unable to control potatoes.
Rational explanations
Like so many cultural expressions in fin-de-siècle Russia, reports of haunted houses,
were subject to change.
46 From about 1908, science was more frequently invoked
when it came to explaining haunted houses. Electricity, which had newly been
introduced into the daily lives of city dwellers, served particularly well as an
explanation of formerly inexplicable phenomena. The role played by science in
newspapers and tabloids was very similar to the role of science in popular literature.
Jeffrey Brooks has observed that
science is often invoked when the reader is asked to accept something
marvellous and mysterious without the aid of superstitious belief. In this
sense, the popular literature might be considered antiscientific, since the
use of science is more akin to magic than to logic.
47
This was especially so in the case of electricity. Electricity and electrification were
potent symbols of modernity in fin-de-siècle Russia, but electricity was
simultaneously associated with the supernatural.
48 It is not surprising then, that
electricity, which could so successfully combine the scientific with the mysterious,
was used to explain haunted houses, often with a rational intention. A fine example of
the use of science in newspaper reports published in 1911 can be found in Volyn.
46 Frank and Steinberg (eds.), Cultures in flux.
47 Jeffrey Brooks, When Russia Learned to Read: Literacy and Popular Literature, 1861-1917,
Princeton, NJ, 1985: 259-60.
48 Lionel Decle, The New Russia, London, 1906: 161-2. A. Toporkov, ‘The devil’s candle: how
artificial light perturbed turn-of-the-century urban Russia,’ History Today, 46, 1996: 34-6.13
When unusual phenomena occurred in Mr Lysenko’s Zhitomir home, the latter
suggested the following explanation:
My house is located near the crossing of streetcar [lines]. During the days
in question there was, obviously, an extraordinary accumulation of
electricity, which ultimately found itself an outlet and because my house
is the highest in the neighbourhood, the electricity swooped down on its
roof from where its influence spread throughout the house.
49
However, Mr Lysenko had to acknowledge that neither Mr Beker, the director of the
electric power plant, nor the physicist Dr Dumanenskii found his explanation
convincing.
50 Compared to Florentsov’s reaction to supernatural phenomena in Kazan
some thirty years earlier, Lysenko’s approach is indicative of a considerable change in
attitude. Florentsov’s landlords, it will be recalled, chose the traditional approach of a
public prayer, while Florentsov’s son-in-law suspected the maid Sasha of possessing
mediumistic abilities and Florentsov himself resorted to holding a séance. In contrast,
Lysenko preferred what he considered to be a rational and scientific explanation.
What was the reason for the increasing attractiveness of rational explanations for
haunted houses at the turn of the century? Jeffrey Brooks has argued that although
popular superstitions still flourished in late imperial Russia, the belief in the power of
supernatural forces was in decline. Brooks follows Keith Thomas in identifying the
crucial factor for the decline of magic and the widespread dissemination of a more
scientific approach in the growth of a notion of self-help.
51 Although this is certainly
the case, I wish to add another interpretation. Brooks suggests that the appeal of
supernatural explanations probably resumed again around 1910, but this is not so in
the case of spiritualism.
52 The attraction of spiritualist explanations markedly
decreased after 1905. This claim is corroborated by statements from the editors of the
spiritualist journal Rebus. Viktor Pribytkov, editor until 1903, perceived a favourable
attitude towards the movement among the general readership in the 1890s. Pavel
Chistiakov, his successor, however, felt compelled to write a deeply disillusioned
editorial in 1910. In this piece, Chistiakov enumerated the many factors that conspired
to generate pessimism among the remaining spiritualists. The media had turned
against them, financial support was running out and the editorial board was left with
heaps of unsold copies of the journal. Followers of the movement bemoaned the fact
that by 1912 spiritualist ideas had lost their appeal among the younger generation.
53
The reasons for this decline are complex. One of them might be that the fashion of
spiritualism had run its course, but there seem to be other, more complex explanations
as well. Firstly, the popularity of spiritualism was undermined by the foreign odour of
this Western import, not helped by the fact that spiritualism was propagated in Russia
49 Quoted in Rebus as ‘Nepokoinye iavleniia v Zhitomire,’ Rebus, 30, 1911, pp. 5-6 (p. 6). For similar
scientific explanations see V.M. Danilevskii, ‘Telepaticheskoe iavlenie,’ Rebus, 23, 1904: 3-5; B.,
‘Nepokoinye doma v Peterburge i Moskve.’; M. F., ‘Tainstvennaia sila istseliaiushchaia bol’nykh,’
Peterburgskii listok , 1 July 1911:. 3; ‘Koloshenskaia chertovshchina,’ Peterburgskii listok , 14 January
1916: 3.
50 ‘Nepokoinye iavleniia v Zhitomire,’: 6.
51 Brooks, When Russia Learned to Read,: 268. Keith Thomas, Religion and the Decline of Magic, ed.,
Harmondsworth, 1991: 58-89.
52 Brooks, When Russia Learned to Read: 267.
53 V. Pribytkov, ‘Vopros o spiritizme v Rossii,’ Rebus 20, 1901: 4-6, 19-21, 30-2, 39-41, 45-7, 53-4,
61-2. 32; ‘V. I. Pribytkov,’ Rebus 29, 1910: 2-3; ‘Po puti,’ Rebus 31, 1912: 2-3.14
by men with non-Russian names.
54 With the war against Japan in 1904/05, the star of
spiritualism began to decline and the treatment of haunted houses changed
dramatically. Secondly, developments on the labour market had an impact on the
interpretation of haunted houses. ‘The great strikes of 1905 generated a sense of
power and optimism among workers.’
55 This self-assertiveness lingered on after 1905
and despite the conservative rollback, workers and servants continued to articulate
their grievances. Two months after Bloody Sunday in 1905, a union of female
domestic servants was founded in Moscow and domestic servants went on strike in
the same year.
56 Although these professional associations were restricted to the larger
cities, servants now expressed their dissatisfaction openly. Instead, unconventional
and politically ambiguous movements like spiritualism became associated with the
privileged and idle elites. In turning aggressively against the upper classes of society,
the masses turned against spiritualist notions too. Social unity broke apart, and
spiritualism could no longer provide a robust enough common ground for different
layers of society to converge upon.
57 The same media outlets that had previously
popularised spiritualism and played a major role in its dissemination, now used
reports of occult phenomena to make fun of the gullibility of the rich and expose their
‘bourgeois’ pastimes as frauds. They did so frequently by referring to electricity as the
‘true’ cause of seemingly inexplicable events. In the post-1905 climate, haunted
houses lost their anti-authoritarian connotations and spiritualism became associated
with idle salon entertainment. One account, ‘The Enigmatic House’, published by
Peterburgskii listok in 1913 is quite typical of this new treatment of supernatural
phenomena. It tells the story of a poor tenant who successfully stages supernatural
phenomena in his living quarters in order to get a reduction in rent from a spiritualist
landlord.
58
Conclusion
The shift in attitude towards spiritualism in the post-1905 years provided fertile soil
for later misrepresentation of the movement as an essentially elite leisure-time pursuit.
The fascination with spirit hauntings, however, was culturally important and had
expressed diverse interests in the decades before the great social upheavals at the
beginning of the twentieth century. Spiritualism and its attractiveness illustrate the
intricacy of fin-de-siècle Russia: it simultaneously displayed the potential to unify and
bring together people from the most different backgrounds, and it carved out a space
in which social conflicts could be enacted.
54 Russia’s most famous spiritualists were Aksakov, Butlerov and Vagner. Their names were quite
clearly of Tatar, English and German origin.
55 Glickman, Factory Women, p. 192f.
56 Ibid, p. 243. Rustemeyer, Dienstbote: 176-7.
57 These findings support Leopold Haimson’s observations about the disintegration of social unity in
the post-1905 years. Leopold Haimson, ‘The Problem of Social Stability in Urban Russia, 1905-1917,’
Slavic Review , 1964-1965: 1-22, 619-42. This illustrates that the process of alienation from and
hostility towards the bourgeoisie, which for the revolutionary year of 1917 has been termed ‘Anti-
Burzhui Consciousness’ dates back at least a decade further. Boris Ivanovich Kolonitskii,
‘Antibourgeois Propaganda and Anti-”Burzhui” Consciousness in 1917,’ The Russian Review, 53,
1994: 183-196.
58 Provintsial, ‘Tainstvennyi dom (rasskaz),’ Peterburgskii listok, 2 June 1913: 3. This is not to argue
that superstitious belief vanished because of electricity. Beliefs in supernatural influence still existed at
this time, spiritualism, however, lost much of its appeal.15
From the mid-1870s onwards, spiritualist beliefs and practices appealed to diverse
groups and provided a roof under which different people could assemble. Spiritualism
offered new visions of society by challenging traditional authorities and by offering
social experimentation during the séance. Accounts of ‘enigmatic houses’ relished
descriptions of figures of authority unable to assert their influence at home. At the
same time, haunted houses provided space for ritualised drama, for careful
disobedience and rebelliousness within the set pattern of hysteria and spirit
communication. As ordinary Russians became more and more self-assertive in the
years after the revolution of 1905, social unity broke apart and neither the social
experimentation of the séance nor the sanctioned carnivalesque challenge of
authorities in haunted houses satisfied social discontent. Mysterious phenomena were
now explained in ways perceived to be rational and spiritualist notions were ridiculed
in the popular press. In the preceding decades, however, spiritualism had aptly
illustrated the complexities of Russian society, where weak unifying practices co-
existed alongside expressions of social conflict.17
The Ukrainian Stundists and Russian Jews:
a collaboration of evangelical peasants with Jewish intellectuals in late
imperial Russia
1
Sergei Zhuk
(Ball State University)
The spread of the radical evangelical movement in southern Russia and Ukraine by
the 1880s coincided with the activities of revolutionary intellectuals, who tried to
exploit the anti-state feelings of persecuted evangelicals. Some of these
revolutionaries were Jews. Because of anti-Semitic pogroms after the assassination of
Alexander II in 1881 in the southern Russian provinces many Jews tried to emigrate,
while others tried to survive by converting to Christianity. The last development,
which was called the movement of ‘New Testament Jews’ by Russians, converged
with the evangelical movement in the Ukrainian provinces of Kiev, Kherson and
Tavrida and influenced peasant religious dissenters as well. The Russian police
discovered these connections first, but the Orthodox clergy and Russian conservative
press used this information about the collaboration of Jews and Christian dissenters,
who were called Stundists, for their ideological campaign against the evangelical
peasants. The Jewish theme contributed to the construction of the anti-Russian image
of the first Russian Stundists, who were Ukrainian peasants by origin and whose
theology and religious practices were reminiscent of the West European Reformation.
A return to the Hebraic origins of the Christian faith and an emphasis on the Jewish
roots of Christian theology was a prominent feature of the entire European
Reformation.
2 From medieval times Russian religious radicals shared the same
interest in the Judaic religious background of the first Christian communities
described in the book of the Acts of the Apostles. So-called ‘Judaisers’
(‘Zhidovstvuiushchie’) of medieval Russia emphasised the Judaic traditions of their
Christian beliefs, including the celebration of the Sabbath rather than Christian
Sunday.
3 Later on, during the eighteenth century in central provinces of European
1 The American Council of Learned Societies, IREX, Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies
and Mellon Foundation supported financially this research, which is a part of a wider research project I
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Russia, their ideas and religious practices laid a foundation to the religious movement
of ‘Subbotniki’ (‘Sabbatarians’), who changed their holiday from Sunday to Saturday,
introduced circumcision and denied the universal authority of the Orthodox Church
hierarchy. Saint Dmitrii of Rostov (Dmitrii Rostovskii) wrote that Subbotniki
‘celebrated Jewish Sabbath and did not worship Christian icons because they were
influenced by Lutheran, Calvinist and Judaizers’ ideas.’ At the end of the eighteenth
and beginning of the nineteenth centuries, the Subbotniki movement spread to the
south, to the new regions of Russian colonisation in southern Ukraine and northern
Caucasus, where their ideas of ‘Moses law’ and ‘Hebrew rituals’ affected local
Molokans and other religious dissenters. By 1812 Subbotniki became especially
popular among the Cossack settlers in the Don Army and Terek regions. Some
Molokans in Ukraine accepted Sabbatarian religious practices, which transformed the
entire Molokan movement. During the 1820s-1830s, according to official
calculations, there were more than 20,000 Subbotniki in the European part of the
Russian Empire.
4 The first Russian Subbotniki introduced Sabbatarian (‘Hebraic’)
theology and practices to the evangelicals among Russian and Ukrainian peasants and
elaborated rituals based on the Old Testament, which became an important component
of the popular Sabbatarian movement up to the twentieth century.
5
The most numerous sect among the first evangelicals in the Russian Empire was
that of the Ukrainian Stundists, who later on became predecessors of different
evangelical Christian churches in southern Russia, including Baptists (Stundo-
Baptists), Adventists and Pentecostals. From the outset this sect was related to the
religious awakening in the German and Mennonite colonies. In it the evangelical
movement among the German colonists converged with the religious revival among
Orthodox peasants and produced a movement that contemporaries referred to as
Stundism. Contemporary authors and historians noted this as a remarkable moment in
the popular evangelical movement’s development in the Russian Empire.
6 The
German-speaking settlers brought Stundism to Russia as a part of the Pietist
movement. The word derived from the German ‘Stunde’ (hours). At the beginning of
the eighteenth century members of the German Pietist movement, followers of Philip
Jacob Spener, organised the meetings in their houses for reading and discussion of the
Bible during the special hours (Stunde) after church ceremonies. These Pietists from
comparative. Textes reunis M. Dmitriev, D. Tollet et E. Teiro Paris 2003: 77-98 and Tat’jana A.
Oparina, ‘La polemique anti-juive en Russie au XYIIe siecle,’ Les Chretiens et les Juifs dans les
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russkikh sekt i ikh tolkov Khar’kov 1910: 368 -387, 393. See also: Nicholas B. Breyfogle, Heretics and
Colonizers: Forging Russia’s Empire in the South Caucasus Ithaca, N.Y. 2005.
5 See: Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Rossiiskoi federatsii (hereafter – GARF), f.109, 1 ekspeditsiia, op.40,
d.21, part 2, l.40-41. In the 1860s the creed of the Russian Sabbatarians who followed Hebraic theology
and practices included: ‘1. A complete belief in various acts of the Holy Spirit; 2. Non-admittance of
sinful people to the meetings; 3. A public repentance in front of the whole meeting or the elected
person; 4. A celebration not only of New Testament holidays, but Old Testament biblical holidays as
well (Sabbath). Following the old Jewish tradition, they kept observance of three such days: 1
September, Day of Labor (or Pipes); 10 September, Day of Purification, and 15 September, a
celebration of the Feast of Tabernacles. They celebrate both the Old Testament and New Testament
holidays according to the lunar calendar rather then the general Christian one.’ ibid., l.6-8ob.
6 The development of Stundism has been covered in detail by both Russian and Western historians.
See: Heather Coleman, Russian Baptists and Spiritual Revolution, 1905-1929 Bloomington 2005, and
O.V. Beznosova (Kudinova), ‘Pozdnee protestantskoe sektantstvo Iuga Ukrainy (1850-1905)’ Ph.D.
diss., Dniepropetrovsk University 1998.19
Württemberg, who were called the Stundist Brothers, brought their new religious
experience to the German colonies in the Russian province of Kherson in 1817 where
the German colony of Rohrbach became a centre of Pietist activity. The Pietist
minister Johann Bonnekemper was the pastor of the Lutheran community in Rohrbach
and a leader of the new Pietist Stundist movement among local Germans. From 1824
his meetings known as ‘the Stundist meetings’ laid a foundation for a broad Pietist
movement among the German-speaking settlers of the province.
7 This German Pietist
movement converged with religious revivals among the members of the Nazareth sect
in the German colonies in Bessarabia during the 1840s and among Mennonites in the
provinces of Ekaterinoslav and Tavrida during the 1850s. Along with the Western
Baptist influences, which were brought by German missionaries to southern Russia
during the late 1860s, these evangelical awakenings among the German and
Mennonite colonists laid the foundation for the movement among Ukrainian peasants,
who were called ‘the Ukrainian Stundists’ (‘Khokhly-Shtundy’) by Russian
contemporaries.
8
By the beginning of the 1890s thousands of peasants from the Ukrainian provinces
(the overwhelming majority were ethnically Ukrainian) joined this evangelical
movement. Beginning with only twenty members in 1862 the Stundist sect among the
Ukrainian peasants grew to thousands and spread over southern and central Ukraine in
the 1870s. During the 1880s Stundism reached the provinces of Tavrida,
Ekaterinoslav, Poltava, Kharkov, Chernigov, Volynia and Podolia (there were 2,956
dissenters in the province of Kherson in 1886, 2,006 in the province of Kiev in 1884,
300 in the province of Ekaterinoslav). Overall, in 1885 the members of the Ukrainian
Stundist meetings, who were registered by the local police, numbered more than
seven thousand people.
9
7 C. Bonnekemper, ‘Stundism in Russia,’ Missionary Review of the World, March 1894, vol.17, 203.
8 The Ukrainian Stundists did not fit into an official scheme of dissident movement in Russian
historiography. All historians now agree that eventually Ukrainian Stundism contributed to the
development of the broad evangelical movement in Russia and the Soviet Union as well. However, the
history of the Stundist peasants and their theology and religious practices is still unclear and confused.
Even at the beginning of the twentieth century Russian observers of the Stundist movement were not
sure about its real origins. The obvious similarities between German and Russian sectarians, who were
both referred to as the ‘Stundists,’ confused both liberal and conservative authors. At the same time, all
observers noted millenarian trends in the theology of Ukrainian peasant dissidents. The more insightful
Orthodox scholars of Stundism, such as Arsenii Rozhdestvenskii, Alexei Dorodnitsyn and Piotr
Kozitskii, expressed their uncertainty about the origin of Russian Stundism in their listings of different
views regarding various theories on Stundist roots in the Russian empire. See Arsenii Rozhdestvenskii,
Iuzhno-russkii shtundizm St.Petersburg 1889: 12-13, 42-43, 59-60; A. Dorodnitsyn, Yuzhno-Russkii
Neobaptism, izvestnyi pod imenem shtundy. Po offitsial’nym dokumentam Stavropol 1903: 117, 122; P.
Kozitskii, Vopros o proiskhozhdenii yuzhno-russkago Shtundizma v nashei literature St.Petersburg
1908: 3ff. According to their analysis, it is possible to single out the following points of view in the
Russian literature on Stundism: 1) Stundism was primarily a Russian phenomenon and influenced by
native Russian sects (Molokans, Shalaputs and Dukhobors); 2) although Stundism may have foreign
(mostly German) origins, its development was dependent on the psychology of the Russian people; 3)
Stundism was a product of German propaganda but other causes, which prepared the ground for it in
the Russian countryside, were more important; 4) Stundism was entirely a product of German
propaganda and the Germanization of the Ukrainian peasantry; 5) Stundism was not simply a product
of Russian conditions or of the propaganda of German Stundism among the German colonists, but also
a direct result of German Baptists’ impact on southern Russian society.
9 Arsenii Rozhdestvenskii, Iuzhno-russkii shtundizm, 145, 147. According to the official report of the
Kiev governor, there were 3,085 Stundists in the province in 1885. In the province of Kherson the local
governor counted 3,049 Stundists in 1885. In Volynia the police registered from 36 to 65 Stundists. In
the province of Ekaterinoslav by 1890 the police registered 267 Stundists. Before this 260 Stundists
had returned to the Orthodox Church. Therefore between 1885 and 1890 we can calculate 527 officially20
By 1889 the Kiev administration alone counted more than 3,500 Stundists and by
1892 there were 4,897 (predominantly Ukrainian) Stundists within its boundaries. The
Stundists themselves estimated their figures at between 100,000 and 200,000 in 1882-
83.
10 These figures are apparently exaggerated. The local administration and police in
their secret annual reports usually presented far smaller numbers of local religious
sects and dissenters. Based on calculations of these annual reports and their
appendices, the number of Stundists had grown from 200 in 1872 to 5,002 in 1890 in
Kiev province, from 20 in 1862 to 4,648 in 1890 in Kherson province, from 300 in
1888 to 1,000 in 1897 in Ekaterinoslav province. What these figures do not reveal is
that Stundist influence was much greater than the numbers suggest. In fact, Stundists
dominated the villages in which they comprised more than two percent of the local
population, influencing no less than one third of population there.
11
In his report to the tsar, the Kherson governor noted in 1890 that the Stundist sect
spread ‘on three fourths of the entire territory of the province.’
12 In 1890 Stundists
lived in 167 localities in the province. The Kherson governor also noted their
increasing organisational skills. ‘The huge number of Stundist leaders (one for every
29 adult members),’ the governor wrote, ‘indicated the larger inner strength of this
growing sect.’
13 By 1895 there were nearly 7,000 Stundists in the province of
Kherson, according to official calculations.
14 The governor of Kiev also noted the
growth of Stundism and criticised the Orthodox clergy’s underestimation of the
numbers of dissidents among Ukrainian peasants. By 1895 there were more than
6,000 Stundists in the province of Kiev.
15 Stundism had become, during the 1890s, the
registered Stundists in the province of Ekaterinoslav. Between 1885 and 1890 the Kharkov police
registered 240 Stundists among the local peasants. See: RGIA, f.1263, op.1, d.4546, l.836; d.4543,
l.424ob.; RGIA, Otchet Volynskogo gubernatora za 1885 god, 8; Otchet Volynskogo gubernatora za
1889 god, 7; Otchet Ekaterinoslavskogo gubernatora za 1890 god, l.371ob.; Otchet Kharkovskogo
gubernatora za 1890 god, l.607
10 Russian journalists from a popular Moscow newspaper calculated in 1884 that there were 24,700
Stundists in Kiev province, 9,000 – in Kherson province, 7,500 – in Bessarabia province, 4,000 – in
Ekaterinoslav province, and 1,000 - in Tavrida province. Moskovskie vedomosti, 1884, No. 326.
Compare with: KEV, 1885, No. 19, 902.
11 See: Arsenii Rozhdestvenskii, Iuzhno-russkii shtundizm, 134-6, 145, 147. All other scholars base
their studies on the calculations of Arsenii Rozhdestvenskii. Compare with: A.I. Klibanov, Istoria
religioznogo sektantstva v Rossii (60-e gody XIX v. - 1917 g. Moscow 1965: 208 ff. My calculations
are based on data from: TsDIAU, f. 442, op.52, d.433, l.35, 36ob., 61-2; f.127, op.690, d.43, l.5ob.;
f.442, op.53, d.357, l.14, 29; f.442, op.55, d.447, l.67-67ob.; f.442, op.623, d.364, l.36ob., 37. RGIA,
Obzor Ekaterinoslavskoi goubernii za 1881 god, p.8, 23,24; Obzor Ekaterinoslavskoi goubernii za 1882
god, p.8, 21-2; Obzor Ekaterinoslavskoi goubernii za 1883 god, p.8, 25-6; Obzor Ekaterinoslavskoi
goubernii za 1884 god, p.7, 24; Obzor Ekaterinoslavskoi goubernii za 1889 god, p.27, 56-7.
12 RGIA, Otchet Khersonskogo gubernatora za 1890 god, 13. In the Russian original, the governor
literally complained of ‘the spread’ of Stundism influence. [He wrote in Russian: ‘Raion
rasprostranenia shtundizma okhvatyvaet okolo ¾ obshchei ploshchadi gubernii.’]
13 RGIA, Otchet Khersonskogo gubernatora za 1890 god, 14. The majority of the Kherson Stundists
were concentrated in Elisavetgrad district – 64 places: including 20 towns and cities, 42 villages and
105 rural settlements. The number of Stundists who had officially separated from the Orthodox Church
comprised 4,648 people (including 2,169 children under the age of 21). The police discovered that 83
leaders ruled the Stundist communities of the province. Among these leaders 30 were called the
ministers (presvitery), who performed the religious ceremonies, ‘including the baptism of the children,
the weddings, the communion and burial rituals.’
14 RGIA, f.1263, op.1, d.4182, l.431-4.
15 RGIA, f.1263, op.1, d.4868, l.138ob. According to his report, in 1890 the Stundist movement in the
province of Kiev had increased by 131 members and comprised 5,002 activists. The governor noted an
expansion of Stundism in 18 new localities of the province as well. The Orthodox clergy reported the
figure of 4,681 Stundists the same year, i.e. 320 people less than the police detected. According to the
report of the General Governor of the South Western Region (which included the provinces of Kiev,21
most numerous evangelical movement among the rural population of southern Russia.
According to our calculations, in the main provinces of the southern Russian Empire:
in Kiev, Podolia, Volynia, Kherson, Tavrida, Ekaterinoslav, Kharkov, Bessarabia, and
Stavropol’, and Astrakhan’ between 1891 and 1895 the police registered no less than
20,000 Stundist activists.
16
When German Baptism influenced Ukrainian Stundism in 1869, it resulted in its
division in two parts: 1) Stundo-Baptism, which was more conservative in theology
and religious practices and tried to reproduce the institutions of the German Baptist
congregations in the Ukrainian countryside; and 2) more radical ‘New’ or ‘Young’
Stundism, which resisted the institutionalisation and formalisation of the movement
and emphasised the unmediated spiritual communication of believers with God and
millennial expectations of social justice and equality. The religious radicals made up a
majority in Ukraine from the outset. According to the first reports from Kiev province
in 1874, members of the radical branch of Ukrainian Stundism made up the
overwhelming majority (85%) of detected Stundists there.
17
Russian Jews participated in this evangelical movement from the early days of
Stundism. A police officer from the Odessa district reported to the Kherson governor
that in 1870 he discovered in the village of Adamovka a Jewish woman who had
converted to Stundism.
18 As early as 1875 the Orthodox press noted the unusual
activities of the Jews among the Kherson and Kiev Stundists. These Jews were
attracted to Stundism ‘because of its Protestant character,’ the journalist wrote, and
‘its stress on the inner spirituality which had disappeared from the Jewish religion
long ago.’ Therefore, along with the Ukrainian peasants, Jews from the southern
provinces of Russia became active members of Stundist communities.
19 The first
records of Kherson Stundists mention a seventeen-year old Jewish boy named Israel
who ‘had been invited to join Stunda and baptized into the new faith’ and followed
‘loyally everywhere’ a leader of the Ukrainian Stundo-Baptists, Ivan Riaboshapka.
Riaboshapka baptized this Jewish boy, who became one of the first Jews converted to
the Baptist faith.
20 Another Jew, Joseph (Ios’ka) Zeeserman, a pub-owner in the
village of Chaplinka (the province of Kiev) assisted another leader of the Ukrainian
Stundists, Gerasim Balaban. The local Stundists and their co-religionists from
neighbouring villages used Zeeserman’s tavern for ‘Stundist agitation’ among
peasants who visited it.
21
The Orthodox missionary organisation of Kherson diocese in its report for the year
1887-88 described the proselytising activities of converted Jews, who became ‘zealot
Stundist preachers.’ The Orthodox missionaries complained about ‘one unknown Jew
Podolia and Volynia), by 1893 in the province of Kiev alone between 5,500 and 6,000 Stundists lived
in 200 localities. See in: RGIA, f.1276, op.17, d.189 (1911), l.88.
16 RGIA, f.1263, op.1, d.4868, l.138ob. According to his report, in 1890 the Stundist movement in the
province of Kiev had increased by 131 members and comprised 5,002 activists. The governor noted an
expansion of Stundism in 18 new localities of the province as well. The Orthodox clergy reported the
figure of 4,681 Stundists the same year, i.e. 320 people less than the police detected. According to the
report of the General Governor of the South Western Region (which included the provinces of Kiev,
Podolia and Volynia), by 1893 in the province of Kiev alone lived between 5,500 and 6,000 Stundists
in 200 localities. See in: RGIA, f.1276, op.17, d.189 (1911), l.88.
17 RGIA, f.1284, op.241, d.181. Calculations based on the material from: RGIA, f.821, op.133, d.21,
l.275ob.-277ob.
18 Episkop Alexii [Dorodnitsyn], Materialy dlia istorii religiozno-ratsionalisticheskogo dvizhenia na
iuge Rossii vo vtoroi polovine XIX-go veka Kazan’ 1908: 174.
19 ‘Izvestiia o shtundizme,’ Pravoslavnoe obozrenie, 1876, No.1, 810-1.
20 Kievskaya starina, 1884, N 10, p.316-7.
21 Trudy Kievskoi dukhovnoi akademii (Kiev, 1884), vol. 1, 192.22
who was preaching Stundism’ in the village of Izhitskoe (Tiraspol’ district) in March
1888. According to another report ‘in the small village of Soldatskoie of
Novoukrainskii district a Jewish preacher, who had been converted from Judaism to
Orthodox Christianity before joining the ‘Stunda’, delivered purely Stundist sermons
for local peasants.’
22
The Russian secret police traced the dangerous relationship between Jews and
Ukrainian peasants from the first Stundist meetings in the 1860s and 1870s. Famous
revolutionary populists (both of Jewish and Russian origin) such as L. Deich, I.
Fesenko, and E. Breshko-Breshkovskaia tried to organise revolutionary propaganda
among sectarians, but their efforts came to nothing. In February 1888, Lazarev and
Drovogub, two revolutionary populists, tried to settle among the Stundists from
Zvenigorodka district and propagate socialist ideas among them. They were unable,
however, to influence the peasant evangelicals because the police arrested them
immediately after their arrival in the Ukrainian village.
23
In the police materials Jews were linked to conspiratorial activities involving
religious dissidents in other cases as well. In 1875 the Jewish populist Lev Deich lived
with Tavrida Molokans and unsuccessfully tried to propagate socialist ideas among
the members of this sect.
24 Other revolutionary Jews attempted to do this among the
Kherson and Kiev Stundist peasants during 1874-75. The most alarming case of
Jewish involvement was the Chigirin conspiracy of 1877, when at least three Jewish
intellectuals – Lev Deich, Anna Rozenshtein and Mark Natanson – took part in an
organisation of the peasant movement in the province of Kiev.
25 The Russian police
discovered these connections first, but the Orthodox clergy and Russian conservative
press used this information about the collaboration of Jews and Stundists for their
ideological campaign against the evangelical peasants. The Jewish theme contributed
to the construction of the anti-Russian image of the first Russian Stundists, who were
Ukrainian peasants by origin.
26
Because of the Jewish revolutionaries’ involvement in socialist propaganda among
Stundist peasants, the police were very suspicious of any contact between them and
religious dissidents. Sometimes local literate Jews composed letters for Stundist
peasants who had problems with grammatically correct writing. Despite the fact that
such Jews were not engaged in socialist activism, the police still persecuted them. In
March 1891, the administration of Kiev province submitted a request for the exile of
Leiba Itskov Portnoi from Vasil’kov district. The local Stundists (who called
themselves ‘evangelical Baptists’) from the villages of Romashki, Ol’shanitsa and
Teleshovka (in Vasil’kov district) sent letters to the Russian Minister of Interior
asking that they be allowed to hold their religious meetings for worship. When the
police checked these letters, it turned out that the ‘Stundist petition’ and letters were
composed and hand-written by the local Jewish ‘resident’ Leiba Portnoi and his
twenty-one-year old son, Nekheim. On 29 March 1891, Portnoi was exiled by the
police to Radomysl in the western part of the Russian Empire. According to the police
papers, Portnoi was punished ‘because Jews writing for Stundists was considered very
22 ‘Otchet Odesskogo Bratstva Sv. Apostola Andreia Pervozvannogo za 1887-88 g. Khersonskie
eparkhial’nye vedomosti, 1889, No. 4, 115.
23 GARF, f.102, op.88 (1890), l.1ob.
24 L.Deich, Za poveka Moscow 1926: 60, 66-7, 110-31, 134-5.
25 Erich Haberer, Jews and Revolution in Nineteenth-Century Russia Cambridge 1995: 139.
26 See: I. Strel’bitskii, Kratkii ocherk shtundizma i svod tekstov, napravlennykh k ego oblicheniyu
Odessa 1893: 17,22,198; Compare with other publications: ‘Kommunisticheskaya propaganda v
Rossii,’ Moskovskie vedomosti,, 1890, No. 106, 2; ‘Sotsialisticheskaya propaganda shtundizma,’ ibid.,
1890, No. 183, 2; ‘Stunda i eya protivogosudarstvennyi kharakter,’ Russkoe slovo, 1895, No. 107, 1-2.23
undesirable, especially since an unemployed Jewish person [without certain
profession] composed various petitions and documents for [the ignorant local
peasants]’.
27
The police records from the 1870s until the February Revolution of 1917 show the
unusually tolerant attitudes of Stundists towards Jews. While the Orthodox Ukrainian
peasants participated in the infamous anti-Semitic ‘pogroms’ of 1881 and 1905, the
Stundist peasants not only avoided any violence against their Jewish neighbours, but
also tried to help them and invited them to their meetings for worship.
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The expectation of the Millennium and the Second Coming of Jesus Christ also
explains the new and more tolerant attitudes of the radical peasant evangelicals such
as the Maliovantsy towards the Jews. The first followers of Kondrat Maliovannyi tried
to preach to the Jews about the Millennium. Like all the groups of the Radical
Reformation, they considered the conversion of the Jews to Christianity as the main
condition for the beginning of the Millennium. One Maliovanets, a peasant from the
district of Vasil’kovka, visited on a regular basis the synagogue in the town of Belaia
Tserkva from September 1891 to March 1892. He preached to the Jews about
Maliovannyi and the Millennium. But the local police stopped proselytising activities
of this Maliovanets, and eventually sent him to the Kiev mental asylum.
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The most confusing for the police was a case of the ‘Spiritual-Biblical Brotherhood’
in Elisavetgrad (Kherson province) because both Jewish intellectuals and peasant
Stundists participated in the activities of this organisation. At the end of 1888, the
Russian secret police submitted its report with an analysis of the issues of the local
periodical of the Russian Orthodox Church, published in Kherson. Police officers paid
special attention to information regarding the anti-sectarian St Andrew Brotherhood
of the Orthodox Church. The Orthodox correspondent complained of the activities of
the Jewish ‘Spiritual-Biblical Brotherhood,’ which involved Orthodox Christians and
Stundist peasants. In the debates of the Orthodox missionaries with Stundists, he
wrote, ‘those Jews took the Stundist side and supported the sectarians in everything.’
A police agent noted in his report a fragment from the Orthodox publication about the
active participation of Jews in the Stundist meetings in Elisavetgrad area. He cited a
sentence in this publication describing how ‘during a meeting one pale Jew solemnly
argued that the present day Orthodox Christian Church did not resemble the original
Christ’s Church of the first century AD and that Jesus Christ would drive out the
27 Tsentral’nyi derzhavnyi istoruchnyi arkhiv Ukrainy (hereafter – TsDIAU), f. 442, op.620, d. 22, p.1-
3ob. As John Klier noted the Russian Orthodox Church was concerned about the risk of ‘Judaising’ by
peasants exposed to Jewish religious life and cultural influences. This concern of the Orthodox Church
was translated into law in 1825. See John Klier, Russia Gathers Her Jews: The Origins of the ‘Jewish
Question’ in Russia Illinois 1986: 166.
28 This happened with the peasants of Zvenigorodka district in April 1882. TsDIAU, f.442, op.832,
d.126 (1882), l.1.
29 Ivan A. Sikorskii, ‘Psikhopaticheskaya epidemia 1892 goda v Kievskoi gubernii,’ Ivan A. Sikorskii,
Sbornik nauchno-literaturnykh statei… V 5-ti knigakh. (Kiev, 1900), vol. 5, 78; Privetstvie Russkomu
narodu ot Kondrata Maliovannogo Moscow, 1907: 10, 11-2. For Ivan Sikorskii’s influence on Russian
psychiatry see Irina Sirotkina, Diagnosing Literary Genius: A Cultural History of Psychiatry in Russia,
1880-1930 Baltimore 2002: esp. 136-9. Compare with the confusing picture of these events in the
recent article by Daniel Beer, ‘The Medicalization of Religious Deviance in the Russian Orthodox
Church (1880-1905),’ Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History, Summer 2004, Vol. 5,
No. 3, 451-82. Beer obviously dismissed original documents about the movement of Maliovannyi.
Moreover, he mistakenly treated the Maliovantsy as the Old Believers and called their leader not
Kondrat, but Vitalii.24
Russian people from their new churches as he had done before with the Jews in
Jerusalem.’
30
In response to requests from the administration of the Orthodox Church, the police
began their own investigation. In December 1881 the head of the local police in
Kherson noted the activities of Iakov (Iankel’) Mikhelev Gordin, a Jewish resident
from Vitebsk, who had organised ‘the Spiritual Biblical Brotherhood’ in Elisavetgrad.
In fact, Iakov Gordin pioneered the efforts of liberal Jewish intellectuals to create
organisations for a cultural dialogue with Christian dissidents of the southern Russian
Empire. His society particularly targeted the Stundist peasants.
Gordin is an interesting figure in the history of Russian and American Jewry. He was
born on 1 May 1853 in Mirgorod in the Ukrainian province of Poltava to a poor
Jewish family. Although he did not receive a formal college education, he was a
talented student of both Jewish and Russian literature. Since 1870 he had been
contributing essays and articles to various Russian periodicals. During the 1870s he
worked as a farm labourer, longshoreman, travelling actor, teacher and journalist. He
became a permanent author for such periodicals, as Zaria, Nedelia, and
Elizavetgradskii vestnik, where he worked as an editor as well, and Odesskie novosti,
where he published under the pseudonym ‘Ivan Koliuchii’ (Ivan the Sting). During his
travels he met different people and visited Stundist meetings in the Ukrainian
countryside. The police noted that Gordin was a close friend of the revolutionary
populists who visited Elisavetgrad where he had lived since the late 1870s. He even
published a novel ‘Liberal-Narodnik,’ in which he described his personal experience
and his meetings with religious dissenters and populists.
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In 1877 Iakov Gordin invited all the progressively minded Jews of Elisavetgrad to
establish a Jewish Bible society in the city. This society would unite those who
‘denied all religious dogmas and ceremonies and acknowledged only the moral
doctrines of the Bible.’ Its members rejected ‘all mercantile pursuits, and endeavoured
to live by physical labour, primarily by agriculture.’
32 The main goals of this society
were the religious education of Jews, the transformation of Jews into farmers living
on land, and the prevention of their further practice of usury and financial speculation.
Under pressure from the Orthodox clergy, the police reported on Gordin’s old
connections in Elisavetgrad with the revolutionary circle of the ‘People’s Will’ (a
populist organisation involved in the assassination of the tsar in 1881). The police also
confirmed Gordin’s connections with the Ukrainian Stundists, who often visited his
‘Spiritual Biblical Brotherhood.’ Moreover, the police learned that he lectured to
Stundists on the political economy of Karl Marx. In May of 1890 a Kherson police
officer tracked down revolutionaries, such as Galushkin (Teraspol’skii), Gaevskii,
Afanasii Mikhalevich and Ivan Basovskii ‘who came to Elisavetgrad, in particular, to
30 A report of the Spiritual Affairs Department to Police Department authorised an investigation about
Jewish involvement in Stundist activities: GARF, f. 102, op.84 (1888), d. 454, l. 2, l.2 ob.; RGIA, f.
821, op.8, d.345 (1884), l.97. See the article: ‘O polozhenii sektantstva v Khersonskoi eparkhii,’
Khersonskie eparkhial’nye vedomosti , 1888, No. 21, 315-6.
31See The Jewish Encyclopedia, ed. Isidor Singer New York 1904: Vol.6, 46; S.M. Dubnow, History of
the Jews in Russia and Poland from the Earliest Times until the Present Day, Transl. by I.Friedlaender
Philadelphia 1918: Vol. 2, 333-335; Kalman Marmor, Yaakov Gordin New York 1953, Nora Levin,
While Messiah Tarried: Jewish Socialist Movements, 1871-1917 New York 1977: 143-6; Jonathan
Frankel, Prophesy and Politics: Socialism, Nationalism, and the Russian Jews, 1862-1917 Cambridge,
Mass., 1981: 56-7; John Klier, ‘From Elisavetgrad to Broadway: The Strange Odyssey of Iakov
Gordon,’ in Extending the Borders of Russian History: Essays in Honor of Alfred J. Rieber, ed. Marsha
Siefert Budapest 2003: 113-25.
32 Quoted from: S.M. Dubnow, Op.cit., vol.2, 333.25
propagate revolutionary ideas among Stundists.’ All these Populists were Jews!
According to the police reports, ‘all revolutionary efforts to collaborate with Stundist
peasants turned out to be a failure.’ That was why the disappointed Populists decided
to combine their propagandist efforts among Stundists with their activities among
local Jews, who in 1877 founded ‘an organization for Jewish artisans’ (the above-
mentioned ‘Brotherhood’ with Gordin, Zlatopol’skii and Portnoi as their leaders). The
Jewish populists even used the meetings of the ‘Spiritual Biblical Brotherhood’ for
their readings of Marx, Ferdinand Lassale and other Western socialists. They sent
their own agents -- Vasilii Gorbunov, Vladimir Tsenkovskii and Pavel Levandovskii -
- to the Stundist meetings and ‘by presenting Jesus Christ as the first socialist in world
history, they tried to persuade the Stundists to quit the sect and join the revolutionary
movement’.
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But the religious Jewish ‘Brotherhood’ and its leader Gordin did not approve of
these populist efforts. Members of the organisation moved to the countryside and
organised their own community on communist principles, following Lev Tolstoi’s
ideas of non-violence. Gordin’s supporters rejected the violence and terrorism of the
Populists and distanced themselves from revolutionary radicalism. The activists of the
society, including Gordin himself, visited cities with a significant Jewish population,
such as Odessa. They promoted ideas of cultural dialogue between Jews and
Christians, and, for the Jewish community, agricultural activity and non-violence in
politics.
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The Jewish members of the ‘Spiritual Biblical Brotherhood’ also distanced
themselves from the local traditionalist Jewish community. As the governor of
Kherson province reported in January 1885, the local administration had already
permitted this society to establish its own separate synagogue and elect its own rabbi
in July 1884. The Ministry of the Interior initially supported this society because it
rejected ‘Jewish nationalism and fanatical religiosity,’
35 and on 8 December 1888 the
Ministry of Justice agreed to the Bible Brotherhood’s request to establish a register of
births, separate from other Elisavetgrad Jews. This organisation also demonstrated its
non-traditional Jewish character by attempting to appear more ‘civilised’ and
‘Russified.’ Jewish members of this society kept all their records ‘exclusively’ in the
Russian language, and they rejected circumcision, prenuptial agreements and other
old Jewish traditions as ‘barbarous customs.’
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In 1888 they elected the founder of their ‘Brotherhood,’ Iakov Gordin, as their new
rabbi. They asked the local administration for special privileges for their agricultural
community and demonstrated their innovative practices in the distribution of goods,
mutual assistance, rejection of traditional circumcision and permission for marriage
between Christians and Jews according to the ancient Hebrew rituals described in the
Old Testament. Kalenik Kozhemiachenko and Larion Dragulenko, two Ukrainian
Stundists, both former Orthodox peasants, participated in the meetings and followed
the rules and rituals established by the Brotherhood. The marriage of Evgenii Gar, the
Russian Orthodox doctor, and Rosa Fainzilberg, the Jewish obstetrician, according to
the rituals of Brotherhood demonstrated the ideal of this society – the rapprochement
33 Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi istoricheskii arkhiv (hereafter – RGIA), f. 821, op.8, d.345 (1884), l.36.
34 RGIA, f. 821, op.8, d.345 (1884), 38ob. The police especially mentioned Lev Tolstoi’s influence on
Russian Jews.
35 The Russian administration praised the goals of the new society, which ‘attempted to eradicate the
coarse fanaticism and religious delusions in the Jewish masses.’ RGIA, f. 821, op.8, d.345 (1884), l.3-
4ob.
36 RGIA, f.1405, op.89, d.2269, l.1-1ob., 3-3ob.26
of Christians and Jews. Members of the Brotherhood declared that their main goal
was ‘the spiritual and moral renovation of the Jewish religion, and introducing Jews to
Christian teaching.’
37
At first, the Russian police permitted the activities of the Jewish Brotherhood
because it did not appear to be a dangerous organisation, especially after its conflict
with the Jewish revolutionaries and its opposition to terrorism. According to police
reports, the Brotherhood tried to create a version of Christian Tolstoianism among
Elisavetgrad Jews and brought the pacifist evangelical groups, such as Stundists, into
their improvised Judeo-Christian community. Only the persistent demands of the
administration of the Russian Orthodox Church and conservative leaders of the Jewish
community provoked police persecutions of the new Jewish agricultural community
in the Elisavetgrad district. Police agents reported that the Jewish members of the
‘Brotherhood’ settled in the Ukrainian countryside and tried to establish contacts with
local Stundist peasants ‘without any terrorist goals.’
38 But new cases of socialist
propaganda among the Ukrainian Stundists of Kherson and Kiev provinces during
1888-1891, and the disclosed connections of Evgenii Gar and Iakov Gordin with
peasant evangelicals changed the police’s attitude.
A police detective noted in 1890 the unusual popularity of Stundist ideas among
young radical Jewish intellectuals such as Iakov Gordin, who visited numerous
Stundist meetings in Kherson province. According to the police, these young Jews
were influenced by populist ideas of socialism. As a result, they decided to combine
the evangelical ideas of social justice with a communist utopia, but without political
violence. Therefore, they tried to organise communist agricultural colonies in
localities with a strong Stundist influence. On 18 June 1890, a police officer informed
his superiors that in November of 1889 ‘prominent members’ of the ‘Spiritual Biblical
Brotherhood’ established an ‘agricultural colony on communist principles in Glodossy
[a famous centre of Ukrainian Stundism], got acquainted with local peasants, invited
these peasants to their houses and read to them the Gospels with their own Jewish
interpretation.’
39 The members of the ‘Spiritual Biblical Brotherhood’ followed Lev
Tolstoi’s interpretation of Christianity as well. Along with the Bible and socialist
literature, they began to read and discuss Tolstoi’s work. They even tried to put
Tolstoi’s ideas into practice in their colony. In 1889 they opened a building for the
distribution of agricultural products among members who were in need and among
local peasants. Simultaneously, the ‘Biblical Brothers’ used this building for reading
37 GARF, f.102, op.87 (1889), d. 606, l.20, 61ob., 65ob., 71ob.
38 See about Stundist pacifism and rejection of revolutionary violence and terror in ‘the manuscript,
written by Timofei A. Zaiats’ published in: Materialy k istorii i izucheniyu russkogo sektantstva i
raskola, ed. Vladimir Bonch-Bruevich. Vol. 3. St. Petersburg 1910: 15-6. Russian priests worried
about the positive example Stundist communities represented for Ukrainian and Russian peasants
because ‘sectarians reject violence and live like members of one family and in this regard they serve as
an exemplary model of brotherly relations, help each other by advice and in a material way, and in their
contacts they are tender and cordial.’ Missionerskoe obozrenie, 1899, July-August, 103.
39 GARF, f. 102, op.87 (1889), d. 606, p. 4, 11, 19-21, 23-4, 57-57ob. In his report this officer noted,
‘in November 1889 Isaac Finerman, a prominent member of the Jewish society bought two peasant
houses, rented 20 desiatins of the land in the village of Glodossy in Elisavetgrad district, settled there
with like-minded Jews having in mind the propagation of their religious anti-government notions
among the adherents of the Stundist persuasion who densely inhabit this area. Finerman’s wife, Khana
Liubarskaia, Antolii Butkevich, Mark Goldfeld, Kelman Galitskii and his wife Roza Kogan, Izik Ostry
and Isaia Burshtein, who followed after Isaac Finerman, were the most active propagandists among the
settlers of this Jewish colony.’ See also memoirs of the Russian Jew who converted to the Baptist faith
and emigrated later to England: Jaakoff Prelooker, Under the Tsar and Queen Victoria: The
Experiences of a Russian Reformer London 1895: 109-111.27
and discussions with the peasants about the Bible and Tolstoi’s books. The Glodossy
Stundists became active participants in these discussions. As the police officer noted,
the practical peasants liked their new neighbours because the Jewish colonists helped
them with medication and with ‘various advice of a medical and agricultural
character.’ At the same time, the colonists disseminated the evangelical literature and
tried to influence the Stundist peasants, as one officer noted, in ‘a direction that was
unreliable from the political point of view.’
40
In August 1891, after a special investigation, the Department of Police came to a
final conclusion about the negative results of the ‘Biblical Brothers’ activity among
the Stundists. The police had confirmed the spread of the socialist ideas among the
religious radicals. As a result, they closed the ‘Spiritual Biblical Brotherhood’ on 7
October 1891 and cancelled the election of a new rabbi for a new synagogue
established by Gordin’s adherents. Moreover, the police agents began a secret
surveillance of Gordin and ordered his arrest in January 1892. But the police missed
their chance. Gordin and his sixty followers had immigrated to the United States a
year earlier and had become American citizens. Nevertheless, the secret police
ordered frontier-guards all along the Russian border to arrest Iakov Gordin as ‘a
dangerous criminal’, if he appeared, even if he was carrying a US passport.
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Iakov Gordin, as far as we know, never returned to Russia.
42 Gordin, who was
convinced that ‘the only remedy for Jewish persecution was economic
reconstruction,’ tried to establish a Tolstoian-type agricultural colony in America for
Russian Jews. But his attempts failed. Eventually he settled in New York City and
became a famous Yiddish playwright and writer for the local radical press. Until his
last days, he played an important role among New York’s socialists and kept the old
traditions of his Spiritual Biblical Brotherhood alive among Russian-speaking Jews.
In his works and lectures he resisted any kind of nationalism, including Zionism. He
also rejected political violence (even in the name of socialism). Gordin remained
convinced that the Judeo-Christian ideal of the Bible pointed to the friendship of all
nations, rather than to the superior position of one particular ethnic group.
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In 1882 the young Jewish intellectuals in Odessa made another attempt to establish a
cultural dialogue between Jews and Christians. Iakov Priluker, a Jewish teacher from
Odessa, followed Gordin’s example and organised the group of ‘New Israel,’ which
was open to both Christians and Jews. As Semion Dubnow has noted, ‘New Israel’
followed only the teachings of Moses ‘and rejected the Talmud, the dietary laws, the
rite of circumcision, and traditional forms of worship; the day of rest was transferred
from Saturday to Sunday; the Russian language was declared to be the ‘native’ tongue
of the Jews and made obligatory in everyday life; usury and similar distasteful
pursuits were forbidden.’
44 As with the case of Gordin’s group, a majority of the Jews
did not support the idea of cultural dialogue. According to contemporaries, as well as
historians, the Russian Jews opposed Gordin’s and Priluker’s experiments. They
accused Gordin and Priluker of ‘seeking to win from the Russian government those
equal rights denied to the Jews collectively.’ As conservative critics in the Jewish
40 RGIA, f. 821, op.8, d.345 (1884), l.118-9ob. During the 1880s these Christian Jews even tried to
establish a Baptist colony in the Crimea. See: Christopher M. Clark, The Politics of Conversion:
Missionary Protestantism and the Jews in Prussia 1728-1941 Oxford 1995: 246.
41 GARF, f.102, op.87 (1889), d. 606, l. 60-1, 65-6, 71, 73, 90-1.
42 See a different opinion: John Klier, ‘From Elisavetgrad to Broadway,’ 113-25.
43 For his socialist ideas see Ezekiel Lifschutz, ‘Jacob Gordin’s Proposal to Establish an Agricultural
Colony,’ The Jewish Experience in America, Ed. by Abraham J. Karp New York 1969, vol. 4, 253-64;
Nora Levin, Op.cit., 143-5.
44 S.M.Dubnow, Op.cit., vol.2, 334.28
community argued, ‘reform of Jewish religious practice would be accepted by the
masses [of Jews] only if based on the Talmud and sanctioned by established rabbis.’
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After the pogroms of the 1880s, Russian Jews became preoccupied by the problems of
physical survival. A mass emigration from Russia was a more realistic solution for the
majority than the utopian projects of Jewish-Christian communities. Only a radical
minority of Jewish intellectuals, who had been involved already in revolutionary
activities of Russian intellectuals, joined Gordin’s and Priluker’s organisations. When
the police stopped the activities of the ‘New Israel’ in Odessa at the end of the 1880s,
Iakov Priluker emigrated to England, joined one of the local Protestant congregations,
and devoted his life to Christian missionary activities among the Jews.
Attempts to establish new relations between Jews and evangelical peasants resulted
in the conversion of some of these Jews to Christianity. As a result of this cultural
dialogue with Russian evangelicals, a new movement began among young Jewish
intellectuals, whom Russian contemporaries called ‘New Testament Jews.’ This
movement converged with the evangelical movement of Ukrainian peasants and
demonstrated again the international character of the religious revival, which only
confused its outside observers. The participation of the Jews in the evangelical
movement also influenced the peasant dissenters, who developed more tolerant and
more cosmopolitan attitudes.
The most important representatives of the New Testament Jews were the members of
the group established by Iosif Rabinovich in 1884 in Kishinev (Bessarabia). As the
governor of Bessarabia reported to the Ministry of the Interior on 3 November eleven
Jews from Kishinev requested permission to establish a community separate from the
Old Testament Jews. Their community included the Jews who believed in Jesus Christ
and the New Testament. Their leader, Iosif Rabinovich, entered a special Protestant
theological seminary in Berlin (Germany), converted to Christianity, and was
ordained as a ‘Congregationalist minister’ in March 1885. In Russia he prepared for
the publication of four books about the Christian Jews and submitted the manuscript
of these books to a censor. At the same time, he established connections between his
‘New Testament Israelites’ and local evangelicals and Orthodox Christians. The
governor of Bessarabia supported his activities among Bessarabian Jews and asked his
superior in St. Petersburg to satisfy Rabinovich’s request for the official registration
of his ‘sect’ and publication of his books. Rabinovich planned to expand the activities
of the New Testament Jews to other provinces of the Russian Empire and to attract the
young Jews to Christianity. Therefore he planned for a propagandist ‘literature and
special schools for Jews who would join Christianity.’
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The Ministry of the Interior consulted the Holy Synod about Rabinovich’s ‘New
Testament Israelites.’ Meanwhile, the local Orthodox clergy and Kishinev landlords
submitted their complaints about Rabinovich’s activities among the peasant
population of the province. According to these complaints, the movement of New
Testament Jews ‘recast all Christian principles in their own Jewish fashion,’ and
brought ‘obvious German influences to the Russian countryside,’ confusing the local
Orthodox population. In their letters to the Holy Synod, Russian conservatives, who
knew about his graduation from a German theological institution, treated Rabinovich
as a German spy and portrayed him as ‘the secret agent of German imperialism and
the German Protestant Church.’ The Holy Synod asked the police to stop the anti-
45 S.M.Dubnow, Op.cit., vol.2, 334.
46 RGIA, f. 821, op.8, d.345 (1884), l.1, 11-11ob., 14-5, 16-7, 22-3. The detailed description of
Rabinovich’s plans is presented in a special police report ‘The Religious Movement among the Jews in
the South of Russia.’ Ibid., l.45-83.29
Russian activities of Rabinovich and his Jewish adherents. In 1886 the secret police
began a special investigation of the case of the ‘New Testament Israelites,’ but found
nothing criminal in Rabinovich’s activities. Nevertheless, K. Pobedonostsev, the
Ober-Procurator of the Holy Synod, who was called by historians ‘the symbol and the
author of Alexander III’s program of reaction,’
47 insisted on banning the New
Testament Jews’ movement in southern Russia. Pobedonostsev explained to the
officials of the Ministry of the Interior that it was pointless to permit officially ‘the
activities of Rabinovich sect in the localities noted for the mass spread of Baptism and
various rationalist sects like the Stundists.’ According to Pobedonostsev, ‘this sect
promoted a new religious dissent among Russian citizens and their defection from
Orthodoxy.’ Therefore, he recommended that Rabinovich join the officially permitted
Protestant church in Russia rather than establish a new sect. On 4 August 1886 the
Holy Synod refused to grant Rabinovich’s request and banned all his publications.
Nevertheless, Rabinovich tried to persuade the local administration that his activities
were legal. He stopped his contacts with the Stundist peasants and in December 1888,
he wrote to the Minister of the Interior with an explanation of his intention to promote
a rapprochement of Jews and Christians. He even agreed to register his sect with the
police and to follow the rules and requirements of the Orthodox Church. But the
Ministry and the Department of Police did not want to contradict the Holy Synod. The
police were influenced by the scandalous rumours about Gordin and Priluker’s Jewish
organisations, and they feared new socialist and German propaganda among the
peasants.
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However, the police could not sever the ties of the New Israel sect of Rabinovich
with the Stundists in Kishinev. During the 1890s, the Christian Jews and Russian and
Ukrainian evangelicals received religious literature through the German co-
religionists of Rabinovich. The Stundist peasants regularly visited meetings for
worship in Rabinovich’s house in Kishinev. Nikita Sharakhovich, one of the Russian
followers of Rabinovich, played a prominent role in maintaining contacts with
dissident peasants. In 1895 the local clergy complained to the governor of Bessarabia
about new cases of defection from the Orthodox Church under the influence of the
‘New Israel’ and the Kishinev Stundists. As it turned out, all suspected Stundists,
including Sharakhovich, were using the meeting house of Rabinovich for ‘Stundist’
propaganda among the local Orthodox peasants. In December 1895, the district court
of Kishinev sentenced Sharakhovich and his co-religionists to imprisonment for their
Stundist propaganda among Orthodox Christians. As we can see, during the 1890s,
Kishinev, along with Odessa, became an important centre in the expansion of the
evangelical movement among the rural population of southern Russia.
49
This movement connected the New Testament Jews, radical intellectuals, and
peasant religious radicals in one mainstream of opposition to Russian Orthodoxy and
to the tsarist administration as well. As it turned out, all these groups participated in
the same ‘eschatological’ discourse, and shared the same belief concerning the end of
‘this sinful world of social injustice’ and the ultimate destiny of mankind. Socialists,
47 James H. Billington, The Icon and the Axe: An Interpretive History of Russian Culture New York
1966: 439.
48 RGIA, f. 821, op.8, d.345 (1884), l. 24, 34, 41-4, 47, 102-7ob. See also a biographical study of
Rabinovich in English: Steven J. Zipperstein, ‘Heresy, Apostasy, and the Transformation of Joseph
Rabinovich,’ Jewish Apostasy in the Modern World, Ed. by Todd M. Endelman New York 1987: 206-
31. Compare with Kai Kjaer-Hansen, Joseph Rabinowitz and the Messianic Movement
Edinburgh,1995.
49 RGIA, f. 796, op.176, d. 2145, l.1-8, 10-4.30
radical evangelicals and New Testament Jews believed in the possibility of ‘a new
human Paradise on Earth’ without exploitation and humiliation.
50 At the same time,
all these radicals viewed the future society as a congregation of individuals, based on
principles of moral purity and human dignity. According to their eschatological
dreams, such a society would have no racial or ethnic hatred. This ideal attracted
intellectual radical Jews, who took part in the Russian revolutionary movement and
collaborated with peasant evangelicals as well.
Under the influence of different Western Christian missionary organisations some
Russian Jews converted to Christianity. Moreover, the leaders of the local Ukrainian
Stundists and Baptists, such as Riaboshapka and Balaban, invited Jews to join the
evangelical movement and convert to the Baptist faith.
51 The police worried about
cases of Jewish conversion to Stundism and Baptism. For instance, from the 1880s to
1910s they followed closely the formation of the Jewish evangelical organisation in
Odessa. Its agents analysed publications of the Jewish newspaper Zions Freunde,
which concerned the activities of Jews who preached for the evangelical Christians.
They found out that Isaac-Leon Rosenberg, an Odessa Jew, regularly preached
evangelical sermons at the Stundist meetings for worship every Tuesday and Friday
evening. During these meetings in 1908-1909, the police counted that forty Stundists
usually visited the ‘meeting house with the Jewish preacher’ on 23 Kouznechnaya
Street in downtown Odessa. As the police discovered, the Ukrainian Stundists and
Baptists used to meet with local Jews in other meeting houses of Odessa as early as
1891.
52
The police documented the convergence of New Testament Jews and Stundo-
Baptists. One police agent reported that the Jewish Baptist Christian community in
Odessa had a ‘Jewish priest Rosenfeld who was preaching Christian sermons
exclusively in Hebrew.’ The Russian administration worried about this Jewish
involvement in the Christian sectarian movement, because ‘given the Jewish
inclination to political intrigues, the Jewish intrusion in the Russian sectarian
movement could turn these sectarians to an undesirable anti-Russian political
direction.’ The administration of the Russian Orthodox Church informed the police
about four Jewish Baptist ministers in southern Russia, but the police found only three
-- Vladimir I. Melamed, Barukh N. Shapiro and Leon Rosenberg, who all served as
Baptist preachers for local Stundo-Baptist communities. In addition, the police
discovered that Rosenberg, a Jewish shopkeeper from Odessa, corresponded with
another Christian Jew, Samuil Vilshenzon, an agent of the London Biblical Society,
who sent money and literature to Jews and Stundists in the Odessa district.
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50 See this description in memoirs of different participants in the events such as the Ukrainian Stundist
Tymophii Zaiats and New Testament Jew Iakov Priluker. The adherents of Lev Tolstoi, P.Biriukov,
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Russian, edited and published memoirs of T. Zaiats in Sytin’s magazine: ‘Zapiski Timofeia Zaitsa,’
Golos minuvshego, 1913, No. 8, 152-76, No. 10, 149-74, No. 11, 162-93, No. 12, 168-83. Compare
with: Jaakoff Prelooker, Under the Tsar and Queen Victoria: The Experiences of a Russian Reformer
(London, 1895), 109-11.
51 Jaakoff Prelooker, Under the Tsar and Queen Victoria, 105ff.
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In November 1902, in the village of Snegourovka (Vasil’kovka district of Kiev
province), the police agents arrested a group of ‘enthusiastic’ Stundist peasants who
were waiting for ‘the works and performance of the Holy Spirit.’ Among the 126
spectators of this ‘performance’ at least two were Jewish. One of them was ‘a Jewish
resident of town Korsun’ (Kanev district, the province of Kiev) Berko Ievsei
Gershkov Ostrovskii, who called himself a Stundist and who had been arrested as a
Stundist on April 10 [1902];’ the other was ‘a subject of the Austrian crown, a
baptized Jew, Piotr Kramar’, who had converted to Greek Roman Christianity (Uniate
Church) from Judaism.’ As it turned out, these Jews were connected to the New
Testament Jewish movement, and they brought new religious literature and money to
local Stundists.
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The Orthodox press and police shared the fear of foreign (Jewish and German)
influences on the Orthodox peasants. All observers noted that the Stundists were
different ‘ethnographically’ from their Orthodox peasant neighbours.
55 In their
cultural protest, the Stundists preferred to associate with German colonists or even
Jewish city dwellers rather than with their Orthodox peasant neighbours. ‘The
German colonists live much better than the Orthodox peasants,’ Stundists told the
Orthodox missionary, ‘therefore we prefer to live like the Germans and that is why we
join the German nation.’
56 They cut off all relations with the Orthodox peasant
community, which they associated with ‘heavy drinking, corruption, theft, violence,
adultery and sloth.’ They used the model of the German colonists’ lifestyle to
construct their new social identity.
57 The denial of their local Ukrainian identity was
so evident among the Ukrainian Stundists, that some authors called them anti-
Ukrainian:
The Stundists removed all elements of Ukrainian folk culture from their
life. They changed their morals, customs, character and songs. Even their
language changed – it became a strange mixture of Ukrainian, German,
Polish and literary Russian. Stundists suppressed any expression of the
folk culture – Ukrainian songs, dances, customs and dress. There is no
sound of a folk song or sign of traditional Ukrainian folk rituals in the
localities where Stundists live. It looks as if the Stundists aspire to become
a separate nation, distinct from their Orthodox peasant neighbors.
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The denial of their peasant past and their traditional Orthodox peasant identity became
the main component of the ‘Stundist reformation’ in the Ukrainian countryside.
Stundists changed more than just their lifestyle. To contemporaries they looked more
like European farmers who tolerated Jews than anti-Semitic Russian Orthodox
peasants.
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This radical denial of the Orthodox peasant identity reached a peak among the
Stundist followers of ‘charismatic prophet’ Kondrat Maliovannyi during the 1890s. In
54 GARF, f.102, op.226, d.12, part 5, p.35; TsDIAU, f. 275, op.1, d.1 (1902), l.89-89ob.; ibid., f.1597,
op.1, d.7, l.8-8ob.
55 Alexii, Materialy, 69, 70; see also about the stereotypes of Stundists in: GARF, f. 102, 3 d-vo, op.
88, d.281, l.1-2.
56 On the ethnographic differences of the Stundist peasants see Ekaterinoslavskie eparkhial’nye
vedomosti, 1890, No. 13, 342-343.
57 Alexii, Materialy, 305.
58 Ekaterinoslavskie eparkhial’nye vedomosti, 1889, No. 23, 658-9. The observers noted that these
changes took place during ten years, from 1878 to 1888.
59 RGIA, f.1284, op.222 (1902-1904), d.29, l.31, 35.32
their expectation of the Millennium of Jesus Christ, the Maliovantsy stopped working
and changed their diet, dress and hairstyle. They replaced all peasant aspects of their
everyday life with practices that they had associated with an urban middle-class
existence. They wore the fashionable dress of city residence. They used decorations,
perfumes and make-up, which were unusual for Ukrainian peasants. Rather than
following a peasant diet, they ate more sweets, candies and chocolate, and they drank
tea and ‘other non-peasant beverages.’ They changed their manner of speaking, trying
to avoid peasant words and imitate the language of the literate elite.
60 Members of the
investigating committee discovered in May of 1892 that followers of Maliovannyi had
expensive food in their houses and were dressed in fashionable European dress. A
community of the Maliovantsy paid a large sum of 140 rubles to Jewish merchants for
a set of expensive clothes for their community. As Vasilii Skvortsov, one of the
members of the investigating committee, noted, ‘The dissenters threw away their
national costumes as peasant emblems of their former slavery and labor; their new
dresses served as the symbols of their anticipated new forms of the better social life
and of their expected privileged position in the kingdom of their ‘Redeemer,’ which
will be established for them here on Earth rather than in Heaven.’
61
Ukrainian dissenters rejected both their peasant and Ukrainian identities because
they were associated with exploitation and humiliation. Denying the national principle
in the construction of their identity, they admitted Jews as ‘Christian converts’ into
their community. By doing so, the dissenters invoked one of the conditions for the
Advent of Jesus Christ – the conversion of Jews to Christianity. Some Jewish
intellectuals responded to the invitation of the Ukrainian evangelicals and joined their
Christian movement.
The Orthodox authors always pointed to ‘the Jews who exploited our countryside
and our peasants in particular.’ These authors argued that Jews incited the Stundist
peasants against the Russian Church and the Russian state, and pushed them in the
direction of ‘communist revolution.’
62 But police documents show a different picture
of the relations between Stundist peasants and the New Testament Jews, that of
friendship and mutual assistance. Educated Jewish intellectuals tried to help the
Russian and Ukrainian peasants in their search for a better life and social justice.
Evangelical religion and the revolutionary movement created a common ground
between the two groups of outsiders in Russian society: Jews and poor Ukrainian
peasants.
60 See I. Sikorskii, Op. cit., 52-4 (A description of 1892), and RGIA report of the Kiev General
Governor (of 1895).
61 Vasilii Skvortsov, ‘Novoshtundism,’ Moskovskie vedomosti, 1892, No. 227.
62 P. Petrushevskii, ‘O shtundizme..,’ Trudy Kievskoi dukhovnoi akademii (Kiev, 1884), vol. 1, 187.
See also: I. Strel’bitskii, Kratkii ocherk shtundizma i svod tekstov, napravlennykh k ego oblicheniyu
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‘Forebears’, ‘saints’ and ‘martyrs’: the politics of commemoration in
Bulgaria in the 1880s and 1890s
1
Stefan Detchev
(West University, Bulgaria)
Тhe  memory  of  the  Bulgarian  national  revolutionary  movement,  as  in  all  other 
national ideologies,
2 was not transmitted only in books.
3 It was embodied in the
images of ‘saints’ and ‘martyrs’ commemorated at specific places. This paper will
focus on the importance of the cult of forebears and predecessors as a part of popular
political culture in Bulgaria in the 1880s and 1890s. During this period it increasingly
mattered how ordinary people felt about nationality. The importance of this problem
increased because of the introduction of universal male suffrage which followed the
Tărnovo constitution of 1879.
4 In this regard attention will be paid to days of national
commemoration usually organised at the places of execution of Bulgarian national
heroes and where Bulgarian rebel detachments had had battles.
5 These days of
commemoration were cultural and discursive practices that constituted new identities,
new definitions of patriotism and identification with the state.
I will be arguing that the commemoration of dead leaders and great events from the
past played a very important role in shaping popular historical memory as part of
identity building which cannot be done without stories, signs and symbols.
6 These
rituals shaped the ways in which the national revolutionaries were perceived and
imagined. They invented a nationalistic public tradition and fostered a form of
patriotism specific to itself. In this way historical myths became a part of political
mythology and they aided political mobilisation. The commemorations were the
obvious sites for this to take place. They were occasions for politics and folklore to be
manifested together. Because of this, special attention will be given to the
nationalistic and radical language, to the operation of national symbols, and to the
pervasive concern with ritual and gesture.
During this period European political life found itself increasingly ritualised and
filled with symbols and public appeals. As the previous religious ways of ensuring
subordination, obedience and loyalty were eroded, the need for something to replace
1 My work was facilitated by suggestions, comments and encouragements made by several colleagues,
especially Timothy Ashplant, Emanuel Gutmann, Thomas K. Schippers, Nico Wilterdink, Ton Zwaan,
José Alvarez Junco, Rafael Cruz and Dessislava Dragneva.
2 On Bulgarian nationalism see for example M. Todorova, The Course of Discourses of Bulgarian
Nationalism, in East European Nationalism in the Twentieth Century, ed. Peter F. Sugar. Washington
1995: 55-102.
3 I am referring here to some very important books that shaped the reception of the national
revolutionary past in the decade after 1878 as Z. Stoianov, Vasil Levski. Diakonat. Plovdiv 1883.;
Chetite v Balgaria na Philip Totia, Hadzgy Dimitar i Stefan Karadzga (1867-1868), Plovdiv 1885.;
Cherti ot szivota i spisatelskata deiatelnost na Liuben S. Karavelov. Plovdiv, 1885; Zapiski po
balgarskite vastania. (Razkaz na ochevidec). vol. 1. Plovdiv 1884.
4 For the Tărnovo constitution in English language see C. E. Black, The Establishment of Constitutional
Government in Bulgaria. Princeton 1943: 69-133; C. Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism.
Russian Influence in the Internal Affairs of Bulgaria and Serbia, 1879-1886. Connecticut 1978: 37-8,
102; R. Crampton, Bulgaria 1878-1918., A History. New York 1983: 27-35.
5 In the very beginning this analysis was inspired mainly by L Hunt, Politics, Culture and Class in the
French Revolution. Berkeley 1984 and especially the first part entitled ‘The Poetics of Power’
6 About the role of these commemorations in the political mobilisation see S. Detchev, ‘Roliata na
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them was met by what some authors like Eric Hobsbawm have called ‘the invention
of tradition.’
7 This development was a mixture of planting from above and growth
from below. In this regard new national festivals were instituted. However, as this
article will demonstrate, Bulgarian radical politicians had no recent historical
resources such as crown, military glory, empire or colonial conquest
8 and for that
reason, despite the imitation and appropriation of other nationalistic traditions, they
turned to the different legitimising resources at their disposal.
A day of national commemoration is one of those occasions when nationalist or
patriotic discourse provides its own revealing glimpse into modern Bulgarian national
mythology. Ritual occasions like Hadzgi Dimităr’s day, Hristo Botev’s day and others
gave an opportunity for Bulgarian rebels against Ottoman domination from the past
were presented as ‘saints’ and ‘martyrs’ and these very words were used by
contemporaries in order to depict them.
Initially these days of national commemoration originated in a fragile civil society
and as an initiative of the political circles around the Popular Liberal Party. Among
other factors, in 1879 the Liberals won the first parliamentary elections for the
National Assembly in the Bulgarian principality by appropriating during the pre-
election campaign the symbolic capital of the late Liuben Karavelov a former émigré,
radical journalist and politician during the national movement against Ottoman
domination.
9 At the beginning of 1882, during the struggle against the pălnomoshtia
regime (which had been established by the monarch Alexander I and the
Conservatives when they suspended the constitution in 1881), in order to re-enforce
their political message, the liberals organised in Rousse worship at the graves of
Karavelov and another national revolutionary activist Angel Kăntchev.
10 At the start
of 1885 even the Conservatives in the Bulgarian principality were forced to make an
attempt to discredit the Liberals by appropriating the moral authority of the late
revolutionary leader Vasil Levski as well as the revolutionary leader, journalist and
poet Hristo Botev. They made this in obvious opposition to the prestige of
Karavelov.
11 In the spring of 1885 bones of Georgi S. Rakovski (a national ideologist
and revolutionary leader under Ottoman domination) were carried from Romania to
Bulgaria, initiated by the Volunteer’s association in Rousse.
12 This was used by the
Liberals and their leader, the Bulgarian Prime Minister, Petko Karavelov (Liuben
Karavelov’s brother) as a political demonstration to increase their prestige among the
public. It is not surprising that as a result of this action their political adversaries were
furious. They immediately blamed the Liberals for the attempt to appropriate
Rakovski’s heritage and represent themselves as his unique political followers.
13
Moreover, these commemorations were a part of the struggle for national unification
after the Congress of Berlin in 1878.
14 On the eve of the Unification of Eastern
7 E. J. Hobsbawm, The Age of Empire. New York 1987: 105.
8 Ibid.
9 G. Todorov, ‘Bălgarskata sledosvoboszgdenska publicistica i istoriografia za zhivota i deinostta na
Liuben Karavelov (1879 - 1885)’, in V pamet na academic Mihail Dimitrov. Sofia 1974: 401.
10 Ibid.: 403.
11 Otechestvo, 23 May 1885, No 26.; Tărnovska konstitucia, 13 Feb. 1885, No. 112.
12 Z. Stoianov, Săchinenia, vol. 3. Sofia 1983: 432.
13 Sredec, 12 June 1885 No. 132
14 I. Stoianovitch, Iz minaloto. Sofia 1992: 37-8.; E. Statelova, A. Pantev, Săedinenieto na Kniazhestvo
Bălgaria i Iztochna Rumelia. Sofia 1985: 68-9.; I. Dimitrov, Predi 100 godini Săedinenieto. Sofia
1985: 123.35
Rumelia
15 and the Bulgarian Principality (6 September 1885)
16 these
commemorations were very important in mobilising the Bulgarian public especially in
Eastern Rumelia in order to support the Unification movement. On 17 May 1884,
through the initiative of the pupils from the local secondary school in Plovdiv, the first
commemoration of Hristo Botev was organised. On 19 May 1885 Botev was
commemorated again in the towns of Plovdiv, Chirpan, Iambol and Sliven.
17
Following on from the first attempts of 1884,
18 on 20 and 21 July 1885, through the
initiative of the Volunteer’s association of Kazanlăk, a day of national
commemoration was organised for Hadzgi Dimităr at Buzludzga in the Balkan
mountains. There were guests from Eastern Rumelia and the Bulgarian principality.
Priests held a memorial service at the grave of the hero after which speeches and
recitals of poems devoted to Hadzgi Dimităr’s death began. This was followed by
eating and drinking as well as popular dances (hora). Shouts of ‘Down with
Rumelia!’, ‘Long live the Unification!’ and ‘Long live complete (celokupna)
Bulgaria!’ accompanied the holiday.
19
Organised by political figures with radical and populist leanings, all these
commemorations were overwhelmed by rhetoric against ‘notables’ (chorbadzgii),
‘monks’ and ‘kings’.
20 In this regard they marked the competition for power between
the Liberal and Conservative parts of the Bulgarian political class.
Days of national commemoration were also organised during the ‘Bulgarian crisis’
(1886-87). This was a unique period when as a result of Bulgarian Unification on 6
September 1885 and the coup d’etat on 9 August 1886 (when pro-Russian Bulgarian
officers kidnapped the Bulgarian monarch), the country entered political crisis and for
a period of almost ten years Bulgarian-Russian relations broke down (1886-1896).
These events had their shattering impact on Bulgarian society and its political culture
because they brought very crucial political and cultural matters into debate. ‘The
Bulgarian crisis’ (1886-1887) challenged many assumptions about the role of Russia
in Bulgarian history and politics. During the crisis and in the following years, the
politically active part of the population and the whole of the Bulgarian intelligentsia
were irreconcilably divided on the issue of ‘Russia’ and the ‘Russian menace’ and
thus it became central for Bulgarian political life.
21
On 20 April 1886 a commemoration ceremony took place in the small town of
Panagiurishte and at ‘Oborishte’ where the so-called Bulgarian National Assembly of
1876 made the decision to proclaim the uprising against Ottoman power.
22 On 18May
1886 pupils from a local secondary school in Plovdiv organised a commemoration to
15 For a general overview on Eastern Rumelia in the English language see R. Crampton, Bulgaria 1878
– 1918, : 85-97.; B. Jelavich, History of the Balkans. Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries. vol. 1,
1983: 366-70; C. Jelavich, Tsarist Russia :7-8, 14, 93, 208-13, 224; D. Perry, Stefan Stambolov and the
Emergence of Modern Bulgaria 1870-1895, Durham and London 1993: 70-6.
16 About the union between Eastern Rumelia and Bulgarian principality in English language see B.
Jelavich, History of the Balkans, vol. 1: 370-1; C. Jelavich, Tsarist Russia: 214-36.; R. Crampton,
Bulgaria 1878-1918: 97-103; D. Perry, Stefan Stambolov: 74-81.
17 E. Statelova, A. Pantev, Săedinenieto: 60-1.
18 Z. Stoianov, Săchinenia, vol. 3. Sofia 1983: 391, 426-9.
19 I. Stoianovitch, Iz minaloto: 37-8; E. Statelova, A. Pantev, Săedinenieto:. 68-9.; I. Dimitrov, Predi
100 godini: 123.
20 Z. Stoianov, Săchinenia, vol. 3. Sofia 1983: 395, 425, 430.
21 For more see. S. Radev, Stroiteli na săvremenna Bulgaria vol.. 1. Sofia 1973:739-803; vol. 2 Sofia
1973. R. Popov, Bălgaria na krăstopăt. Regentstvoto 1886 - 1887. Sofia 1991. In the English language
see C. Jelavich, Tsarist Russia , B. Jelavich, History of the Balkans, vol. 1, 1983: 237–74, 371-2; R.
Crampton, Bulgaria 1878-1918: 105-24; D. Perry, Stefan Stambolov: 84-123.
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Hristo Botev as in the previous two years.
23 At the same time a commemoration was
organised by a special commission headed by the mayor of Vratsa at ‘Milin kamăk’,
where in 1876 a detachment commanded by Botev had had one of its battles with
Ottoman troops.
24 There were also several commemorations for Botev in 1887.
25
There was a commemoration of Hadzgi Dimităr again on 20 July 1886.
26
Meanwhile, on 13 July near the village of Vishovgrad, where eighteen years
previously a rebel detachment had fought a battle with Ottoman troops, Bulgarian
revolutionaries were commemorated. One of the revolutionary leaders, Stefan
Karadzga, was commemorated and in one of the main speeches the Bulgarian
monarch, Alexander I, was represented as the embodiment of ‘Karadzga’s spirit.’
27
The same kind of commemoration at ‘Kanlădere’, where in 1868 Bulgarian rebel
detachments led by Hadzgi Dimitar and Stefan Karadzga had fought with Ottoman
troops, took place in July 1886
28 and 1887.
29
These commemorations established a new patriotic political repertoire. They mapped
many sacred geographical places like Buzludzga, Oborishte, Batak, Perushtica,
Drianovski manastir, Shipka, Milin kamăk, Kozlodui. In the mass consciousness these
sacred places became part of a modern Bulgarian national and political mythology.
Therefore, these places began to have extraordinary emotional and symbolic
significance and great emotional power and passion. Contemporaries were aware of
this function in 1885, writing about ‘the historic role’ that Buzludzga was to play in
the future, Z.Stoyanov stated explicitly that ‘it will be contemporary with the Mount
of Saint Athos’.
30
The names of national heroes including Hadzgi Dimităr, Stefan Karadzga, Liuben
Karavelov, Georgi Rakovski, Hristo Botev also became sacred. In the 1880s the
phraseology of forebears and predecessors was given and presented as ‘saints’ and
‘martyrs’ and became a regular, required part of nationalist discourse. The constant
reminders of ‘our popular martyrs’ of 1868, 1875 and 1876 was an important part of
the political discourse of radical nationalist circles within the Popular Liberal party.
31
This was especially salient in the proclamations written by the initiative committees
of the associations known as ‘Bulgaria for itself’ (‘Bălgaria za sebe si’) that began to
appear to oppose the political pressure coming from St Petersburg in many Bulgarian
towns and villages in February and March 1887.
32 Mention of these ‘martyrs’ in all of
the proclamations was as a ritualistic gesture.
33 Political documents tried to suggest to
the contemporary public that ‘the shadows of these patriots’ and ‘martyrs’ ‘… are
flying above us and they are looking at how we will behave in these critical times’.
34
This language of ‘our martyrs’ was a revival of the Bulgarian emigrant discourse in
Romania from the beginning of the 1870s, when with the contribution of Botev,
23 Z. Stoianov, Săchinenia, vol. 3. Sofia, 1983., s. 459.
24 Nezavisimost, 14 May, No. 18; 28 May 1886, No. 22.
25 Nezavisima Bălgaria, 23 May 1887, No. 98.; Svoboda, 20 May 1887. No. 57.; Bălgarsko, 16 June
1888. No. 17-18.
26 Svetlina, 26 July, No. 191, Rositca, 30 July, No. 9.
27 Nezavisimost, 30 July 1886, No. 37.
28 Nezavisimost, 23 July 1886, No. 35.
29 P. Frangov, Tărszgestvoto pri Krăvnata reka. Veliko Tarnovo 1887.
30 Z. Stoianov, Săchinenia, vol. 3. Sofia 1983: 395.
31 Z. Stojanov, Ne mu beshe vremeto. Rousse 1886: 9.
32 For more see V. Tankova, ‘Problemi na organizacionnoto ustrojstvo i razvitie na Narodnoliberalnata
partia (1886-1894)’, Vekove 1988 5: 24-7.
33 See for example Nezavisima Bălgaria, 28 Feb. 1887, No. 66, 5 March 1887, No. 68, 24 March 1887,
No. 76.; 28 March, No. 78; 31 March, No 79 and many others.
34 Nezavisima Bălgaria, 31 March 1887, No. 79.37
Levski and Hadzgi Dimităr as ‘martyrs’ of the Bulgarian national cause were depicted
and imagined.
35 Moreover, on the eve of the Russo-Turkish war in 1877, the
Bulgarian Central Charity Society (BCBO) issued a proclamation to Bulgarians to
join the coming Russian army in the name of the ‘blood of our martyrs.’
36 When in
1885 the Conservative politician from Eastern Rumelia, Danail Jurukov, was invited
by Zahari Stoianov to attend the commemoration of Hadzgi Dimităr at Buzludzga he
replied that there was no reason to worship ‘different saints.’ Stoianov answered that
he would not like to worship ‘Russian ones’ because ‘we should have our own’.
37
Furthermore, having in mind the carrying of Rakovski’s bones, at that time
Conservative and Pro-Russian politician and journalist Ikonomov, wrote in his
memoirs: ‘Church and citizenry made a bow to his coffin and honour these remains
much more than they deserved. All of us wondered about the jealousy of some
Bulgarians toward this hero and patriot and everybody praised this jealousy.’
38
In 1886-87 through the speeches and the orchestrated atmosphere at these
commemorations, radical circles within the Liberal party tried to put forward many
notions and ideas with current political salience. They tried to appropriate the
symbolic capital of Bulgarian ‘martyrs’ against Ottoman power in order to legitimise
and intensify the struggle against Russian pressure and interference in Bulgarian
internal affairs. Yet at the beginning of 1886. Stoianov underlined: ‘As a people we
can be proud that all our popular workers and patriots: Rakovski, Karavelov, Levski,
Botev, Kănchev, Volov, Benkovski have been against official Russia. They have
never appealed to her because they have known that (the) Russian whip is more
painful than the Turkish one.’
39 In the following months the press that supported the
resistance of the Bulgarian regency led by Stambolov against Russian policy argued
that
if there had not lived on the Balkan Peninsula Bulgarians, if there had not
been crazy heads Hadzgi Dimitărs, Levskis, and other naughty elements,
then Russia should not have had a taste of here.
40
In the speeches at these commemorations the orators emphasised the heroic deeds of
the Bulgarian insurgents against Ottoman rule in explicit or implicit opposition to the
Russian military action of 1877-78.
41 Many of them explicitly placed a symbolic link
between the policy of the Bulgarian government against current Russian pressure and
the Bulgarian ‘martyrs’ of the 1860s and 1870s. Their ‘shadows’ were depicted as
looking like the contemporaries whether they would be able to preserve ‘liberty,
which was accomplished through their valuable blood.’
42 The radical journalist D
Petkov emphasised how ‘the liberty for which Botev sacrificed his life is being raped
for a year by a strong tyrant.’
43 – an unequivocal allusion to the Russian tsar
35 About Botev’s own contribution to this mythology of ‘saints’ and ‘martyrs’ in the first half of 1870s
see for example Z. Stoyanov, Hristo Botjov. Opit za biografija. Sofia 1976: 242.
36 Osvobozhdenie Bolgarii ot tureckogo iga. vol. 1., Moskva 1961: 643-4.
37 Jurukov, D. Spomeni iz politicheskia szivot na Bălgaria. Sofia 1932: s. 114.
38 Ikonomov, T. Memoari. Sofia 1973: 399.
39 See the introduction written by Z. Stojanov in G. S. Rakovski, Preselenie v Rusia ili ruskata
ubijstvenna politika za bălgarite. Sofia 1886: 8.
40 Z. Stojanov, Kakvo napravihme v Tărnovo? Rousse 1886: 6. See also Svoboda, 20 May 1887., No.
57
41 Svetlina, 26 July 1886, No. 191.; P. Frangov, Tărszgestvoto:. 28.
42 Nezavisimost, 30 July, No. 37.
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Alexander III. In another speech at Botev’s commemoration Stoianov used an anti-
Russian argument about how ‘while we have such celebrities as Liuben Karavelov,
Botev, Levski and others, the Bulgarian people, its liberty and autonomy will never
die.’
44 The following year it was stated even more explicitly against Russian policy
and the Bulgarian Russophiles how ‘Rakovski, Levski, Hadzgi Dimităr, Karadzga,
Karavelov and others did not die for ‘the glory of the Russian tsar’.
45
Therefore in these commemorations the liberal, or more properly, radical, elite
commemorated events connected with the Bulgarian revolutionary past and struggles
against the Ottoman Empire. These national days of commemoration usually turned
into political meetings and festivals. They were cultural practices that in crucial
moments served political purposes. They served the liberals against the conservatives
by using rhetoric such as ‘ordinary people’, ‘poor’ and ‘little’ against ‘educated’,
‘wealthy’ and ‘notables.’
46 This also served the Unification movement in 1885 and the
government and radical nationalist circles during the political crisis in 1886-87. In the
following years it served the government led by Stambolov against Russia and the
Pro-Russian part of the Bulgarian political class. That is the reason why an
overwhelming rhetoric connected with ‘patria’, ‘people’, ‘nation’, ‘independence’ and
‘freedom’ was counterposed to what was ‘alien’ and ‘foreigner.’
47
The Bulgarian liberal and radical elite of nationalists created their own kind of
ceremonies. The names of national heroes and hallowed historical places became key
words in a public space that served political purposes and for the making of the nation
and modern patriotism. These cultural practices popularised the romantic language of
national glory that became increasingly invested with emotional significance.
Although it was enunciated with religious fervour, it was nonetheless resolutely
secular in content.
The message within these commemorations was of a new political energy of radical
nationalism. It was a version that was ready to legitimise extreme activities and to
imagine a complete rupture with St. Petersburg in the name of Bulgarian ‘autonomy’,
‘liberty’ and ‘independence.’
48 The commemorations and the symbolic energy of the
‘martyrs’ gave some advantages for the liberal and radical political elite over the
conservatives, the anti-Russian camp over pro-Russians. In this way radical
nationalism was defined as a genuine one.
Moreover, these important dates from the past were put within the interpretative
framework that included 6 September 1885 (the day of the Unification)
49 and 7
November 1885 (the day of the victory by Bulgarian troops at Slivnitza during the
Serbo-Bulgarian war of 1885). It was explicitly mentioned in a speech made at
Panagiurishte by the teacher At. Hr. Simov who emphasised that the ‘20 April created
in our country the 11 August 1877,
50 20 April organised the 6 September 1885 and
this very day marked 7 November 1885.’
51
44 Nezavisimost, 21 May 1886. No. 20.
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The organisation of these commemorations was an attempt to challenge and
substitute the system of commemorations and holidays that had been established since
1879. During this period, apart from the Bulgarian monarch’s birthday; the day of his
ascension to the throne and the day of St Cyril and St Methodius, there were also
commemorations for the Russian tsar’s birthday and his name-day together with the
whole Russian royal family; a day of the proclamation of the Russo-Turkish war of
1877-78; the crossing of the river Danube by Russian troops in 1877; the important
battles and entrances of Russian troops in different towns during the war; prominent
events of Russian history; anniversaries of Russian writers, diplomats and military
officers.
52
The radical-democratic view of recent national history had acute practical
importance. It was part of the political strategy, struggle and programme and it
contained a political appeal to the masses. But we have to keep in mind that these
commemorations also suggested loyalty to the Prince
53 and Nation. Following the
Rousseauan heritage, Bulgarian ‘patriotism’ was a civic religion required by the state
and all these ceremonies were an attempt to convert the citizens to the new religion. In
this regard the Bulgarian case reaffirmed what many authors who have studied
ethnicity and nationalism have already stressed about the similarities between
nationalism and religion.
54 Moreover, they have shown nationalism as a secular
religion, ‘political religion’ or ‘civic religion.’
55 Emile Durkheim has emphasised the
role of collective rites and ceremonies in the reaffirmation of all societies. He also
stressed the role of commemorations, great events in national life and how, during the
French Revolution, things that were purely lay in character were transformed into
sacred things, writing: ‘these were the Fatherland, Liberty, Reason. A religion tended
to become established which had its dogmas, symbols, altars and feasts.’
56
Insofar as these celebrations were a politicising experience, political mobilisation
connected with internal Bulgarian political divisions. It drew group boundaries that
might include some and exclude others and it resulted in the suppression of difference
and the inclusion of common and ‘poor’ people against ‘rich’ and conservative who
were excluded. In such a way the commemorations with their symbols and rituals
were strategies for the extension of power. They became an important medium for
working out political attitudes and they had extremely significant consequences. They
inspired citizens’ loyalty to and their identification with the state and ruling elite.
They increased the degree of sacrifice that had to be imposed on civilians. These
events shaped historical and political perceptions of the masses at that time and they
were used to create a new national consensus that gave certain advantages to the
liberal and radical part of the elite. The public character of the ritual authorised a
52 See for example Bălgaro-russkij kalendar za 1879. Sofia 1879.; Kalendar za 1881. Izdava
redakcijata na “Bălgarski glas”. Sofia 1881; Kalendar za 1881 godina. Izdanie na Slavjanskoto
blagotvoritelno druzhestvo v Sofia, Sofia 1881.
53 Nezavisimost, 30 July 1886, No. 37.
54 B. Anderson, Imagined Communities: reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism., 2
nd.
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55 Among many examples see D. Apter, ‘Political religion in the new nations.’, in Geertz, Cl. Old
Societies and New States, New York 1963.; M. Juergensmeyer, The New Cold War? Religious
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direct relation between the commemorated forebears, ancestors and ‘martyrs’ on the
one hand, and all those who organised or attended the event, on the other.
In the following years, Stefan Stambolov’s government (1887-1894)
57 and circles
close to it, carried on organising these kinds of commemorations. In May 1888 there
was a commemoration of Botev in Sofia. In the morning there was memorial service
in ‘Sveti Kral’ church followed by a march with a band to Vasil Levski’s grave where
speeches were given.
58 There was a march to the royal palace in order to congratulate
the monarch on his day and a breakfast was organised outside the city.
59
In 1888 there was a celebration of Botev’s detachment at the village of Kozlodui on
the river Danube. Participants included pupils, teachers, citizens, officials, peasants,
Botev’s brothers-in-arms and other former participants in the Bulgarian revolutionary
movement. Many delegations from different towns especially from the northern part
of Bulgaria were present as well. Clergy carried church banners. There were military
officers also. The pupils were carrying posters with selected couplets from Botev’s
poems written on them. There was Botev’s portrait, military and civil music bands.
The bank of the Danube was decorated with banners and arches. There was gunfire. A
funeral march was played by the band. The procession was led by the clergy, followed
by the portrait of the hero, and several delegations from different places with their
garlands. There was an ecclesiastical memorial service. Some speeches were made by
officials, teachers and journalists. Participants were carrying several garlands. After
this ceremony, a lunch started. In the afternoon, people had fun with music bands,
shepherd’s pipes, (kaval), bagpipes (gaidi) and violins. There were popular dances
(hora).
60 Between 17-19 May there was a holiday for the population from the region
of Vratsa.
61 A traditional commemoration was also organised in Plovdiv.
62
In May 1888 at Milin kamăk there was an ecclesiastical memorial service. Speeches
were delivered to glorify the heroes and their commander. Pupils recited Botev’s
poems. Those who took part were peasants from the region, teachers, pupils and
women from the town of Vratsa, Botev’s comrades, the mayor of the town.
63 Some
complained however, that up to that time at Milin kamăk as well on the bank near
Kozlodui there had only been wooden crosses as public monuments.
64
On the eve of 18 May 1889 Vratsa was decorated with national flags. Administrative
buildings, schools and private houses were decorated with garlands. An ecclesiastical
liturgy was held. The national anthem at the time ‘Shumi Maritza’ and the song ‘Tih
bial Dunav’, that was devoted to the memory of Botev, were played. Since the day of
the hero and the day of the monarch coincided, the pupils came with the portrait of the
new Bulgarian monarch Prince Ferdinand decorated with tricolors and garlands. There
were many officials with their spouses, the clergy from the Vratsa region, citizens and
peasants who had come with Botev’s portrait dressed with garlands, tricolors and
insurrectionary banners. The band played the song ‘Tih bial Dunav’ in honour of
Botev. A teacher made a speech about the importance of Prince Ferdinand’s day. A
choir sang for the Prince. The band played ‘Shumi Maritza.’ The pupils recited
57 D. Perry, Stefan Stambolov, pp. 124-211; R. Crampton, Bulgaria 1878-1918: 125-160.; B. Jelavich,
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Botev’s poems. A stone was put at the place of the future monument to Botev. The
chorus sang Botev’s song ‘My Prayer.’ There was a procession to the city council. A
telegram was sent to the Prince with congratulations. The breakfast was organised in
the city garden where music played. People had fun and played dances (hora).
65
On 17 May 1889 again there was a commemoration of Botev’s detachment at the
village of Kozlodui. The commemoration was organised by the citizens and officials
in the town of Oriahovo. Delegations from all local villages were also present. The
event followed the whole ritual and ceremony that had been already established.
66
This tradition was carried on in the next year also on 17 May.
67
On 27 May 1890 there was a bigger commemoration in Vratsa when Botev’s
monument was formally opened. The celebration was even postponed from 21 to 27
May in order to allow Prince Ferdinand to visit it together with the Prime Minister,
Stambolov. Botev’s mother, spouse and daughter also took part in the event. Many
towns and communities in the Bulgarian principality sent their garlands.
68 Botev’s 14-
year-old daughter, Ivanka Boteva made a speech suggesting loyalty to the contested
Petersburg Bulgarian monarch.
69 The commemoration was covered by all newspapers
in the country.
During this period the commemorations of Hadzgi Dimitar, Stefan Karadzga and
their rebel detachment were no less important. In July 1888 a commemoration was
organised by the Shipka patriotic association ‘Bulgaria for itself.’
70 In 1889, near the
town Sevlievo, at Kanlădere, a commemoration was organised by the volunteer’s
association ‘Lev’( ‘Lion’). In the town a band played at the central square in front of
the monument. Boys wore the uniforms of Bulgarian rebels. They carried the banner
and marched through the town. The stone was placed where the monument was to be
built. At night, fires illuminated the place. There was music and popular songs. Pupils
recited poems in the evening. Participants included people from different towns and
villages in the region. The next morning there was a memorial service and a garland
was placed at the stone. Speeches were given and popular dances (hora) took place, at
noon they returned to Sevlievo.
71 On 8 July 1890, during the next commemoration,
which was preceded by much more publicity in the newspapers, the monument was
opened and sanctified by the priests from the nearby villages.
72
A tradition of commemorations at Buzludzga was carried on during this period. In
1889 the commemoration was organised on 20 July as St. Elijah’s day instead of 18
July. However, since the political environment was cooler there were about 300-400
people present. The decision was taken for the commemoration to take place every
year on 20 July. The participants also decided to send a request to the National
Assembly to provide money for building a monument to the heroes.
73 At the
commemoration on 20 July 1890 it was decided that a monument should be built.
74
There were many similar events during this period. Some of the commemorations
were devoted to the uprising of 1876 in Thracia. In 1889 and especially in 1890 those
65 Svoboda, 31 May 1889, No. 271.; Napred, 16 July 1889. No. 8.
66 Svoboda, 14 June 1889, No. 275.
67 Svoboda, 9 May 1890, No. 361.
68 Lichnijat arhiv na Stefan Stambolov, vol. I, Sofia, 1994, s. 54.; Svoboda, 9 May 1890, No. 361; 3
June 1890, No. 367; Nova Bălgaria, 16 June 1890, No. 3.; Narodna misăl, 7 June 1890, No. 10.
69 Svoboda, 6 June 1890, No. 368.; Nova Bălgaria, 9 June 1890. No. 2.
70 Narodni prava, 27 July 1888, No. 52.
71 Svoboda, 22 July 1889, No. 286; Napred, 16 July 1889, No. 8.
72 Narodni prava, 21 July 1890, No. 183.
73 Svoboda, 1 August 1889, No. 289.
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commemorations were very intense. They were organised on 20 April 1889
75 and
1890 in Panagiurishte and at Oborishte.
76 Similar commemorations took place also in
Koprivshtica on 20 April 1890.
77 On 27 April 1889 local teachers organised a
commemoration in the village Perushtica. An arch was built and mourning flags were
put up. One of the teachers told a story about the uprising in 1876.
78 In the next year
this commemoration in Perushtica was repeated followed by a ceremony in the village
of Batak on 4 May 1890. The Bulgarian monarch was present at the commemoration
in Perushtica.
79 The relatives of the dead heroes took part in many of these
commemorations too.
80 There were also former participants from the Bulgarian rebel
detachments who were still alive. By and large, in 1890 those commemorations were
much more intense because they formed part of the campaign for the elections of the
sixth National Assembly. In the following years these kinds of commemorations were
also organised at Kozlodui,
81 Buzludzga,
82 Panagiurishte
83 and other places.
In the next part of the paper I will add something more to the logic of all these events
as expressed symbolically in language, images and gestures.
These commemorations served as legitimising underpinnings of Stambolov’s
government, its internal and foreign policy, as well as of the political class who ruled
Bulgaria in the late 1880s and early 1890s. For example, in the speeches by a local
teacher and educational inspector at Oborishte in 1890, the Prime Minister,
Stambolov, was depicted as ‘the first worker’ at the time of the uprising in 1876.
84 Yet
in September 1887 the newspaper Vardar wrote that only two of the fighters from the
national movement against Ottoman rule were still alive – Stambolov and Stoianov.
85
In June 1890 Nova Bălgaria emphasised that it was Stambolov who carried on
publishing in the Romanian town of Geurgevo, Botev’s newspaper of the same name
after the poet’s death in 1876.
86 In many other cases this symbolic link between the
Prime Minister and governmental circles, on the one hand, and the national
revolutionary movement against Ottoman power from the past, on the other, was
underlined.
87 Until the end of the regime the close friendship between Stambolov and
Botev was used to legitimise Stambolov and as a justification for his policies.
88
Part of the message was sought to legitimise explicitly the anti-Russian policy of the
Bulgarian government. In 1888 at the commemoration in Plovdiv, in a speech made
by Nikola Spepij, Botev was juxtaposed to ‘the Russians who are trying to enslave
Bulgaria.’
89 In the discourse of the governmental newspapers the above-mentioned
opposition between the heroes of the Bulgarian national revolutionary movement and
75 Napred, 16 July 1889. No. 8.
76 Svoboda, 25 April 1890, No. 357.; Plovdiv, 29 April 1890, No. 31.
77 Svoboda, 26 May 1890, No. 365.
78 Svoboda, 10 May 1889, No. 265.
79 Plovdiv, 6 May 1890, No. 33.
80 I. Stoianovitch, Iz minaloto., p. 38.; D. Marinov, Stefan Stambolov i noveishata ni istoria. Sofia
1993: 64.; C. Petrov, ‘Buzludganskite tărzhestva i tiahnata rolia v revoliucionnata ni istoria.’,
Istoricheski pregled, 1971, 3: 59.
81 Svoboda, 4 June 1892, No. 826.
82 Malăk vestnik, 11 July 1892, No, 28.
83 Svoboda, 29 April 1894, No. 1376.
84 Svoboda, 25 April 1890, No. 357.
85 Vardar, 22 Sept. 1887, No. 1
86 Nova Bălgaria, 9 June 1890, No. 2.
87 Narodna misăl, 7 June 1890, No. 10.
88 Svoboda, 15 March 1894, No. 1342.
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Russia took a prominent place.
90 In a debate with a Russophile newspaper Macedonia
regarding Russian help for the Bulgarian Liberation, the newspaper Plovdiv wrote:
Then, why have so many Bulgarian heroes shed their blood? Why have so
many Bulgarian daughters passed through great disgrace? Why have so
many Bulgarian mothers had to wear black clothes? In the end, you,
Bulgarian foes with Bulgarian names, why were Batak, Perushtica and
Panaguirishte wrecked in streams of blood?
91
Even at the end of the Stambolov’s rule the official newspaper Svoboda continued to
use rhetoric reflecting how Rakovski, Karavelov, Levski and Botev – ‘as much as
they wanted to see their fatherland free, so much they avoided and were afraid of
Russian deliverance’.
92 Therefore, the Bulgarian government and its political
followers took the symbolic role of the fighters against Ottoman rule whilst the
Russian Empire took the symbolic place of the Ottoman Empire.
93
As I have already mentioned, although still in 1886-87 the Bulgarian monarch
Alexander I was sometimes depicted as an embodiment of the martyrs’ spirit,
94 in the
next years with the new Bulgarian monarch, Prince Ferdinand, this symbolic link was
intensified. It was not by accident that Botev’s commemorations were organised so
that the day of the hero and the day of the monarch would coincide. The portrait of the
new Bulgarian monarch was a part of the commemoration and he was personally
congratulated on his day and Botev’s day as well. The importance of his day was
emphasised together with the commemoration of the poet.
95 Ironically, the poet was a
writer whose poetry and journalism were generally directed against the monarchy.
Notwithstanding, Prince Ferdinand was even personally present at some of the
commemorations and played an important role in them.
96 Moreover, despite the
continuing rhetoric about ‘liberty’, ‘autonomy’, ‘independence’, ‘the new, young and
honorable’ and against what was described as ‘old, rotten and backward’,
97 there was
also much more emphasis on the ‘Prince.’ Explicitly or implicitly, the energy of this
rhetoric was more pro-Monarchical and anti-Russian.
These cultural practices show the proper place of symbols and images in political life
as a part of the new cultural framework. They included constant repetition of the
above-mentioned key words and principles, shared attitudes and the use of the same
symbols. This symbolic repertoire was very important. The use of symbols including
clothing, flags, banners of identification, images engraved with words, colours,
objects, simple slogans, really reinforced the political messages. In such a way these
rituals became an instrument for the fashioning of the people. Using different
symbolic practices such as the use of certain rhetoric, the spread of certain symbols
and rituals gave to the political elite and its followers a sense of unity and purpose.
People were socialised into a sense of national awareness.
90 Dobrudzga, 28 Nov. 1887, No. 6.; Vardar, 25 Sept. 1887., No. 2.; Svoboda, 20 Oct. 1888, No. 212;
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These symbols, rituals, common collective practices and periodic festivals brought
scattered groups together and they gave a reality to an otherwise imaginary
community. Participants in these rituals were usually teachers and pupils from
secondary schools and also intellectuals and members of the urban educated classes
including officials, judges, prosecutors, lawyers, army officers, clerks, secretaries,
booksellers, printers, photographers, doctors, clergymen, artisans, shopkeepers,
merchants, but also peasants. For those people the political symbols and rituals used
during the ceremonies were reminders of duty and public obligations. By
mythologising they glorified the new, more understandable version of patriotism and
set a moral example for the population.
The experience of the people during the commemorations was mediated and
informed by different discursive practices. Of course, the content of the rituals is an
unreliable guide to what the common people actually thought, however, it could be a
guide to what they were moulded into thinking. We know too little about what went
on in the minds of most relatively inarticulate men and women, their thoughts and
feelings. Nevertheless, we can say that the investment of these symbolic actions with
political significance gave a greater impact among the population to certain politics,
individuals, political groups and organisations.
But what was really very important in these political rituals and practices was the
masses that took part.
98 This public was not very active politically, most of it was
illiterate and without the habit of reading books, newspapers and pamphlets.
99 It was
outside of public political debates that were going on in clubs, pubs and newspapers.
But by being involved in these national days of commemoration this mass public took
part in a specific socialising process of identity and nation-building. Insofar as part of
the political behaviour occurred within highly charged symbolic actions and collective
rituals of community, the investment of these valued collective rituals with a specific
and a new nationalistic political content was symptomatic of the process of nation-
building in certain rural areas. By being based on the popular memory of rebel
detachments confined to the region, this process sometimes reached villages far
removed from the political mainstream. Therefore this public received new values that
went beyond the frameworks of the local region and were part of a new political
culture created by the elite. In this regard, the goal was also to define the nation based
on common history through the rituals that fashioned public memory. In such a way
these cultural practices, that were part of the politics of identity, created in the
participants the sense of having a group identity. They were engaged in collective
action that created allegiance and uniformity out of diversity.
However it must not be assumed that these practices affected all groups of the
population in the same way. There were also differences in the reception of these
political and cultural practices according to region and social status. The elite whose
horizon was less localised than that of the peasant was more influenced. For the rural
population very often the revolutionary struggle against Ottoman rule meant little if
anything. This was the reason why local rituals were imbued with national meaning.
This way through these ritual practices the identification with Bulgaria and modern
Bulgarian nationalism was internalised.
98 Public holidays were usually celebrated only by state officials. See Bălgarska narodna kultura.
Istorico - etnographski ocherk. Sofia 1981: 167.
99 About the literacy level at that time see D. Mishkova, Literacy and Nation Building, 1878-1912, East
European Quarterly, XXVIII, 1, 1994.45
And last, but not least, what is most striking in these commemorations is their
combination of traditional
100 and modern elements. These new cultural practices were
not only a manipulation from above. Popular traditional elements were also borrowed
and fostered by political activists and the government. Therefore these rituals had two
distinct sources - one in popular culture, the other in the modern European patriotic
tradition. In this regard, these rituals were a dialogue between the elite or modern
culture and popular or traditional culture. In the 1880s and 1890s these political
festivals were a complex creation including on the one hand rituals borrowed from
traditional popular culture (songs, dances, collective drinking and eating) and on the
other, rituals and imagery of modern urban nationalism invented by the political elite.
Pagan elements were also part of the popular festivities and life. But they were
influenced by a Christianity that was adapted in popular culture. Moreover, as far as
popular songs played out of the formal ritual were concerned, it could be very telling
that they were never mentioned explicitly in newspaper accounts. Perhaps it was
thought they would contaminate the ‘purity’ of modern patriotism. We can only
wonder whether those songs were not part of the common Ottoman heritage or the so-
called chalga genre.
Apart from paganism and Christianity there was also a third, modern and secularised
element that had a wide space.
101 As I mentioned above it included rituals and
imagery of modern urban nationalism invented by the political elite. Here one can put
speeches that were given and poems that were recited, which included the rhetoric of
modern political ideologies and nationalism. The same can be said about the shouts,
slogans and posters that accompanied the commemorations. This modern element is
also evident in the repertoire of marches and songs played by military and civilian
bands - the national anthem at the time “Shumi Maritza”, the song “Tih bial Dunav”
devoted to the memory of Botev and several other Botev songs. Similarly the symbols
of insurrectionary banners from the past, the national tricolour as well as the uniforms
of Bulgarian rebels had the same effect as the monuments devoted to the memory of
the heroes.
The rituals borrowed from popular rural fairs
102 were integrated into the
commemorations. In the late nineteenth century the rural feast days usually combined
ecclesiastical and entertainment elements.
103 They included common customs and
ritual practices like songs, dances, eating and drinking. In this regard ritual practices
fully belonged within the universe of popular culture if it is defined not as the culture
of the common rural and urban people and opposed to that of the elite, but as a
repertoire of themes and acts ready for use by people of different social levels. The
festivities themselves incorporated a strange mixture of elite and popular practices -
processions, dances, songs and other activities rooted in traditional popular culture. In
such a way pre-existing symbols and sentiments were mobilised for a modern national
cause. In this way mobilisation made great play of local traditions, appropriating the
forms of popular culture. We can see therefore in this case how the national
movement could, perhaps, mobilise certain feelings of collective belonging which
somewhere already existed.
100 About the role of sacred or consecrated places in Bulgarian tradition see Tz. Georgieva,
Prostranstvo i prostranstva na bălgarite XV-XVII vek. Sofia 1999: 291-8. For the holiday in early
modern Bulgarian town and the first attempts to establish modern holidays see R. Gavrilova, Koleloto
na zhivota. Vsekidnevieto na bălgarskia văzroszdenski grad. Sofia 1999: 280-293.
101 Balgarska narodna kultura: 162-4.
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These popular holidays were not exhausted, but their forms were radically
transformed. As ancient rituals they also served as vehicles for political expression.
The ritualistic activities provided the framework for rural reactions to national
appeals. Therefore nationalism and local folklore were mutually reinforcing.
Reference to custom thus lent legitimacy to the government that claimed to be in
defence of the country against foreign enemies.
In fact, Christianity embraced all different elements of the feasts. Religious rituals
and festivals had retained their symbolic and social importance as a part of the
popular culture. It is also evident from the message in a newspaper about the
commemoration in Vratsa on 27 May 1890. In this regard its title ‘A New Easter in
Vratsa’
104 is very revealing. Ironically, it described the commemoration of an
anticlerical author like Botev. Moreover, together with the song ‘He is still alive, still
alive’ (Zhiv e toi, zhiv e”), devoted to Hadzgi Dimităr, the most popular Botev’s
songs at that time were ‘Borba’ (‘Fight’) and ‘My Prayer’ (‘Moiata molitva’), both of
them undoubtedly anti-clerical. Thus, the Bulgarian case again reaffirmed the
tendency of nationalism to assimilate traditional religion and the continuing
importance of religion for nationalism itself.
105 It also shows the religious functions
and the vital role of different national historical narratives about continuity, identity,
destiny and salvation, linking the sacred to the secular.
106
As one can see these commemorations were an interesting and strange mixture of
secular and religious ceremonies. Rural habits came together in a bizarre mix of
pagan, Christian and nationalistic discourse. In this way the commemorations of
modern Bulgarian ‘saints’ and ‘martyrs’ were a strange mixture of Christianity,
paganism, traditional and modern entertainment, Orthodox church rituals, modern
secular nationalism and traditional folklore. In fact, they were not mutually exclusive.
As I mentioned these practices and rituals meant different things to different people.
This romantic nationalistic rhetoric did not appeal always to everyone but it appealed
to enough people to make its influence deep and lasting. Perhaps that was the reason
why although these practices were established by political radicals, in the following
years they were to be appropriated by other political streams also. Even a Russophile
newspaper like Macedonia referred to Botev in order to legitimise its Pro-Russian and
Tsarist views.
107 Conservatives also identified with the commemorations and used
them for political purposes because of the deep effect of them.
108 Whilst in 1885,
referring to the commemoration at Buzludzga, Jurukov said that he did not like the
worshipping of ‘different saints’, in 1889 another conservative politician and
merchant Dimitri Papazoglu promised to build a monument to Hadzgi Dimităr
109 and
according to some sources he gave 1000 leva for this undertaking.
110 Bulgarian pupils
from the secondary schools conceived their rioting against the local school
administration in accordance with the Bulgarian revolutionary movement in the past
104 Nova Bălgaria, 9 June 1890, No. 2; 16 June 1890, No. 3.
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and used certain symbols, language and imagery from April 1876.
111 Even Bulgarian
socialists made a systematic attempt to counterpose their own carefully articulated
version of the national revolutionary past with a variety of symbolism and ritual
expression.
112 This counter-mythology of the past was an important aspect of this
activity.
113 In such a way these rituals of a new political repertoire were a means of
popular mobilisation for political purposes that received wide diffusion in the
following years.
111 J. Pekarev, Moite politiko-obshtestveni spomeni. Sofia 1929: 72.
112 C. Petrov, Buzludganskite tărzhestva, D. Blagoev, Nashite apostoli. Sofia 1886; K. Bozveliev,
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Celebrating the nation: the case of Upper Silesia after the
plebiscite in 1921
Andrzej Michalczyk
(Max Weber Center for Advanced Cultural and Social Studies, Erfurt, Germany.)
The territory discussed in this article was for centuries the object of conflicts and its
borders often altered. Control of some parts of Upper Silesia changed several times
during the twentieth century. However, the activity of the states concerned was not
only confined to the shifting borders. The Polish and German governments both tried
to assert the transformation of the nationality of the population and the standardisation
of its identity on the basis of ethno-linguistic nationalism.
The handling of controversial aspects of Polish history is still a problem which
cannot be ignored. Subjects relating to state policy in the western parts of pre-war
Poland have been explored, but most projects have been intended to justify and
defend Polish national policy. On the other hand, post-war research by German
scholars has neglected the conflict between the nationalities in Upper Silesia. It is
only recently that new material has been published in England, Germany and Poland.
This examined the problem of the acceptance of national orientations in the already
existing state rather than the broader topic of the formation and establishment of
nationalistic movements aimed (only) at the creation of a nation-state.
1
While the new research has generated relevant results, they have however,
concentrated only on the broader field of national policy, above all on the
nationalisation of the economy, language, education and the policy of changing
names. Against this backdrop, this paper points out the effects of the political
nationalisation on the form and content of state celebrations in Upper Silesia in the
following remarks.
The most important issues are partly connected with the analyses mentioned above.
According to Linek, the years 1922-1950 covered ‘a time of dynamic activity by the
nation-state’ in Upper Silesia and were characterised by holistic actions by the state
aimed at implementing principles of an ethnic nationalism.
2 Arguing along the same
lines, Hobsbawm named his chapter covering the years 1918-1950 ‘The apogee of
nationalism’.
3 The question that results from those observations is to what extent state
celebrations were performed for nationalising purposes. Moreover, I try to examine
how far the social inclusion or exclusion that could be activated before or during the
festivities depended on nationalistic principles. Finally, I aim to look at how the
population of Upper Silesia reacted to the ideas created by the state authorities.
The state celebrations that constitute the core of this case study can be defined, on
the one hand, as forms of the representation of the national policy in public; and, on
the other, as a collective experience of the participating individuals.
4 They are planned
1See: Richard Blanke, Orphans of Versailles: The Germans in Western Poland, 1918-1939 Lexington
1993; Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism reframed: nationhood and the national question in the New
Europe Cambridge 1996; Matthias Kneip, Die deutsche Sprache in Oberschlesien. Untersuchungen zur
politischen Rolle der deutschen Sprache als Minderheitensprache 1921-1998 Dortmund 1999; Bernard
Linek, ‘Deutsche und polnische nationale Politik in Oberschlesien 1922-1989’, in Die Grenzen der
Nationen: Identitätenwandel in Oberschlesien in der Neuzei, ed. Kai Struve and Phillip Ther Marburg
2002:137-68.
2 Linek, 140.
3 Eric J. Hobsbawm, Nations and nationalism since 1780: programme, myth, reality (Cambridge 1990.
4 See: Winfried Gebhardt, Fest, Feier und Alltag. Über die gesellschaftliche Wirklichkeit des Menschen
und ihre Deutung. Frankfurt/M 1987: 63ff.; Inszenierungen des Nationalstaats. Politische Feiern in50
or founded, and throughout related to a concrete, usually historical occurrence. They
offer the state an exceptional opportunity beyond everyday life to reflect on the origin,
importance and future of the groups and/or institutions, to enact them in public and,
thus, to present them on a broad social basis.
5 The festivities have a potential strength
to become an important medium for the codification, transmission and appropriation
of collective models and to stress historical continuity and cultural unity.
6
The selected case study deals with the Upper Silesian plebiscite celebrations. These
celebrations represented the biggest enactments of the Polish and the German state
power in Upper Silesia in the period from 1922 to 1932 and, thus, are also best
documented. Most source material used for this research comes from the
contemporary press and public as well as secret reports by civil servants. This case
study begins in 1922. In this year, the international allied commission abandoned its
governance and safety tasks in the controversial borderland, and the Upper Silesian
administration was assumed by the Polish and the German states. This development
facilitated the organisation of Polish and German celebrations of the anniversary of
the plebiscite from 1923 onwards. The last celebration of the plebiscite organised by
state authorities took place in 1932. This year marks the final date of this paper.
Nationalism and the Upper Silesians before the plebiscite
With the increase in national consciousness and a progressing polarisation of national
attitudes during the ‘Kulturkampf’ the Upper Silesian ethnic borderland, home to
strategically crucial heavy industry, changed into an area defined by nationalism in
the early years of the twentieth century. After the defeat of Austria and Germany in
the First World War, the new Polish state claimed the entire region on the grounds
that ethnic Polish people lived there. As a result of German and Polish military actions
(the so-called ‘Silesian uprisings’) and a plebiscite, Upper Silesia was divided
between Poland and Germany in 1922, and became the borderland of two nation-
states.
Even though Germany had lost large parts of its eastern territories, it still contained
sections of Polish-speaking or Slavophone people, and because of the readjustment of
European borders after the First World War, a German minority now found itself
citizens of Poland. Relations between the nationalities in Upper Silesia were already
complicated at the time when the country was still part of the German empire. The
intensification of political rivalry and agitation was reflected in a specific way in the
consciousness of the local population, which took place before the plebiscite. Yet,
many Silesians remained unimpressed despite the sharp national mobilisation and
even bloody fights.
The language problem was related to the ethnic process of identification. Upper
Silesians frequently had a command of both German and Polish, leading to a situation
in which the language was not a decisive criterion for nationality. For a considerable
part of the population the daily use of the Slavophone Upper Silesian dialect was not
necessarily synonymous with Polish national consciousness. About 60% of the Upper
Italien und Deutschland seit 1860/1871, ed. Sabine Behrenbeck and Alexander Nützenadel Köln 2000;
Hans-Juergen Luesebrink, ‘Das Fest’, in Orte des Alltags. Miniaturen aus der europäischen
Kulturgeschichte, ed. Heinz-Gerhardt Haupt München 1994: 202-6.
5 See: Celebrating Ethnicity and Nation, American Festive Culture from the Revolution to the Early
Twentieth Century, ed. Geneviève Fabre, Juergen Heidekind and Kai Dreisbach New York 2001.
6 See: Behrenbeck and Nuetzenadel: 13; Festive Culture in Germany and Europe from the Sixteenth to
the Twentieth Century, ed. Karin Friedrick London 2000.51
Silesian population, according to the official census of 1910, spoke Polish or regional
Slavonic dialects. The plebiscite in 1921 had already shown that only 40 percent
voted for Polish control of Upper Silesia. Moreover, in this region over 90% of the
population were Roman Catholic. Religion often influenced the life of the inhabitants
in much a stronger way than national divisions, and formed a common ground and,
thus, a base for deeper understanding between both ethnic groups.
The governments of Poland and Germany realised that some people in the Upper
Silesian border area were indifferent to their national identity. From the perspective of
the state apparatuses, the Upper Silesians could be assigned to three national defined
groups.
7 Two of them developed clear dividing lines, i.e. the group of the ‘indigenous’
and the ‘strangers’. However, the attitude of the third group was contradictory to the
idea of the nation-state propagated in Warsaw or Berlin. These people were described
- in terms of the nationalistic discourse - as national ‘unstable’ or ‘undecided’, and
appeared in the reports as a group with ‘unconscious national attitude’. Additionally,
they often showed resistance to national declarations and preferred other forms of
identification, e.g. regional or religious ones, as opposed to national identity. These
circumstances formed a focus for conflict. However, propaganda measures introduced
by the states covered not only the nationally ‘problematical’ group, but also other
parts of the population which were exposed to the nationality policy. The whole
population of Upper Silesia therefore became an object of mobilisation, further
consolidation, assimilation, or societal exclusion. The official state celebrations of the
anniversary of the plebiscite revealed this development.
The celebrations of the anniversary of the plebiscite in German Upper Silesia
On 20 March 1921, the plebiscite that was to decide upon the state affiliation of
Upper Silesia took place. A total of 60% of the people voted for the annexation of
Upper Silesia to Germany. For these people it meant that the whole plebiscite area
would not be separated from the German Republic; the day that the results were
announced, many spontaneous ceremonies were held. That the region remained
divided by a state border many supporters of Germany regarded as ‘unfair’ and
‘treacherous’. Every year in commemoration of the plebiscite, the German population
organised protest demonstrations against the decisions of the allies as well as against
the whole system constructed at Versailles.
The first celebration of the anniversary of the plebiscite in 1923 occurred without
planning or a unified central idea. Only Alfons Proske, the Regierungspraesident in
Oppeln/Opole, made an appeal to celebrate the anniversary in March 1924. As a local
official of highest rank, he insinuated unambiguously that Upper Silesia and its
population was torn apart by allied order against the true will of the Upper Silesian
people. According to him, the division was the root of the region’s poor economic
situation, particularly among the German resettlers from Polish Upper Silesia. Proske
called for loyalty to the lost parts of Upper Silesia and to the whole fatherland, and for
commemoration of the injustice of the border area. Commemorations of the plebiscite
were organised under his motto on 20 and 21 March.
Proske’s call contributed to the announcement of the fundamental points of the
German government’s propaganda during the ceremonies. Above all the division of
the territory was deemed unacceptable and regarded as Franco-Polish revenge. The
celebration of the plebiscite’s anniversary gave the German authorities a perfect
7 Linek, 144.52
opportunity to show the world that their country had the right to govern the whole of
Upper Silesia after March 1921. Accordingly, voices for a removal of the ‘unfair’
border became very clear and explicit. Appealing to the solidarity of their nation, the
government pointed out that the Germans remaining in the Polish part of Upper
Silesia were not forgotten, and that they were a valuable part of the nation. The
emphasis on national consolidation was directed toward both, the German Diaspora in
Upper Silesia, and toward the Polish state that dominated there. The authorities also
styled everyday life in Upper Silesia as daily national combat and as experienced
patriotism.
8
Over the years, the course and contents of the festivities display a rising interest by
the authorities. In 1923, high officials did not show much interest in organising
commemorations; however, patriotic events with a unified programme were already
propagated by a set of newspaper articles that published the call of Proske in 1924. A
year later, the anniversary of the Upper Silesian vote took a genuinely official form,
and included large events in many cities, framed by festive speeches given by civil
servants.
9
The fifth anniversary of the plebiscite in 1926 formed a temporary zenith of state
participation in the celebrations. The changed international situation of Germany, and
internal developments in Upper Silesia contributed to the fact that the periphery of the
German empire moved to the centre of public life. A year before, two political events
took place and produced an additional burden for German-Polish relations, in
particular for the Upper Silesian issue. The so-called custom war which concentrated
on the export and import of Upper Silesian coal broke out and escalated on the new
German-Polish border in the summer of 1925. A few months later, diplomatic
negotiations in Locarno were completed and confirmed the international
acknowledgment of the French-German and the Belgian-German borders; however,
they kept open the future of the East German border. The two occurrences gave rise to
a very emotional exchange of arguments between the German and Polish governments
which was expressed, inter alia, in official celebrations of the plebiscite, and had
direct influence on the form and content of the ceremonies.
All political parties represented in the government as well as various paramilitary
and homeland associations, such as Vereinigte Verbände Heimattreuer Oberschlesier
[The United Federations of Homeland-Faithful Upper Silesians] and Jungdeutschland
[Young Germany] responsible for nationalist propaganda among the Upper Silesian
people took part in the arrangement of the celebrations. The first ceremonies took
place in various Upper Silesian cities on 21 March and consisted of processions joined
by representatives of the regional elite which became the speaker of the state
government. The fifth anniversary of the plebiscite was crowned in the capital of the
German Upper Silesia with costly official celebrations one week later.
10 National
flags were put up everywhere in the city as a welcome and an honour gate with the
inscription ‘Gedenke, dass du ein Deutscher bist’ [Commemorate that you are a
German] was erected on the main street. Over two hundred prominent personalities of
Upper Silesia, among them representatives of the local government, municipalities,
clubs and societies as well as all local clergy and military participated in the
8 Oberschlesische Volksstimme 81/21.3.1924; Oberschlesische Zeitung 68/20.3.1924; Archiwum Akt
Nowych w Warszawie [Archive of New Records in Warsaw] (AAN), Konsulat Generalny RP w Opolu,
Sign. 162, Consul Szczepański’s report to the foreign office No. 82 / 26.3.1924, and No. 118 /
26.3.1925.
9 Oberschlesische Morgenzeitung 68/20.3.1925; Ostdeutsche Morgenpost 82/23.3.1925.
10 Oberschlesische Volksstimme 75/29.3.1926.53
ceremonies. However, it was the numerous guests from Berlin, such as the German
Minister of the Interior Wilhelm Kuelz and the Prussian Minister of the Interior Carl
Severing, that gave the whole event its importance. At the market square, they were
greeted by the public from all windows, balconies, and even roofs. The first part of
the official ceremony took place in the well decorated city theatre and was framed by
musical presentations of local choirs and orchestras, as well as by a speech from
Kuelz. Later, the second ceremony at the market square was followed with a speech
by Severing.
The two speakers thanked the Upper Silesians for the national fight during the
plebiscite and stressed the territorial integrity of the nation.
11 Subsequently, they
emphasised ties to their compatriots who lived as national minorities in other states.
The ministers also pointed out the ‘great, united, internally connected community’ of
the Germans. Severing used martial rhetoric and gave the Upper Silesian plebiscite
the character of a military victory that has to be commemorated festively like the
other glorious battles of the German nation. In this way, he tried to confirm a political
myth and to declare the participants of the battle for the nation as national heroes. On
the other hand, he contrasted the cultural superiority of the Germans with the Poles
who he pictured as violent Slavonic people, and as the enemy who had to be
overcome with weapons of the higher German spirit. A common singing of the
Deutschlandlied completed the celebrations.
In the commemorative speeches and during the course of the celebrations the rank of
the Polish minority in the German national policy is very characteristic. The national
minorities within the German borders did not represent a substantial problem for the
German state in domestic politics. Both groups of people, those not yet nationalised,
and those Upper Silesians who subscribed to Polish national consciousness, were
perceived by the German government as politically and economically harmless. The
Upper Silesians with ‘unconscious national attitude’ had no representation of their
own with clear political outlines and were in the arms of the Catholic Centre Party.
Moreover, over 70,000 Polish speaking or Slavophone people among them nearly all
the members of the native elite left the German part of Upper Silesia after the
plebiscite.
12 The immigration of the Polish leaders was caused to a certain degree by
excesses and assaults of the paramilitary and nationalist German associations and
contributed to the fact that the members of the Polish minority that remained in
Western Upper Silesia were regarded as ‘germanizable’ [eindeutschungsfaehig],
meaning that they would be able to become German; therefore, they were neither
excluded from the ceremonies nor attacked during the national celebrations. The local
authorities strove rather to encourage the members of the Polish minority and the
‘nationally undecided’ Upper Silesians to subscribe to the German spirit [Gesinnung]
by the state celebrations.
13
The celebrations of the anniversary of the plebiscite continued until the Nazi seizure
of power in 1933. Hitler introduced important modifications in the Upper Silesian
holiday calendar. Above all, he cancelled the local festivities of the anniversary of the
plebiscite and shifted the main focus to the national celebration of May Day as an
additional means of Gleichschaltung in Germany. As soon as the Nazis came to
power, they initiated propaganda for a complete separation of Slavonic and Germanic
11 According to a newspaper article by Schadewald in Ostdeutsche Morgenpost in: AAN, Consul
Szczepański’s report to the foreign office No. 147 / 30.3.1926.
12 Linek 147.
13 See for example the speech of the Landrat in Beuthen, Kurt Urbanek in: Oberschlesische Zeitung
68/20.3.1924, or the article on the title-page in Oberschlesische Volksstimme 75/29.3.1926.54
elements according to their racial policy and the mechanisms of exclusion were
applied at the national socialist celebrations. The takeover of power by the NSDAP
had a significant influence on the festive culture in Western Upper Silesia. Hitler’s
idea of a pure German race had weakened measures of nationalisation in the
borderland for several years, even though the long-term purpose was the liquidation of
the Polish/Slavonic minority. Yet, regarding oneself as a member of the Polish
minority became more popular in the first years after the takeover, when the Nazis
had dissolved the German Catholic party and many other organisations whose
activists had experienced the situation in the Upper Silesian borderland. At the same
time, those activists regarded the Polish minority as not worthy of being part of the
German community, the ‘Volksgemeinschaft’. As a result Catholics in particular
found a niche within Polish organisations where they could continue their activities
and holidays.
However, these conditions did not last for long, because the situation of the Polish
minority became precarious as German-Polish relations deteriorated further. Open
terror reigned in Upper Silesia in 1939. Public festivities as well as public church
ceremonies held in the Polish language were forbidden. Those who opposed
government decisions were exposed to persecution by the state. Yet, the situation in
the last twelve months before the outbreak of the war was untypical of Upper Silesian
relations between the world wars. It has to be emphasised that celebrating national
holidays in the German part of Upper Silesia served the unification of the people
without regard to ethnic affiliation for a considerable time. The confrontational efforts
during the national celebrations were introduced with the race policy of Nazi-
Germany in the late 30s.
The Polish minority issue was not the centre of attention for the governing elite of
the Weimar Republic. The national policy was focused on solidarity with the German
minority beyond the borders. The German Volksgemeinschaft in Poland could be used
for the purposes of foreign policy and passed as a justification for revisionist demands
in the East.
14 For these reasons, state authorities aimed to develop the picture of a
‘bleeding border’ which always emerged in the celebrations of the anniversary of the
plebiscite. In this way, they intended to emphasise alleged or real suffering of the
Germans under the rule of the majority nation. The maintenance of the relationships
to the German Diaspora and the national fight for the Germans abroad
[Auslanddeutschtum] performed a compensating role in the Weimar Republic, which
suffered from the consequences of the war and the economic crisis.
The commemorative speeches and the course of the anniversary of the plebiscite in
Western Upper Silesia clarified the principles and the political myth of the German
nation-state. At the same time, they were an expression of the nationalising character
of the celebrations. They stressed the character of German homeland nationalism
which was directed ‘outward’, across the boundaries of territory and citizenship,
toward members of ‘their own’ ethnic nationality, that is toward persons who ‘belong’
(or can claim to belong) to the external national homeland by ethnonational affinity,
although they reside in and are (ordinarily) citizens of other states.
15 The revisionist
programme coded in the German celebrations released an opposite reaction on the
Polish side of the border, where the nationalising nationalism was directed ‘inward’
by the state, toward its own territories and citizenship.
16 In this constellation of two
types of nationalising states, they had to clash head-on. Therefore, the Polish
14 Linek 148; Brubaker 123f.
15 Brubaker 111.
16 Ibid.55
government introduced its own propaganda plan and announced it during the Polish
festivities of the anniversary of the plebiscite.
The Celebrations of the Anniversary of the Plebiscite in Polish Upper Silesia
There were political groups on both sides of the border in Upper Silesia who were
ideologically close, and whose leaders had first-hand experience of government in the
Prussian state. They gained their political know-how under similar circumstances and
were advocates of the constitutional state and parliamentary system. The Catholic
Centre Party governed in the province of Oppeln until the National Socialist seizure of
power. All heads of the local government: Joseph Bitta (until 1923), Alfons Proske
(until 1929), and Hans Lukaschek (until 1933) came from the local German elite. In
contrast to this, in Polish Upper Silesia another practice developed and local officials
of the highest rank wojewoda came from outside the area. Nevertheless, the Christian
Democrats played an important role in the political development in
Kattowitz/Katowice. Their leader Wojciech Korfanty had political allies in Józef
Rymer, the first wojewoda, and in Konstanty Wolny, the first marshal of the local
Silesian parliament.
17 However, the ideological propinquity had no impact on the
political activity of both governments, which did not make attempts for an approach
across national boundaries. This was expressed in the official celebrations, which
reflected upon the recent fights and the national goals of the governments from
Warsaw and Berlin. Consequently, existing similarities had no chance to come to the
fore during the commemorations of the plebiscite.
Only the fourth anniversary was marked with occasional celebrations in the Polish
province of Silesia. Two reasons can be given for this. On the one hand, the
authorities were not interested in bringing back the memory of the disappointing
result of the plebiscite in the light of the post-war expectation of the Polish side. On
the other hand, only the considerable activity of the government in Oppeln and its
direct involvement in carrying out German festivities generated the organisation of
propagandistic countermeasures. The most important press organs massively
campaigned for the broad participation in the rallies in Katowice,
Tarnowitz/Tarnowskie Góry, and Rybnik and in other protest actions against the
revisionist German policy.
18 According to the press, over 50,000 people took part at
the procession in Katowice on 15 March 1925 and passed a common resolution of the
combat readiness of the Silesian people for inviolability of the Polish borders and for
unity with the Polish motherland. Furthermore, the German minority was mentioned
as an internal danger.
19 Large-scale Polish celebration was provoked only one year
later after the ceremonies for the fifth anniversary in the German Upper Silesia.
Similarly to the German part, nationalistic associations, such as The Federation for
Defence of the Western Areas (Związek Obrony Kresów Zachodnich) and The
Federation of Silesian Insurgents (Związek Powstańców Śląskich) took an active part
in the preparation of the celebrations. This confirmed the close symbiosis between the
national movement and the state and gave reliable means of influence on the society
to the governing elite. The well-developed nationalistic associations and federations
17 Maria W. Wanatowicz, Historia społeczno-polityczna Górnego Śląska w latach 1918-1945 Katowice
1994): 47ff.
18 Polonia 74/16.3.1925.
19 Bogdan Cimała, ‘Obchody rocznic plebiscytu na Górnym Śląsku w latach 1924-1927’, Kronika
Katowic 6 1994: 121-2; Edward Mendel, ‘Obchody rocznic powstań śląskich przez społeczeństwo
polskie do 1939’, Encyklopedia powstań śląskich 1982: 33656
were always helpful in relations with the state and, in the end, so effectively
subjugated the needs of the nation-state that gradually they became parts of national
structures. Accordingly, the arrangement of state celebrations and the procurement of
national propaganda were entrusted to nationalistic organisations.
20
The ceremonial procession took place in Katowice on 21March 1926 and, according
to the Polish press, it drew together almost 80,000 people, among them over 400
standard-bearers and nearly 100 musical bands. After commemorative speeches, a
common resolution was accepted in which the inviolability of the Polish borders, the
guarantee of the minority rights for Polish people in Germany, and the exclusion of
Germany from the League of Nations’ council was demanded once more. Moreover,
the resolution’s authors required to dissolve the most important umbrella organisation
of the German minority in the Polish part of Upper Silesia, The German National
Association for Polish Silesia (Deutscher Volksbund fuer Polnisch-Schlesien).
The German minority in Polish Silesia held a stronger social and financial position
than the Polish one on the other side of the border. Reproaching the German minority
and the demand for the dissolution of the minority associations which appeared during
the celebrations, reflected the principles of Poland’s national policy. Accordingly, the
German minority in Western Poland was regarded as one of the biggest dangers for
state integrity. The first Polish government of Ignacy Paderewski had already
developed a framework for the relations to the Germans settled in Poland in January
1919:
21 (1) removal of the Germans from the administration, (2) measures against the
education of Polish children at German schools, (3) fight against the germanisation of
the Protestant population, (4) support for Polish organisations in the fight against the
Germandom [niemieckość], and (5) economic balance between the Polish and the
German population. The governments kept to these guidelines of the nationalising
state and, consequently, the national celebrations in the borderlands often had an anti-
German character. In Upper Silesia, this meant that the people with a German national
consciousness were regarded as ‘state strangers’, and excluded from participation in
the events of the nation-state.
The absence of government representatives from the state capital, particularly on the
fifth anniversary, was a remarkable contrast to the German ceremonies. Some parts of
the Silesian press reprimanded this ‘scandalous’ absence, and the Polish consul in
Beuthen/Bytom criticised the government agencies.
22 Szczepański compared the
propaganda means used on the fifth anniversary of the plebiscite in both states and in
the report to the Polish minister of foreign affairs demanded to use propaganda
measures more effectively and resolutely. This report illustrates that the Warsaw
government had a moderate interest in the nationalisation of the Upper Silesian
celebrations and, at this time, used them only occasionally in order to give the
national policy more expression.
The sixth anniversary of the plebiscite in 1927 took place under a new government.
After the May revolution of 1926, the Sanacja group, rather left-oriented and linked to
Marshal Józef Piłsudski, came to power and the post of the Silesian wojewoda was
assumed by Michał Grażyński, who came from Galicia, but had participated in the
Upper Silesian uprisings. However, this change did not contribute to mitigation of
national policy regarding the German minority in Upper Silesia. In contrast to the
conception of Marshal Piłsudski, who aimed to establish a Polish nation consisting of
different nationalities and to assimilate the existing minorities with state pressure,
20 Biuletyn Związku Obrony Kresów Zachodnich 11(16)/14.3.1926.
21 Dariusz Matelski, Niemcy w Polsce w XX wieku. Warszawa 1999: 66.
22 AAN, Consul Szczepański’s report to the foreign office No. 147 / 30.3.1926.57
Grażyński pursued his own political blueprint with respect to national issues. In his
welcoming speech, he declared the goal of the unification of Upper Silesia with the
Polish state without compromise.
23 Subsequently, he carried out staff changes in his
office and filled the posts with people from nationalist associations.
As a consequence, the celebrations of the sixth anniversary of the plebiscite were
organised by the nationalist federations and expressed the nationalist character of the
new Upper Silesian political elite.
24 The festivities on 20 March 1927 included a large
rally of paramilitary organisations before the representatives of the central
government and the parliament. Commemorative speeches were delivered by the
Polish Minister of Finance, Eugeniusz Kwiatkowski, wojewoda Grażyński, and other
members of the Polish and local parliament. The content of these communications
confirmed the goals of the national policy of the Polish republic in the western areas.
The speakers strove for a serious and patriotic note, but without unnecessary
aggression in relation towards the German state.
25
The sixth anniversary of the Upper Silesian vote represented the pinnacle and, at
the same time, the end of the plebiscite’s celebrations organised by the state
authorities in Polish Upper Silesia. The new Silesian wojewoda had other
conceptions of the national policy in his area of responsibility. Grażyński
concentrated harder on the stimulation of the anti-German uprising’s tradition and
shifted the main focus of the state ceremonies to 3 May. The importance of the
celebration of this day was two-fold in Upper Silesia. On the state level, it was the
anniversary of the first Polish Constitution of 1791; on the local Upper Silesian
level, it was the celebration of the third and biggest Polish uprising in 1921. The
modified celebrations displayed an extremely military character, and were obviously
directed against the Germans. The former insurgents, i.e. the most dogged pursuers
of the German minority, became the leading performers of the celebrations.
Moreover, Grażyński could also fall back on the increased opportunities of an
authoritarian Polish state. This led to many incidents on the national level in the first
days of May after the introduction of its celebration, all the more because the
insurgents felt unpunished under the protection of the wojewoda. Furthermore, the
powerful military anti-German manifestations on 3 May generated a further split in
society because they did not meet any support in the circles of the Christian
democrats, who were still powerful in Catholic Upper Silesia.
However, decisive for Grażyński’s hard and confrontational policy with regard to the
German minority was the character of his political milieu, whose backbone
constituted The Federation for Defence of the Western Areas and The Federation of
Silesian Insurgents. These groups belonged to the new, young and powerful elites of
independent Poland and were shaped by common armed fights for the establishment
of a Polish state. This life experience made them assume an attitude that preferred the
nationalising form of nationalism to the principles of the constitutional state and of the
democratic system in Upper Silesia.
26 Therefore, the political and social pressure on
the German minority in the Polish Upper Silesia became stronger, and was reflected
in the militarised celebrations of the uprising’s tradition.
23 Polonia 246/7.9.1926.
24 Archiwum Państwowe w Katowicach [State Archive Katowice] (APK), Urząd Wojewódzki Śląski,
Wydział Prezydialny, Sign. 18/ p. 8-10.
25 Gazeta Robotnicza 62/17.3.1927, 64/19.3.1927, 65/20.3.1927; Polska Zachodnia 17., 18., 20.3.1927;
Polonia 79/21.3.1927.
26 Linek 149.58
Reactions towards nationalising propaganda
The last point of this article discusses the attitude of the Upper Silesian population
towards the propaganda of nationalisation presented during the celebrations of the
anniversary of the plebiscite. These remarks are only based on official state
documents and local newspaper articles and can therefore not present a complete
attitude of the Upper Silesians, and the extent of their involvement in the holidays. It
is also extremely difficult to examine different forms of the perception of the state
propaganda, when the objects of this propaganda produced only few historical
sources.
An approximate number of the participants can be drawn from official documents.
The national celebrations, particularly those of the fifth or tenth anniversary of the
plebiscite, were mostly very well attended, even by a hundred thousand people.
27 The
authorities organised the festivities at the most important central places of the cities,
market squares, or sports stadiums for instance, which were technically the most
suitable places for big events. Access to the places of the event was usually made
easier by free or reduced carriage, and people were sometimes encouraged to
participate in the ceremonies by receiving a free meal. This probably had a certain
influence on attendance figures, particularly in times of economic crisis. Accordingly,
the stadiums and market places were filled with large crowds. The official documents
indicate only very slightly whether these people were truly interested in the
celebrations or whether different motives induced them to take part in public
enactments of the nation-state. I can only assume that there were various perceptions,
extended from an extremely patriotic, if not chauvinistic position, up to an attitude
indifferent towards nationalism. This inhomogeneous image confused the authorities.
The Polish and German authorities that followed the plebiscite, or the Nazis, as well
as the Polish authoritarian government, had tremendous problems in determining the
national identity of some parts of the population that took part in the celebrations,
although they strove for a highly differentiated image of the nationalities in this
region.
It cannot be determined easily how far the propagandised image of the two
conflicting nations corresponded to reality, but even official documents suggest that
there were many situations in Upper Silesia when the nationalising purposes did not
come to the fore during festivities. An occurrence from everyday life may serve as a
flagrant example. A regional leader of the NSDAP reported to Berlin – exactly on
the second anniversary of the Nazis takeover of power - on a wedding celebration,
which was well attended by Polish and German speaking people and which lasted
over two days. It alarmed his superior that his deputy in the regional structure of
NSDAP Hans Witolla got married to a radical pro-Polish activist’s stepdaughter. He
wrote:
I consider this [wedding] impossible for reasons of the secrecy of different
political procedures in the district leadership, particularly Buhl [bride’s
stepfather] must be called prominent and the most radical Polish minority
leader. His name appears again and again in the features of the Polish
press as well as in the reports of the secret state police. All Polish
meetings take place in Buhl’s house. It is said that Wittola also was in
27 See pictures and commentaries in the local newspapers on 20-23 March 1926 or 1931 e.g. in
Ostdeutsche Morgenpost, Oberschlesische Zeitung, or Polska Zachodnia.59
Buhl’s house during Polish meetings. However, I do not know anything
about facts which Witolla noticed or experienced there and which are
important for the responsible authorities.
Approx. 150 people participated in the wedding reception in the Hotel
Lax. […] The following day, the wedding was celebrated at Buhl’s house.
I cannot imagine that Witolla would have received the consent to this
marriage from the regional NSDAP-apparatus, particularly according to
the situation in the Upper Silesian plebiscite area.
28
The population in ethnically mixed Upper Silesia had the opportunity to choose from
a rich spectrum of civilization and culture and to decide circumstantially which side of
identification was better to prefer. There are many examples in official reports,
particularly concerning the activities and holidays of youth associations. Even in the
late 1930s, there were such cases in the Upper Silesian borderland, which were
unheard of in the Central Polish or German regions. In a report from one village, a
policeman wrote that several members of the local Hitler Jugend, including its leader,
took part in festivities of their rival Polish youth association.
29 At the end of the letter
he admitted that there was no-one in the village who would qualify as the leader of the
HJ. In general, youth and sport associations’ holidays were a sphere where
nationalism played a limited role. The members of Polish clubs participated in
German meetings until the outbreak of the war and those Upper Silesians, who tended
towards German identity, in Polish events. The authorities were extremely indignant
about this. They did not notice that the national affiliation of associations designed by
them was not adopted by the Upper Silesians. In the eyes of the native population,
most associations were linked to their homeland, or were simply Silesian.
The lack of chauvinism among the Upper Silesians also manifested itself in cultural
events, which were attended by German speaking and Slavophone people. What was
more important to them was the quality of the event or the ease of access. Their
negligence to subscribe to national slogans was noticed by the German government as
well as by the Polish authorities in their part of the region. Contrary to the central
parts of the nation-states, one could not find apparently objective bases of national
consciousness like language, religion, or descent. An identity related to the homeland
remained the most important in Upper Silesia and usually dominated a secondary
German or Polish national consciousness until 1945.
30 The bi-linguistic and bi-
cultural competence of the Upper Silesian population could appear even during the
same evening. In 1929 the chief of police in Gleiwitz/Gliwice reported on a Polish
singing choral society from a suburb of the city. The society had organised a
celebration with a guest choir which sang Polish songs. Subsequently, most guests as
well as the organisers, who all belonged to the Slavophone part of the population,
took part in a party and talked German most of the time. Having had a couple of
28 Report from the Landrat in Oppeln to the Regierungspraesident on 31.1.1935, in Deutsche und Polen
zwischen den Kriegen. Minderheitenstatus und”Volkstumskampf’ im Grenzgebiet, ed. by Rudolf
Jaworski and Marian Wojciechowski München 1997: 911 (translated by author).
29 Report from the Polizeipraesident in Gleiwitz to the Regierungspraesident in Oppeln on 12.4.1938, in
ibid.: 949.
30 Philipp Ther, ‘Die Grenzen des Nationalismus: Der Wandel von Identitäten in Oberschlesien von der
Mitte des 19. Jhs. bis 1939’ in Nationalismen in Europa. West- und Osteuropa im Vergleich,ed. Ulrike
von Hirschhausen and Ute Leonhard Göttingen: 2001: 332.60
drinks, the participants began singing some German drinking and soldier songs. The
police officer continued to report:
The two Polish minority leaders [Lapa and Aulich] persuaded people not
to sing German songs; but their interference was not considered. Some
invited guests –members of the Polish minority – were offended by Lapa’s
behaviour. […] Finally, Lapa antagonised so many among his fellowmen
that he did not have enough courage to go home to Ostroppa after the
party, but he went to the city centre in company of political police
officials in order to avoid an assault.
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Finally, one must underline that the emphasising of the national identities was
changeable or not fixed in wide sections of the population of Upper Silesia. The
decisive factor here was the attractiveness of the national and political offers, which
were attentively observed by Upper Silesians. Accordingly, their (temporal)
accentuation of the German or Polish national identity corresponded to the economic
and political situation in Germany and Poland. However, these possibilities of
identification did not exclude one another and could be activated, maintained, or also
concealed depending on the context of everyday life.
32
Conclusions
By analysing the German and Polish celebrations of the anniversary of the plebiscite,
I have tried to follow up the nationalising activity of the states expressed in the form
and content of the ceremonies. I can give an affirmative response to the question
posed at the beginning, whether the German and Polish authorities used the
celebrations for purposes of national policy. The structures of the two states were
dominated by national movements and, accordingly, the state realised their political
goals. Examining celebrations, we could see that although both governments of Upper
Silesia were ideologically close, none made attempts for an approach. The Polish and
German Christian democrats did not develop an alternative programme; moreover,
they encouraged ethnic nationalism and thereby intensified the separation of a
‘bleeding border’. After the political revolutions in both parts of Upper Silesia,
extreme nationalising groups came to power and as a result clashed head-on. New
nationalising guidelines were expressed in the state celebrations, which became more
militarised and tended to exclude members of the national minority.
The state celebrations in particular turned out to be a place of social exclusion or
inclusion. In the Polish part of Upper Silesia, they were created or modified to
integrate Silesian society into the Polish nation-state and its culture after more than
five centuries of separation. In principle, this concept did not include members of the
German minority. In addition, the Silesian wojewoda, Grażyński, contributed to a
further discouraging of the societal integration within the Polish population. The
inappropriate state policy during holidays did not solidify the society as a whole, but
only one group that supported the government. The way the holidays were celebrated
depended on the existing policy and was a result of this policy.
Summing up, I can maintain that Germany and Poland used similar instruments of
state propaganda in the conflict over Upper Silesia. One of them was the celebration
31 Report from the Polizeipraesident in Gleiwitz to the Oberpraesident in Oppeln on 5.1.1929 in ibidem:
933 (translated by author).
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of the anniversary of the plebiscite, which took the form of the representation of the
national policy in public. But the efforts to use celebrations in a definite way had
different effects on society. Upper Silesians reacted very differently towards national
holidays. Their response ranged from a complete acceptance or enthusiasm for
national ideas proclaimed during festivities to a passive attendance or, in a few cases,
even disturbances. Yet, this is not unusual for peripheral regions such as Upper
Silesia, where history has fixed the phenomena typical for a majority of ethnic
borderlands. One such phenomenon is indifference or even resistance against ethno-
linguistic nationalism frequently manifest in circumstantial and pragmatical
identification and determined by the practical wisdom of everyday life in the
borderland of nation-states.63
Three states, one common past: chance or malediction?
The role of history and historiography in the formation of collective
identities and mutual relations in Belarus, Lithuania and Poland
1
Rüdiger Ritter
(Bremen University)
Common experiences and a common past offer a special possibility for good relations.
But having a common past also can create disharmony. If one has to share traditions
with others, it becomes more difficult to find specific elements to call one’s ‘own’. So
especially in a situation of intensive search for identity a common past may be
harmful to the formation of one’s own identity and to mutual relations as well. In the
case of Belarus, Lithuania and Poland after 1989, both generalisations hold true.
While Polish-Lithuanian relations are excellent, Lithuanian-Belarusian relations are
rather complicated. The reasons for this are not only political or economic, but mainly
a consequence of the important role history and historiography play in the process of
collective identity formation. The present article will examine the structure of this
process.
History as a means of legitimation of nation-states
After 1989, not only Soviet satellite states, up until then bound to the Soviet Union by
the Warsaw Pact and Comecon, acquired real independence, but also former Soviet
republics recreated themselves as independent states. One of the main tasks of these
new political units was the formation of collective identities which would confirm
their existence.
2 This was done by means of history. All new states claimed
themselves as old ones, having been victims of an alien system of repression that they
had now got rid of.
It is important to stress this because it shows that not only democratic decisions such
as parliamentary resolutions, free elections and so on legitimated the new
independence. In order to avoid being labelled a nation ‘without history’, the new
states turned to the past for justification and legitimation.
3 They searched for
structures of continuity as grounds for the necessity to recreate their state. By seeking
continuity in the past, this kind of justification was the general method of legitimation
by ‘history’ after 1989. Thus, the longer continuities could be drawn back into the
past, the more precious they appeared for the purposes of contemporary identity
construction. Thus, facts of the remote past, in particular, acquired high importance in
this process of legitimation. Especially important is the detection of medieval states,
1 In this paper I present a research project on ‘Collective identities and history in post-socialist
discourses: Belarus, Lithuania, Poland, Ukraine’ under the supervision of Prof. Dr. Zdzisław
Krasnodębski at Bremen University, a project which I started in February 2003.
2 For the complexity of collective identity see Shmuel Noah Eisenstadt and Bernhard Giesen, ‘The
Construction of Collective Identity’, European Journal of Sociology, 36, 1995: 72-102. For identity
politics in the three countries see Graham Smith and others ed. Nation-building in the Soviet
Borderlands. The Politics of National identities, Cambridge 1998: esp. the chapters ‘National history and
national identity in Ukraine and Belarus’, 23-47 and ‘Nation-rebuilding and political discourses of
identity politics in the Baltic states’: 93-118.
3 This was especially important for ‘small nations’ as, for instance, the Belarusians. Despite the
extreme disharmony between Belarusian historians over Belarusian history it was one of the main aims
of all sides to reject the accusation of being a nation without history.64
kingdoms or duchies as ‘predecessor states’, even if this involves resorting to
anachronisms.
4 The reason for the use especially of remote historical facts and not
those of the nearer past in this process of nation-building can to a certain extent be
explained in terms of how collective historical memory works. There is a fundamental
difference between personal historical memory, on the one hand, and cultural
historical memory, on the other.
5 Events in the near past, which form part of personal
memory, such as the Second World War or the political changes after 1989, are part
of controversial discussions. So their role for legitimation is weaker than the role of
events of the medieval past, which are regarded as an integrative part of national
consciousness, widely accepted as an integral part of culture and often even taught in
schools. This is the reason why the present paper will concentrate primarily on an
examination of facts of the remote, rather than the near, past.
Homogeneous nation-states, common history, different interpretations
In the whole of Eastern Europe after 1989, the new states understood themselves as
independent, self-reliant units – not only independent from the Soviet Union, but also
from each other. The idea of one’s own history was one of the consequences of this
social consciousness. The classical form of nationalist ideology is a monistic
construction: one state consists of one nation, of one ethnic unit, has one capital, one
history and so on. This entails the postulate of an exclusive conception of history
having the purpose of legitimating the existing nation-state by giving a rather
teleological narrative of the state’s ethnic unity.
But in the case of the three countries Belarus, Lithuania and Poland the situation is
particular. Here, only Hitler and Stalin had created homogeneous nation-states by
resettlement and relocation of the population and exterminating Jews and minorities.
Before, there had always been multiethnic political units in the area. So after 1989 the
realisation of an exclusive conception of history in these states was loaded with great
conflict potential because of the cultural intersections and the common past of these
countries. All three countries are situated on the territory of the former Republic of
Both Nations. Since this was no modern national state, it is not possible to describe it
as ‘Polish’, ‘Lithuanian’, ‘Belarusian’ or ‘Ukrainian’ without falling into
anachronisms. But the idea of the homogeneous nation state postulated exactly this:
seeking national continuities in the pre-modern period. The result was open
contradiction between historians of the three countries, especially in the eastern part
of the Republic of Both Nations, the so-called Grand Duchy of Lithuania.
These open contradictions are visible in the existence of various different,
conflicting and incompatible narratives developing in Belarus, Lithuania and Poland,
each of them using the Grand Duchy as a source of legitimation for the existing state.
In all of them its capital, Vilnius, plays a fundamental and controversial role. The
Grand Duchy was claimed as being Polish, since (at least after 1569) it was part of the
Republic of Both Nations, often simply called Polish Republic (Rzeczpospolita
Polska). It was also claimed as Lithuanian and viewed as the predecessor state of
4 Jerzy Kłoczowski and others have recently pointed out that one should not speak of the Republic of
Both Nations simply as ‘Poland’, suggesting an anachronistic continuity. See Paweł Wroński, ‘O Unii
Lubelskiej I Unii Europejskiej. Z profesorem Jerzym Kłoczowskim rozmawia Paweł Wroński’,
Magazyn Gazety Wyborczej, 29–30 maja 1988, 22, 273: 9.
5 On the distinction between personal and cultural memory see Aleida Assmann and Ute Frevert,
Geschichtsvergessenheit / Geschichtsversessenheit. Vom Umgang mit der deutschen Vergangenheit
nach 1945, Stuttgart 1999: 35-53.65
modern Lithuania.
6 It was finally claimed as Belarusian because of the eastern
Slavonic majority of inhabitants.
7 It is even possible to claim it as the Ukrainian state
(before the union of 1569) or to call the Eastern part of the Kingdom of Poland simply
Ukraine after 1569, even when this interpretation does not play a significant role in
the discussion of Ukraine nowadays. However, for Ukraine the disputes with Russia
on the ‘rights’ on the Kievan Rus’ are far more important than disputes with her
Western neighbours.
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These different narratives focus on the role of Vilnius. In the Polish narrative, the
town called Wilno forms an integrative part of Polish culture as a centre of Polish
nineteenth century Romanticism with a poet like Adam Mickiewicz at the forefront.
Called Vilnius, the town played the central role in Lithuanian historical and political
thought as ‘capital of Lithuania’, on the basis of the historical argument that the town
was founded by the Lithuanian Duke Gediminas. Belarusians view the same town,
now called Vil’nja, as one of the centres of the Belarusian national movement.
9
The idea of historical ‘truth’ as an obstacle for mutual understanding
Bearing in mind the great potential for conflict that emanates from this one single
example of their common past, it seems to be almost impossible that the three
countries could ever come to terms with each other. Indeed, there were harsh
controversies concerning this especially between certain Lithuanian and Belarusian
historians. A typical Lithuanian comment on Belarusian historical ideas is the
statement ‘One cannot choose one’s history’ (Istorijos nepasirinksi), whereas the
Belarusian ‘answer’ is a similar, almost equal phrase: ‘History is not bound to
elections’ (Historyja ne padliagajuc’ halasavanniam).
10 Deeply rooted in the cultural
memory of every nation lies the idea, or rather feeling, of one single historical
‘reality’ and one real existing past, which historians only have to ‘find out’ and to
6 Alfredas Bumblauskas, ‘Kolizje historiograficzne w kwestii charakterystiki Wiekliego Księstwa
Litewskiego’, Lithuania, Warszawa 1,14, 1995: 29-46. Between Polish and Lithuanian historians there
were violent quarrels over the interpretation of the Latin words ‘applicare’ in the 1385 treaty of Krewo.
Polish historians understood this as incorporation of Lithuania, by this denying Lithuanian
independence as a whole, whereas their Lithuanian colleagues stressed the independence of the Grand
Duchy not only after 1385, but also after 1569. Even nowadays the opinions between Polish historians
are divided, but the incorporation theory has lost its leading role in Polish historical thinking. For a
short overview of the historiography of Polish-Lithuanian union see Mečislovas Jučas, Lenkijos ir
Lietuvos unija (XIV a. vid. – XIX a. pr.), Vilnius 2000: 11-85.
7 Jakub Zejmis, ‘Belarusian National Historiography and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania as a Belarusian
state’, Zeitschrift für Ost- und Ostmitteleuropaforschung, 48, 3, 1999: 383-96.
8 A good overview of Ukrainian historiography is offered by Tomasz Stryjek, ‘Historiografia a konflikt
o Kresy Wschodnie w latach 1939 - 1953. Radzieckie, rosyjskie, ukraińskie i polskie prezentacje
dziejów ziem wschodnich dawnej Rzeczpospolitej jako część ‘wojny ideologicznej’ w okresie lat
trzydziestych – pięćdziesiątych XX wieku’, in Krzysztof Jasienica ed. Tygiel narodów. Stosunki
społeczne i etniczne na dawnych ziemiach wschodnich Rzeczypospolitej 1939 – 1953, Warszawa 2002:.
429-564. See also Stephen Velychenko, Shaping identity in Eastern Europe and Russia. Soviet-Russian
and Polish Accounts of Ukrainian History 1914 – 1991, New York 1993.
9 Andrzej Garlicki, ‘Wilno żądają wszyscy’, in Robert Traba ed. Tematy polsko-litewskie. Historia.
Literatura. Edukacja, Olsztyn 1999: 67-83.
10 Albinas Kuncevičius, ‘Istorijos nepasirinksi. Baltarusijos vėlyvųjų viduramžių archeologijos
naujienos 1993 metų publikacijose’, Baltų archeologija 8, 2 ,1994: 23-24 and Anatol’ Citoŭ, ‘Lios
simvala – lios naroda’, in Ė. M. Skobelev ed. Gerb i flag belorusskoj derzhavy, Minsk 1997: 10. In his
own words, the Lithuanian historian intended to reject Belarusian aspirations to the Lithuanian past,
whereas his Belarusian colleague in these very words intended to defend the Belarusian character of
these very facts against other positions.66
‘demonstrate’.
11 Processes of commemoration aim at strengthening these feelings in a
ritualised manner in the form of holidays, commemoration days, monuments and so
on.
12 A nationalist, teleological interpretation of this feeling is the notion of historical
‘rights’ or historical ‘missions’ a nation must fulfil.
It is these very ideas of historical ‘truth’, historical ‘missions’ and historical ‘rights’
that make understanding so difficult. The idea of historical ‘truth’ augmented
dramatically in the last years of the socialist system. Oppositional movements stressed
the idea of the one and unique historical ‘truth’ making a sharp distinction between
communist ‘lies’ and their own historical ‘truth’.
13 This led to an enforced history
within society, totally obscuring the fact that no change from ‘lie’ to ‘truth had taken
place’, but only a change from one system of interpretation to another. The
historiography of the anti-communist opposition, too, was, however, guided by
interests.
14
But already a few years after the end of the communist system, the simple distinction
between ‘lies’ and ‘truth’ became increasingly obsolete. Under the Soviet regime, one
single, unified narrative of history in the form of a canon, serving as state ideology
had dominated, even if (as, for instance, in Poland) already at the end of the ‘70s this
domination came to be questioned. After 1989, a quick diversification took place. The
result was a pluralism of cultures of memory and the development of different and
contradictory lieux de mémoire, leading to a landscape of conflicting memories. For
example, the forced common consensus on Soviet foundation myths (e.g. victory in
Second World War) no longer existed. The Jedwabne discussion in Poland destroyed
old common myths and helped to start a contrastive, pluralistic discussion on the
past.
15
Consequently, pluralism in society gave rise to pluralism of conceptions of history
and narratives. Thus, after 1989, it is not possible to speak simply of ‘the Polish
narrative’, for instance. The best example is Belarus, where at least two contrastive
conceptions of history developed in opposition to each other, each of them trying to
11 See Henryk Samsonowicz, O ‘historii prawdziwej’. Mity, legendy i podania jako źródło historyczne,
Gdańsk 1997 esp. the chapter ‘Co to jest mit?’: 6-26. For a methodological approach to the problem of
‘truth’ see Chris Lorenz, Konstruktion der Vergangenheit. Eine Einführung in die Geschichtstheorie,
Köln 1997 especially the chapter ‘Tatsache, Interpretation und Wahrheit’: 35-64.
12 A good overview on the situation of various European countries is to be found in Emil Brex and
Hannes Stekl, Der Kampf um das Gedächtnis, Wien 1997. See for the Polish case the articles of
Stanisław Grodziski, ‘Nationalfeiertage und öffentliche Gedenktage Polens im 19. und 20.
Jahrhundert’: 205-16 and Czesław Brzoza, ‘Aus der Geschichte des 3. Mai-Gedenktages in Polen’:
217-30.
13 This was especially stressed in the Soviet Union opposite groups. See e.g. Robert W. Davies, Soviet
History in the Gorbachev Revolution, London 1989 and Gert Meyer ed. Wir brauchen die Wahrheit.
Geschichtsdiskussion in der Sowjetunion, 2
nd edn, Köln 1989.
14 This is not to deny the necessity of detecting socialist ‘foundation lies’ as Kurapaty or others of
moral importance. See e.g. David R. Marples, ‘Kuropaty. The Investigation of Stalinist Historical
Controversy’, Slavic Review, 53, 1994: 513-23.
15 See Paweł Machcewicz, ‚Przeszłość jako wyzwanie’ in Paweł Machcewicz and others ed. Wokół
Jedwabnego, 2 vols, Warszawa 2002, 1, 14-7. On the diversification of memory cultures in Lithuania
see Alfredas Bumblauskas and others ed. Lietuvos sovietinė istoriografia. Teoriniai ir ideologiniai
kontekstai, Vilnius 2001; Rüdiger Ritter, ‘Prescribed identity. The Role of History for the Legitimation
of Soviet Rule in Lithuania’, in Olaf Mertelsmann ed. The Sovietization of the Baltic States, 1940 – 1956,
Tartu 2003: 85-11; in Belarus Rainer Lindner, Historiker und Herrschaft. Nationsbildung und
Geschichtspolitik in Weißrußland im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert, München 1999, chapter ‘Nationsbildung
und Geschichtspolitik in spät- und postsowjetischer Zeit’, 367-478.67
claim historical ‘truth’ for itself.
16 Thus, the situation after the end of the Socialist
system grew even more complicated. In the new countries, various different and
contradictory narratives evolved, replacing the forced agreement of an official
Socialist/Soviet narrative.
Different types of understanding the nation
The challenge was thus the same for all three countries. In order to come to terms with
each other, their individual ‘truth’ had to be modified in a certain way. But the ability
to do so was not equal in all these countries. As the following analysis will show, the
ability depends on the ruling idea of nation and of the structure of national narratives
in each of the given countries. There are great differences in both points between the
three countries: firstly, there is a different type of understanding of ‘nation’ between
Poland, Lithuania and Belarus and, secondly, there is a characteristic structure of
intersection of Polish, Lithuanian and Belarusian foundation myths.
The idea of nation forms the centre of the historical narratives of all three countries.
But what is meant by nation in these countries is far from being the same.
Additionally, there is a pluralism of concepts of nation in each one of these countries.
In Polish thinking two main streams exist: there is the ethnical, ‘modern’ concept and
the historical, ‘federalistic’ one, both symbolised by Roman Dmowskis idea of Piast’s
Poland and, on the other side, Józef Piłsudski’s idea of a Jagiellonian Poland.
17
Poland’s Western shift after 1945 led to a concentration on an ethnic-based
understanding of nation, but the idea of a Polish historical, cultural nation still exists
to this day.
The Lithuanian idea of nation seems to be purely ethnical at the first glance.
18 But
there is an historical element in the Lithuanian concept of nation also, which is visible
in the claim for Vilnius at the beginning of nineteenth century. The Lithuanian claim
rested in fact on historical reasons, being justified by the character of Vilnius as the
capital of medieval ‘Lithuania’. But even this claim for Vilnius is based on what one
could call a historical ethnic idea of the Lithuanian nation: there is the Lithuanian
conception of an ethnic Lithuanian medieval state with a then Lithuanian-inhabited
capital of Vilnius, which lost its Lithuanian character only because of processes of
polonisation and belorussification.
19 So, finally, the claim for Vilnius is based on an
ethnic idea of nation, too. In fact, there is no real historical idea of nation in
Lithuanian thinking today: The modern Lithuanian national movement did (and does)
not claim the whole territory of the former Grand Duchy of Lithuania as the future
Lithuanian state, but only its small Western part, the so-called ‘Lithuania propria’.
16 Anna Brzozowska, ‘Symbols, Myths, and Metaphors. The Discursive Battle over the ‘True’
Belarusian Narrative’, Slovo, 15, 1, 2003: 49-58; Henadz Sahanovich, ‘The War against Belarusian
history’, Education in Russia, the Independent States and Eastern Europe, 20, 1, 2002: 18-27.
17 See the essay of Andrzej Walicki, Trzy patriotyzmy. Trzy tradycje polskiego patriotyzmu i ich
znaczenie współczesne, Warszawa 1991.
18 For Lithuanian idea of nation see Abba S. Stražas, ‘From Auszra to the Great War: The Emergence
of the Lithuanian nation’, Lituanus 42, 4, 1996: 34-73. Old, but useful is Manfred Hellmann, ‘Die
litauische Nationalbewegung im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert’, Zeitschrift für Ostforschung, 2, 1953: 66-
106. See also V. Stanley Vardys and Judith Sedaitis, Lithuania. The Rebel Nation, Boulder 1997
chapter ‘At the European crossroads: Lithuania’s Historical roots’, 1-27.
19 Across the centuries the Lithuanian language almost disappeared because there was no written
tradition, but the consciousness of being ‘Lithuanian’ remained, even if it was expressed in Polish. See
Zigmas Zinkevičius, The History of the Lithuanian Language, Vilnius 1998: 263.68
The Belarusian understanding of nation contains important ethnic elements, too.
20
The idea of an old Belarusian nation with its own language helped consolidate the
idea of an independent Belarusian (and Belarusian-speaking) intelligentsia between
both Poland and Russia. The ‘Lithuanian statutes’ of sixteenth century written in a
language considered as predecessor of Belarusian are held as evidence of this. The
idea behind it is that three eastern Slav tribes (Krivichy, Dregovichy, Radimichy)
represent the starting point of Belarusian ethnogenesis. But there are also many
arguments regarding the existence of a non-ethnical concept of nation based on the
idea of a Belarusian territory.
21 This is especially to be seen in the field of culture,
which promotes the notion of a ‘whole-Belarusian process’ dating back to the Middle
Ages, which includes ethnic non-Belarusian people.
22 This idea allows the integration
of noblemen in Belarusian history, ordinarily simply known as ‘Polish’ or
‘Lithuanian’ such as Radziwiłł or Ogiński.
23 Underlying this seems to be the concept
of a Belarusian territory, seen as constant ever since the Middle Ages.
24 Significant
for this ‘territorial’ thinking is the outstanding position of the borderlines of the
Belarusian state in the coat of arms from 1995.
Summing up briefly, it is worth noting that in all three countries there is an ethnic
idea of nation in connection with others, among which the historical idea of nation
seems to be of special importance. Since the general development after 1989 not only
in the three countries, but in the whole of Eastern Europe, went in the direction of
ethnically-based nation states, it seems obvious that Poland and then Lithuania with
their mainly ethnically-based conception of nation had better possibilities for their
nation-building than Belarus with its different conception based also on territorial
arguments. The specific problem of the Belarusian case is already visible at this point:
the intention to draw their ‘own’ narrative by exploring non-ethnical Belarusian
elements leads to an ‘exclusion by inclusion’. Claiming all events on the territory of
today’s Belarus as ‘its own’ is hardly tolerable for neighbours having mostly ethnic-
based ideas of nation.
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Intersection of foundation myths decides the structure of the narrative
The second difference between the three countries’ historical position lies in the
structure of possible national narratives. An analysis of national narratives of history
demonstrates their construction as a sort of chain of foundation myths,
26 which in
20 See for the following Lindner, Historiker, chapter ‘Nationales Selbstverständnis und ‘weißrussische
Mission’’: 459-67.
21 As Timothy Snyder puts it, Belarusians formed the biggest ethnic unit, but nevertheless formed no
nation. See Timothy Snyder, The Reconstruction of Nations. Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus,
1569 – 1999, New Haven, 2003: 281
22 This idea is stressed not only in political discourse, but also in the field of culture. In the introduction
to his history of Belarusian music, V. Skorabagataŭ speaks of an ‘all-Belarusian process’, thus showing
a non-ethnic-based idea of Belarusianness. See Viktar Skorabagataŭ, Zaigrali spadchynnyia kuranty.
Cykl narysaŭ z historyi prafesiinai muzychnai kultury Belarusi, Minsk, 1998: 13.
23 For a Belarusian interpretation of the Radziwiłł family see Irina Maslenicyna and Nikolaj
Bogodziazh, Radzivilly – Nesvizhskie koroli (istoricheskie miniatiury), Minsk 1997.
24 In the work of Georgii Vasil’evich Shtychaŭ, Starazhytnyja dzjarzhavy na terytoryi Belarusi, 2
nd edn,
Minsk, 2002, the title already suggests the existence of Belarus in ancient times.
25 One can see here at work elements of a premodern understanding of nation, as Timothy Snyder puts
it: Snyder, Reconstruction: 281.
26 A ‘foundation myth’ in the sense used here means a fact or event of the past playing a decisive role
in the formation of a certain narrative, thus being a crucial stone in the building of collective identity.
In this way a ‘narrative’ can be understood as a composition of the basic foundation myths. See69
their sum explain the character of the now existing nation. It seems obvious that there
are two basic kinds of foundation myths. Myths of the first kind serve as legitimation
only for one single nation, those of the second kind can be used by various nations.
In the national narratives of the three countries, there are foundation myths of both
groups. One example for the first kind is the kingdom of the Polish Piast dynasty - a
Polish central foundation myth, but without significance for her eastern neighbours, so
there are no disputes at all about this subject.
27 One example of the second kind is the
Republic of Both Nations, especially its eastern part, the Grand Duchy, forming an
important foundation myth for Lithuanians and Belarusians as well, additionally being
an important element of Polish and Ukrainian narratives of history. These one could
call ‘intersected myths’ because of their multifunctional character, important for
identity constructions of two or more nations.
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Such ‘intersected’ myths make possible a classification of narratives into two: those
with a high percentage of ‘undisputed’ foundation myths (i.e. having a function for
one single nation only), and those with a higher number of ‘intersected’ myths. This
classification is important, because the structure of the narrative essentially
determines the problems encountered by one nation in forming her identity by
constructing a concise and consistent story of its own historical development. The a
priori existence of many intersected foundation myths in a given narrative
complicates the process of self-definition and forces one to justify one’s use of
historical events to the neighbours.
So the quota of intersected foundation myths in the narrative of one nation
determines the possibilities of writing a ‘purely individual’ history, a history of one’s
own, without getting into conflict with one’s neighbours. The more ‘intersected’
foundation myths occur, the more problems occur as a consequence of constructing an
‘exclusive’ narrative. If a nation can dispose of many individual, undisputed
foundation myths, the construction of a narrative and thus of national collective
identity is much easier. Moreover, there is a connection between concise narrative and
identity: the more individual foundation myths exist, the stronger one’s own identity
construction.
The ‘intersection area’: Geography and the structures of narratives
In most cases, foundation myths are linked up with concrete issues, that is, with
historical figures, historical events or historical landscapes. It is interesting that very
often foundation myths are bound to a certain territory. Looking at where the three
countries get their foundation myths from nowadays, there is a distinction between
‘individual’ areas and ‘intersected’ ones (e.g. for the Polish case the difference
between the towns of Kraków and Wilno). There is a certain ‘intersection area’, which
Samsonowicz, O ‘historii prawdziwej’, chapters ‘Mity ‘Początku’’ and ‘Polskie mity Początku’: 27-40
and 59-70.
27 See Marek Cetwiński, ‘Kazimierz Odnowiciel: Mit wiecznego powrotu w dziejopisarstwie polskim’,
Biuletyn Instytut Filozoficzny – Historyczny WSP w Częstochowie, 17, 6, 1999: 3-7; Jerzy Topolski,
‘Historiographische Mythen. Eine methodologische Einführung’ in Adelheid von Saldern ed. Mythen
in Geschichte und Geschichtsschreibung aus polnischer und deutscher Sicht, Münster 1996: 27-35.
28 There are also examples of historical events which are interpreted in a different manner by
neighbours, but which do not play a central role in their historical consciousness. One example is the
Chmielnicki-uprising of 1648 – a Ukrainian foundation myth, but interpreted on the Polish side only as
riot without further importance for the formation of Polish identity. See Paul Robert Magocsi, A
History of Ukraine, Seattle 1995: chapter ‘The Polish Historical Viewpoint’, esp. 17 and ‘The
Ukrainian Historical Viewpoint’, esp. 19.70
one could locate approximately between Vilnius and Minsk, to which the foundation
myths of all three countries are bound.
To understand Polish-Lithuanian-Belarusian problems of history and of mutual
relations in the right way, it is important to consider the character of the region
between Vilnius and Minsk. It is one of the typical East European border regions,
where various national narratives and interests stand in sharp contrast between each
other and can hardly be solved because of the very complicated ethnic structure at the
micro-level. The number of these border regions in Eastern Europe is mainly due to
the ethnic mix in many parts of Eastern Europe. But the specific nature of the region
between Vilnius and Minsk has to do with the fact that there are neither ‘natural
borders’ in this region nor a historical name.
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Unlike other border regions like Galicia, Bukowina or Transylvania, the region
between Vilnius and Minsk never formed an independent political unit, but
nevertheless has got a specific quality. It is the region where, since medieval times,
East Slav and Baltic tribes lived together. In the Middle Ages, the area of Baltic
settlement reached at least as far as Minsk, so it is not enough to speak only of the
Vilnius region as an intersection area.
30 The Polish element, which was present in the
region since late Middle Ages, led to the notion of North-Western kresy - the only
kind of denomination existing for this territory. But there are two problems with this
name: firstly, it is a Polish notion only and evokes the idea of Polish domination in
this area: kresy means borderlands, so people living in this area are mentally mapped
to be at the eastern borders of a centre being Poland. For obvious reasons, this
conception is not acceptable neither for Lithuanians, nor for Belarusians nor
Ukrainians. Secondly, the notion of kresy does not distinguish between areas with
ethnic Lithuanian, Belarusian or Ukrainian population, thus postulating a uniformity,
which in fact did not exist.
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The present-day states of Belarus, Lithuania and Poland share this area, but it is
important to point out in what sense. Following its Western shift, present-day Poland
contains hardly any part of what one could call the ‘intersection area’. But also in
former times, there was a Polish state with a considerably extensive area called
‘Polish’: the Polish Kingdom that endured up to 1795 as the Western part of the
Republic of Both Nations. This meant that the heritage of the past one can rely on to
form a ‘Polish’ historical narrative contains a considerable number of ‘undisputed’
foundation myths, historical events as well as towns or regions such as Kraków, the
regions Wielkopolska and Małopolska and others. So especially in Poland it is
possible to build a historical narrative without using the intersected Eastern myths and
based on an huge number of foundation myths undoubtedly ‘Polish’ dating back to the
Middle Ages such as the Piast dynasty or King Kazimierz Wielki. This ‘ethnic’ Polish
history can serve as social glue, moderating identity losses concerning the Eastern
29 See Ralph Schattkowsky, ‘Das Land zwischen Ost und West. Regionalität und Herrschaft im
östlichen Mitteleuropa’, in Mieczysław Wojciechowski and Ralph Schattkowsky (ed.), Historische
Grenzlandschaften Ostmitteleuropas im 16. und 20. Jh. Gesellschaft – Wirtschaft – Politik, Toruń
1996: 7-24; Stefan Troebst, ‘What’s in a Historical Region? A Teutonic Perspective’, European Review
of History, 10, 2003: 173-88.
30 See Zigmas Zinkevičius, ‘Pietryčių Lietuva nuo seniausių laikų iki mūsų dienų’ and Valerijus
Čekmonas and Laima Grumadienė, ‘Kalbų paplitimas rytų Lietuvoje’, both in K. Garšva and Laima
Grumadienė (ed.), Lietuvos rytai. Straipsnių rinkinys, Vilnius 1993: 42-100 and 132-6.
31 On the term kresy see Hanna Dylągowa, ‘Kresy – pojęcie historyczne i emocjonalne’, Więż, 9, 1999:
95-101 and Stefan Kieniewicz, ‘Kresy. Przemiany terminologiczne w perspektywie dziejowej’,
Przegląd Wschodni, 1, 1, 1991: 3-13.71
region.
32 What causes problems in the Polish narrative is the idea of former Polish
Eastern cultural domination.
Nowadays Lithuania contains Vilnius and the Vilnius region: an important part of
the mentioned ‘intersection area’. So the problem of intersected foundation myths is
much more important and it is not possible for Lithuanian historians to create an
undisputed ‘Lithuanian character’ of this region. But Lithuania like Poland consists
additionally of a region with undisputed ‘Lithuanian’ character: the region of
Samogitia, which had constituted during several times in history a nucleus of
Lithuanian national self-assertion. This fact has recently led to a strong regionalistic
Samogitian self-awareness and a conception of history predicated on the assumption
of being the ‘real’ Lithuania.
33
Belarus is in the most unfavourable position, being wholly situated in the mentioned
‘intersection area’. There is no Belarusian region fulfilling a similar role as the
Kingdom of Poland or Samogitia.
34 Between Lithuania and Belarus, there is a second
point, making the situation of Belarus even more unfavourable. Given the similarity
of the Belarusian language to both Polish and Russian, Belarusian culture did not have
an equally undisputed criterion for self-definition and segregation as had the
Lithuanians with their non-Slavic and therefore very different language.
35 It is
interesting to note that the acceleration of Lithuanian national movement started with
the public use of the Lithuanian language. To this day the Lithuanian language has
had a high mythical value in Lithuanian culture.
36 One can detect here a reason for, on
the one hand, the fast success of the Lithuanian national movement and, on the other,
the weakness of the Belarusian case. The Belarusian language was treated either as a
Polish or as a Russian dialect and thus could not fulfil a similar function. So the
postulate of a Belarusian distinct identity was not believed a priori by its neighbours,
but had to be demonstrated again and again.
32 Wojciech Wrzesiński ed. Polskie mity polityczne XIX i XX wieku, 2 vols, Wrocław, 1994 - 1996 gives
an overview over crucial Polish myths. The myth of Polish East (Daniel Beauvois, ‘Mit Kresów
Wschodnich” czyli jak mu położyć kres’, in Wrzesiński, Polskie mity, vol. 1, 93-106) is here only one
myth among others.
33 See e.g. Adomas Butrimas and others, Žemaitijos istorija, Vilnius 1997, esp. the chapter by Egidijus
Aleksandravičius ‘Žemaicių kultūrinis sąjūdis Lietuvos atgimimo istorijoje’: 270-94.
34 However, an important direction in Belarusian historiography uses the medieval duchy of Polack as
undisputed foundation myth. See Lindner, Historiker: 81-4.
35 The problem is not the youth of the Belarusian language, because there is a vivid literal tradition not
only during the reformation, but also in the Middle Ages, when the so-called ‘Old-Belarusian’ was the
official written language of the Grand Duchy. In this function, the Belarusian language is one of the
few non-intersected foundation myths of present-day Belarus. But this myth is relatively weak because
of the similar character of Belarusian in comparison to Polish and Russian. See Snyder, Reconstruction,
41. Many Polish and Russian speakers still do not accept the character of Belarusian as an individual
language, considering it a mere dialect and calling it and its mixed forms ‘the simple language’ (jazyk
‘po prostu’). See Čekmonas, ‘Kalbų paplitimas’: 133. In present-day Belarus there exists a complicated
structure of language mixture of Belarusian and Russian. See Nacional’naja Akademija Nauk Belarusi.
Instytut jazykoznanija imeni Jakuba Kolasa ed. Tipologija dvujazyčija i mnogojazyčija v Belarusi,
Minsk 1999: 112-242.
36 For the Lithuanian idea of nation see Vytautas Berenis, ‘Modernėjančių mentalitetų gimimas’, in
Berenis and others ed. Lietuvių mentalitetai: tautinė istorija ir kultūros problemos, Vilnius 2002: 190-
220. The importance of language for the Lithuanian national idea being characteristic for all Baltic
countries is stressed by Romuald J. Misiunas and Rein Taagepera, The Baltic States. Years of
Dependence, 1940 – 1980, London 1983: 167.72
Strategy
There are two main strategies of coping with the past and writing history. From a
maximalistic, exclusive position, writing history not only serves as a means of self-
definition, but also acquires a strictly exclusive character by creating a history of
‘one’s own’ and ignoring the needs and interpretations of one’s neighbours. The
opposite view offers an inclusive version of historiography, which understands the
idea of historiography as a common task, as the consequence of a common past.
Accepting inclusive elements in one’s own narrative makes for better mutual
understanding, but also presupposes the giving up of several elements of the exclusive
conception. In particular the mentioned idea of historical ‘truth’, common and
widespread in non-scientific circles of society, had to be seriously modified for these
purposes. In the process of designing their identity and their mutual relations, the
main task of the three states after 1989 was to find solutions in this field.
Poland – Lithuania: ‘getting rid’ of history?
In his study, Timothy Snyder shows that after 1989 an important step of Polish
Eastern policy was the rupture with the old traditional Polish understanding of these
areas. The Polish idea of a cultural nation postulated a Polish cultural mission into the
East, which viewed in a certain sense present-day Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine as
part of Poland. The rupture implemented by foreign minister Skubiszewski and
prepared by Jerzy Giedroyć and Jerzy Mierosławski in the Polish emigration journal
Kultura consisted of two main elements. The first was the decision to treat the Eastern
neighbours as states with equal rights and not to see them through the lens of one’s
own narrative. The second element was to place the state interests of the present-day
Polish republic higher above any contentious historical debates.
37
This strategy succeeded in many respects. By ‘leaving history to the historians’ and
preventing its exploitation in actual politics, not only a normalisation of mutual
relations with neighbours was possible, but also a harmonisation of historical
narratives. In the case of Lithuania and Ukraine, this strategy worked well: Poland and
Ukraine succeeded in coming to terms on a most contentious part of their mutual
history, when both countries founded a bilateral commission with the aim of
elucidating the mutual massacres of the 1940s and the post-war resettlement of
Ukrainians by communist Poland, the so-called akcja Wisła.
38
Poland and Lithuania divided between themselves the historical heritage of the
Republic of Both Nations and Grand Duchy: Poland came to regard itself as a
successor of the Western, while Lithuania views itself as successor of the Eastern
part.
39 When the majority of Polish historians spoke no longer of an annexation or
incorporation of ‘Lithuania’ into ‘Poland’ in 1385, they accepted by this the
Lithuanian construction of succession, the Lithuanian historical ‘rights’ on the Grand
37 Snyder, Reconstruction: 218-20. See also Romuald Wernik, O realną politykę wschodnią. Kilka
uwag o polskiej polityce wschodniej i mniejszościowej, Wrocław 1999.
38 After the government formally apologized for this, a common historical commission was set up with
the aim of investigating the akcja Wisła. See Grzegorz Motyka, ‘Problematyka stosunków polsko-
ukraińskich w latach 1939 – 1948 w polskiej historiografii po roku 1989’, in Piotr Kosiewski and
Grzezgorz Motyka ed. Historycy Polscy i ukraińscy wobec problemów XX wieku, Kraków 2000: 166-
78; Włodzimierz Bonusiak ed. Polska i Ukraina w podręcznikach swzkolnych i akademickich.
Materiały z konferencji naukowej nt. podręczników szkolnych i akademickich w Polsce i na Ukrainie,
odbytej 18-19 września 2000 r. w Wyższej Szkole Pedagogicznej w Rzeszowie, Rzeszów 2001.
39 Snyder, Reconstruction, 251.73
Duchy. In addition, both partners created a common version of the Vilnius/Wilno
history, downplaying any remaining controversies.
The reason for these common activities of Poland and Lithuania can be detected in
their common state interests: both states strongly pursued membership in the
European Union. This meant the necessity to solve neighbour and minority problems
as a precondition of entrance. Especially for the Lithuanian raison d’état the notion
was crucial that orientation to the West and membership of Western institutions
(strongly desired because of a fear of Russian aspirations) was possible only with the
help and in communication with the pre-war enemy Poland. As a result, an idea of a
‘strategic partnership’ of the two countries evolved.
40
But there was also a price to be paid for the Polish-Lithuanian agreement. Creating a
common, harmonised version of history automatically means 1) a break with one’s
own traditions and 2) accepting the historical constructions of the other partner.
Poland did the former by giving up her historical ‘rights’ on Vilnius. This meant a
sharp rupture with traditions rooted in Polish cultural thought.
41 Secondly, this also
meant Polish acceptance of Vilnius as the capital of Lithuania and an acceptance of
the Lithuanian construction of history – especially of the two main problems of
Lithuanian history construction.
Firstly, there was a contradiction between the Lithuanian view of the annexation of
Lithuania by the Soviet Union in 1940 as an aggression (which is what it actually
was) and the fact that Stalin himself had given Vilnius to this country. From a logical
point of view, condemning the aggression would also mean condemning the ‘return’
of Vilnius. The reason for the rejection of this contradiction lies in the second
contradiction of Lithuanian history that Poland had to accept: before 1940, Vilnius
was anything but an ethnic Lithuanian city. Even the most optimistic statistics could
count no more than 2% Lithuanians, whereas the Poles came to 30% (the most
numerous ethnic group in the city were the Jews with 40%). What made Vilnius the
ethnically Lithuanian city that it is today was Soviet resettlement politics. If one were
to use the ethnic criterion, Lithuanians should have given Vilnius back to Poland after
the Second World War. But instead of insisting on arguments like this, on the Polish
side efforts were made to accept the Lithuanian positions, for the first time in history
perceiving Lithuania as an equal political partner.
42
Lithuania on the other hand, accepted Polish problems. This shows the ‘new’
Lithuanian reaction to the ‘old’ Polish ideas of cultural mission, which remained
vivid, because they are so deeply rooted in cultural memory, which cannot be blotted
out overnight by political decisions. If Polish official politics accepted the
40 See for the Lithuanian search for security Peter van Ham, ‘The Baltic States and Europe: The Quest
for security’, in Birthe Hansen and Bertel Heurlin, The Baltic states in world politics, Richmond 1998:
24-45; for Polish fulfilment of conditions for EU-entrance see Wanda Dugiel, ‘Warunki członkostwa w
Unii Europejskiej i ich spełnianie przez Polskę, in Elżbieta Kawecka-Wyrzykowska (ed.), Stosunki
Polski z Unią Europejską, Warszawa 2002: 95-116; for ‘strategical partnership’ and Lithuanian-Polish
relations see Jerzy Marek Nowakowski, ‘Trudne partnerstwo strategiczne’ and Povilas Gylys,
‘Najnowsza historia rozwoju stosunków polsko-litewskich’, both in Stanisław Miklaszewski ed. Polska
polityka wschodnia, Kraków 2000: 31-40 and 57-62; Raimundas Lopata, ‘Lietuvos ir Lenkijos
valstybinių santykių raida nuo 1990 m.’, Šiaurės Atėnai, 17. X. 1998, 37, 431.
41 In 1999, the vice-president of the Polish parliament Jan Król expressed the opinion that one should
not overestimate Polish-Lithuanian minority questions, thus showing the intention to set more stock by
Polish-Lithuanian relations as a whole than by ‘old’ minority ‘rights’. See Jan Król, ‘Współpraca
polska-litewska’, in Miklaszewski, Polska polityka, 25-6.
42 Two examples: Janusz Dunin-Horkawicz, ‚Jak szanować Litwę? Nurty wileńskiego myślenia’,
Zeszyty Historyczne, 128, 1999: 82-8; Bogdan Szlachta, ‘Zrozumieć rację Litwinów’, Więż, 8 1992: 22-
31.74
Lithuanianness of Vilnius and its culture, the idea of cultural heritage has endured to
this day.
43 Thus present-day Polish schoolchildren still learn by heart the famous
beginning of Mickiewicz’s poem Pan Tadeusz ‘Lithuania, my fatherland’. For Polish
cultural thinking the idea of a Polish cultural heritage and of a Polishness of Vilnius
and of Mickiewicz is crucial. It is so strongly embedded in the minds of the Polish
population, that its rejection on the basis of rational, state-interest-led reasons is
simply impossible.
With this harmonised version of history, it is possible nowadays for Lithuanians to
accept the Polish position. Since it was no more absolutely necessary to postulate the
Lithuanianness of Vilnius Romantic poets, it was much easier to accept Polish ideas
of Polish cultural heritage on Lithuanian territory. The switch can be seen in the
following two examples. At the beginning of the Lithuanian national movement with
the journal Aušra in 1882, Jonas Basanavičius claimed for the purposes of national
self-definition the whole past of the region as Lithuanian, speaking of Mickiewicz,
Kondratowicz, Moniuszko and all Vilnius Romantics as Lithuanians.
44 Nowadays, not
only the common Polish-Lithuanian background of Mickiewicz is stressed,
45 but also
his ‘European’ character.
46 This shows once more how intensively the leading idea of
Europe structures historical Lithuanian thinking.
47
It was this orientation towards actual state interests that led Lithuanian political
leaders to an acceptance of Polish positions at a further crucial point. Since the
emergence of an independent Lithuania after 1989 the strong postulate of an official
excuse by Poland for the occupation of Vilnius by General Żeligowski in 1920 limited
the possibilities of a Polish-Lithuanian agreement. Thus, the Lithuanians wanted Poles
not only to accept the Lithuanian historical narrative, but also demanded an excuse
from a state which was not responsible for the action.
48 In 1993, Landsbergis for the
first time spoke of the possibility of an agreement with Poland without a Polish
excuse for Żeligowski. This and the final ratification of the Polish-Lithuanian treaty
one year later marked an important turning point. In placing state interests above
historical ‘right’, Lithuania accepted the Polish position and thus desisted from
demanding that Poland should accept the Lithuanian historical narrative as a whole.
49
43 For the idea of Polish culture in the East see Grzegorz Kotlarski and Marek Figura (ed.), Oblicza
wschodu w kulturze polskiej, Poznań 1999.
44 Jerzy Ochmański, Litewski ruch narodowo-kulturalny w XIX wieku (do 1890 r.), Białystok 1965: 179-
90.
45 In his article on the film by Polish director Andrzej Wajda ‘Pan Tadeusz’, based on the poem by
Adam Mickewicz, Marius Ivaškevič called Mickiewicz a ‘bridge’ between Poland and Lithuania. See
Marius Ivaškevič, ‘Kodėl aš ne lenkas? Mintys, šovusios į galvą žiūrint “Poną Tadą”‘, Kultūros barai,
4, 2000: 40.
46 See Egidijus Aleksandravičius (ed.), Mickevičiaus Lietuva. Adomo Mickevičiaus 200-osioms gimimo
metinėms, Kaunas 1999 and Aušra Jurgutienė (ed.), Lietuvos kultūra: romantizmo variantai: mokslinės
konferencijos, skirto Adomo Mickevičiaus 200-osioms gimimo metinėms ir įvykusios 1998 gruodžio
dieną, medžiaga, Vilnius 2001.
47In the years before joining the EU, the problem of the European Character of Lithuanian culture was
broadly discussed. Historians pointed out the individuality of Lithuanian culture in a European context
dating to the Middle Ages. See Darius Staliūnas ed. Europos idėja Lietuvoje: istorija ir dabartis,
Vilnius 2002; Alfredas Bumblauskas and Rimvydas Petrauskas (ed.), Lietuvos europejimo keliais:
istorines studijos, Vilnius 2002; I. Vinogradnaitė, ‘The Construction of National and European Identity
in Lithuania’, in P. Drulák ed. National and European identities in EU enlargement. Views from
Central and Eastern Europe, Praha 2001: 95 – 112.
48 Poland could not accept this postulate as this would lead to further revanchist postulates from other
countries. Snyder, Reconstruction, 254.
49 Ibid., 272 f.75
The Polish-Lithuanian conflict now became part of an old, finished history (therefore
historicised) and was described as such in the Lithuanian media.
50
In this way, Poland and Lithuania managed not only to organise the past by dividing
historical heritage, but also to cope with the ideas of historical ‘truths’ existing in both
societies. This was perhaps the most important achievement of the whole process.
Poland and Lithuania managed to combine the harmonised narratives of history with
the historical ‘feelings’ dominating their respective societies. This was of crucial
importance for the survival of the narrative. If history or a historiographic description
only claims to be a rational construction ‘from above’ and differs too much from these
feelings, it runs the risk of losing social acceptance or even of being labelled as
‘false’. For purposes of identity construction, it becomes worthless because it cannot
play the role of ‘social glue’.
For Polish society, the problem was harder than it was for the Lithuanians. To this
day it has been a delicate task to accept and to marginalise kresy-Romanticism in
Polish society.
51 In contrast to this, Lithuanians are in quite a good position, because
their historical narrative won over. No longer forced to stress the problems of this
narrative, they can use its integrative potential. Here lies an important reason for the
intensity of mobilisation and restructuration of the Lithuanian society. At the official
level, Lithuania nowadays presents itself as a Europe-orientated, modern nation-state
with fair-play politics on minority questions.
52 In this way, the orientation towards
Europe and the European Union helped modify and render more malleable the
historical ‘truth’ in both countries and offered an Ersatz and an additional orientation,
which complemented and thus diminished ‘old’ ideas of historical ‘truth’.
Polish-Lithuanian harmony causes troubles with Belarus: The Licvin-theory of
Ermalovič and the reaction of Gudavičius
The ‘losers’ in this Polish-Lithuanian agreement are the Belarusians. For them, the
common past with their neighbours turned out to be a malediction rather than a
chance. A similar partition of historical heritage to that between Poland and Lithuania
is not possible, because there was never either a historical ‘Lithuanian’ or a
‘Belarusian’ unit, dividing the Grand Duchy in two parts
53 which could have been
used as Lithuanian and Belarusian by predecessor states. This means that the
development of two exclusive, but harmonised narratives was not possible either.
So harmonising the narratives between Poland and Lithuania automatically means
excluding Belarus – a problem all Belarusian national narratives have to cope with.
50 See e.g. Bronys Savukynas, ‘Su kaimynais kaimyniškai, arba pokalbiai apie senuosius stereotipus’,
Kultūros barai, 8, 9, 1997: 2. Saulius Drazdauskas speaks even of the ‘end of history’ of both
countries. Saulius Drazdauskas, ‘Lenkų sindromo pabaiga? Kelios pastabos su istoriniu kontekstu’,
Naujasis Židinys – Aidai, 10, 2001: 521-24, (521).
51 In his analysis of the Polish political system, Zdzisław Krasnodębski describes the unwillingness of
Polish liberals to deal with the past at all: Zdzisław Krasnodębski, Demokracja peryferii, Gdańsk 2003:
229-39. The strategy of getting rid of history may be a consequence of this attitude towards the past.
52 Saulius Kubrys, National Minorities in Lithuania. An Outline, trans. by Milda Dyke, Vilnius 2002.
For an official point of view see Tautinių mažumų ir išeivijos departamentas prie Lietuvos Respublikos
Vyriausybės (ed.), Tautinių mažumų švietimas Lietuvoje: teoriniai ir praktiniai aspektai. Konferencijos
medžiaga 2000 m. gruodžio mėn. 19 – 20. d., Vilnius 2001.
53 A somewhat similar situation exists between Poles and Ukrainians. The Grand Duchy contained
before 1569 important parts of regions with Ukrainian settlers. These regions went after the Lublin
Union to Korona Polska. So there is a historical border separating present-day Belarus and Ukraine, but
not Ukraine and Poland. But this is of no further importance for today, because Korona Polska and the
Grand Duchy do not play a central role as they do in Ukrainian foundation myths.76
Bearing in mind the fact that present-day Belarus and Lithuania both contain parts of
the mentioned intersection area, but not of present-day Poland, it becomes obvious
that there appeared disputes especially between Belarus and Lithuania over history
and not so much between Belarus and Poland. In Belarus there exists at least one
strong narrative, which describes Belarus as a successor to the Grand Duchy. This
posed a particular problem to Lithuanians, who rejected this part of the Belarusian
conception as a whole.
These problems occurred very early when a new historiography was coming into
being, seeking for alternative terms beyond the Soviet paradigm. In 1989, Mikola
Ermalovich published his ideas on Belarusian origin,
54 which later on he worked out
in detail. According to him, the historical right on the designation ‘Lithuania’ does not
belong to Lithuanians, but to Belarusians. His argumentation works as follows:
In the same way that there existed under the Baltic term of “Prusiia” a
strong German state, there hid under the Baltic term of “Litva” a strong
East-Slav state. In the same way that the Eastern Germans were called
“Prusaki”, who should not be confused with Prussians [“Prusy”], so
Belarusians of the Nemen area [paniamonskia belarusy] were called
‘litviny’, who should not be confused with “litoŭcy”. The Grand Duchy of
Lithuania was a poly-ethnical state, but judging by the history of its
foundation on the territory of Belarus, which was its nucleus, and by the
domination of Belarusian culture and language it was first of all a
Belarusian state.
55
Without further research it is not possible to discuss these statements, but that is not
the task of the present article. Ermalovich’s statements form an important part of the
Belarusian way of coping with the past. Even if Ermalovich holds an extreme
position, which is not shared by all Belarusian colleagues,
56 his ideas were highly
important for a certain direction in the discourse on Belarusian self-awareness.
Historians tried to postulate an ethnic-based regional conscience of the Polish-
speaking intelligentsia of the nineteenth century, calling them licviny, and occupying
the regional conscience of Polish speaking noblemen of eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries for this purposes. Great figures such as Adam Mickiewicz are placed in the
proximity of Belarusian culture, implicitly acquiring a certain degree of
Belarusianness.
57
But the ideas of Ermalovich represent not so much an opposition to Polish, but rather
to the Lithuanian narrative, indirectly denying Lithuanians the right to their very
name. Several political circles even propagated the idea of renaming the Republic
Belarus as ‘Litvania’.
58 This triggered, as a consequence, sharp reactions on the part
of Lithuanian historians. When in 1993 a reader of Belarusian history directed to a
54 Mikola Ermalovich, Pa shliadach adnago mifa, Minsk 1989.
55 Mikola Ermalovich, Starazhytnaia Belarus’. Polacki i novagarodski peryiady, Minsk 1990: 351.
56 See a moderate position in Henadz’ Sahanovich, Narys historyi Belarusi, Minsk 2001:59-94. Zejmis,
‘Belarusian National Historiography’, 392-94 describes the ‘more measured approach’ of the majority
of Belarusian historians.
57 On the Polish life of Minsk in the first half of 19
th century see Tadeusz Zienkiewicz, Polskie życie
literackie w Mińsku w XIX i na początku XX wieku do roku 1921, Olsztyn 1997. For a Belarusian
interpretation of Mickiewicz see Lew Miračycki, ‘Adam Mickewicz im Bewusstsein der
Beloruthenen’, in Zdzisław Krasnodębski and Stefan Garsztecki (ed.), Sendung und Dichtung. Adam
Mickiewicz in Europa, Hamburg 2002: 293-300.
58 See the website of this group: <http://www.come.to.litvania.html> [Accessed 9 February 2004].77
broader public was published, Lithuanians reacted and rejected the main ideas.
59 The
debate reached its peak with an article by the Lithuanian historian Edvardas
Gudavičius, who not only rejected this idea as a whole, but also questioned the
scientific character of his colleagues’ contributions.
60 Alfredas Bumblauskas from
Vilnius University spoke of the ‘infantile diseases of a nascent Belarusian
nationalism’.
61
This is an excellent demonstration of the great importance of foundation myths in the
formation of collective identities. The Belarusian attempt to usurp a common
foundation myth, exclusively for one’s own purposes, violated the needs of the
Lithuanian construction of collective identity. For Lithuanians it is simply impossible
to accept the thesis of a leading and founding role played by the Belarusians instead of
the Lithuanians at the beginning of the Grand Duchy, because it stands in sharp
contrast to a Lithuanian historical narrative, which imparts legitimation to modern
Lithuania and as such forms an integral part of the raison d’été of the present-day
Lithuanian state. This is moreover a narrative that has now been accepted by Polish
historians and thereby once more confirmed in Lithuanian consciousness.
Nevertheless, Lithuanian historians were, on the whole, open to sharing the heritage
of the Grand Duchy with Belarusians, but proposed a totally different version of
Belarusian ethnogenesis.
62 This remained so after the ‘agreement’ on history with
Polish historians.
Choosing another past?
In 1995 Belarusian President Aliaksandr Lukashenka introduced a new state flag and
coat of arms. The Pahonia motive was rejected and replaced by a composition with
visible similarities to the former Soviet coat of arms including such elements as the
Red Star and wheat ears. This was not only a change of symbols, but the introduction
of a second historical narrative on Belarusian history, conceptualising Belarus rather
as part of the East-Slavonic family than a Western-orientated country. This meant a
reorientation towards Soviet Belarusian traditions, as Lukashenka himself stressed.
63
Additionally, it marked a radical change in the formation of official identity: if with
the Pahonia motive Belarusian identity was intended to use the whole past of the
intersection area for its own purposes, now a sharp rupture was being made by
59 I. Saverchanka and Zm. San’ko, 100 pytanniaŭ i adkazaŭ z historyi Belarusi, Minsk 1993. In 1994 a
translation of several passages was printed in Naujasis Židinys, followed by a comment by Kastytis
Stalioraitis, ‘DLK paveldas ir Baltarusiai’, Naujasis Židinys, 9,10, 1994: 52-9.
60 Edvardas Gudavičius, ‘Following the tracks of a myth’, Lithuanian Historical Studies, 1, 1996: 38-
58.
61 Alfredas Bumblauskas, ‘The heritage of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania: perspectives of historical
consciousness’, in Grigorijus Potashenko ed. The peoples of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, Vilnius,
2002: 28.
62 In Lithuania, the ideas of Edvardas Gudavičius on Belarusian ethnogenesis are widely accepted. He
speaks of a proto-Belarusian ethnic group called Gudai, from which originated both the Belarusians
and the Ukrainians: Edvardas Gudavičius, ‘The Ruthenians’, in Potašenko, The peoples, 45-56 (earlier
published in Lithuanian in Vytautas Ališauskas et al. ed. Lietuvos Didžiosios Kunigaikštijos Kultūra.
Tyrinėjimai ir vaizdai, Vilnius 2001: 197-206.
63 Vystuplenie Prezidenta Respubliki Belarus’ A. G. Lukashenko na vstreche s pobeditieliami i
prizerami konkursa na luchshii poiasnitel’nyi tekst k Gosudarstvennomu gerbu Respubliki Belarus’ i
Gosudarstvennomu flagu Respubliki Belarus’ 25 sentiabria 1996, in Skobelev, Gerb i flag, 5. See also
Astrid Sahm, ‘Political Culture and National Symbols: Their Impact on the Belarusian Nation-building
Process’, Nationalities Papers 27 1999: 649-61 and Rüdiger Ritter, ‘Ein Wappen, zwei Staaten. Der
Reiter in Litauen und Belarus’, Osteuropa, 54, 7, 2004: 37-51.78
stressing Soviet foundation myths and putting a stop to using the whole intersected
past as a primary source of identity.
But this proved unfeasible. The court historians around Lukashenka tried to ban
Pahonia as a ‘fascistic’ symbol, but failed in excluding it totally from their narrative.
64
They failed also in dominating Belarusian society with their narrative and symbols:
The main propagator of the idea of Pahonia as a state symbol had been the Belarusian
People’s Front ‘Adradzhennje’, the most important political factor in the early ‘90s.
This organisation lost considerable political influence after 1995, but nevertheless it
was possible to organise a conference in 2002 by members of the People’s Front
‘Adradzhennje’ on ‘Ideals of the Belarusian National Republic and the Rebirth of
Belarus’.
65 In 2003, in Belarusian bookshops a huge coloured volume on Belarusian
history was sold which had been printed in Slovakia and presenting an opposite
version of Belarusian history, stressing the officially condemned foundation myths.
66
This demonstrates once more that it is not sufficient simply to ban intersected
historical facts, because the narrative thus constructed seems artificial, violates
historical memory and cannot prevail over other existing concepts. The dispute is
currently going on with an open result but it is already clear that a stable construction
of identity and peaceful relations cannot be achieved without dealing with the
intersected past.
64 After the new state symbols were installed in June 1995, in December 1995 an official competition
was started in order to find a text with the best explanation for them. In general, the Pahonia motive
was not totally excluded from the new historical narrative, but lost its function as an important
foundation myth and was now called an alien, Lithuanian symbol. For some texts of the competition
see Skobelev, Gerb i flag, passim, for the condemnation of Pahonja as fascistic symbol see the articles
of Aleksandr Stukanov, ‘Ėmblema mira i truda’: 88 and Dmitrij Chromchenko, ‘Simvoly nadezhdy i
dobra’: 79.
65 Navukova-histarychnaja kanferencyia ‘Idealy BNR i Adradzhen’nje Belarusi’, Mensk, 17 sakavika
1002 g., conference reader unpublished, in my archives (RR).
66 Uladzimir Arlov and Zmitser Gerasimovich, Kraina Belarus’. Iliustravanaia historyia, Martin
[Slovakia], 2003.79
The Bulgarian monarchy: a politically motivated revision of a historical
image in a post-socialist transitional society
Markus Wien
American University, Bulgaria
From its foundation in 1878, which was a consequence of the previous Russian-
Turkish war, up to 1946 pre-socialist Bulgaria had a monarchic constitution. It was
finally abandoned on 8 September 1946 by a manipulated referendum, which turned
Bulgaria into a ‘People’s Republic’. The last king, Simeon II, had to leave the
country, but did not abdicate formally instead, but he kept his title as a monarch in
exile.
1
During the years of communist rule, which lasted until 1989, it was unthinkable for
Simeon to return to his home country – let alone resume political functions. The
rejection of the monarchy and its representatives as reactionary and feudalist by the
communists was too clear. On the contrary, they were eager to eliminate any positive
memory of the monarchy in the public. They did so by creating an official image of
history which blamed the monarchy for being the main reason, or at least, a very
important precondition for all negative developments in the history of Bulgaria since
1878. Significant terms, such as “adventurism” for Bulgaria’s participation in the
Balkan wars and the First World War under King Ferdinand or ‘monarcho-fascism’
for the authoritarian regime of Boris III, were chosen in order to make the period
before 1944 a part of the public memory as a past which was dark but had been
overcome.
2
After the change of 1989 and the end of the communist monopoly on public opinion,
all of a sudden the possibility of a historical re-evaluation of the Bulgarian monarchy
occurred. At the time, politicians, that is, mainly the leaders of the “Union of
Democratic Forces” (UDF), including President Petăr Stoyanov and Prime Minister
Aleksandăr Kostov, journalists but also authors claiming to be academic, such as
Božidar Dimitrov, the director of the National Historical Museum, took the lead in a
movement which sometimes aimed at glorifying the monarchy, but in any case tried
to present it as a positive era in contrast to the communist one-party dictatorship.
3
From 1996 onwards, the regular visits of Simeon II, partly initiated by the UDF, to
Bulgaria from his Spanish exile helped the monarchic movement gain popularity.
However, a real political perspective for him appeared only around the turn of the
millennium, when the Bulgarians got increasingly disappointed with the established
political parties as well as their representatives and started looking for new
alternatives.
4 By spring 2001, Simeon managed to win so much support among the
public that he took the risk of entering the Bulgarian political scene: as head of his
organisation “The National Movement Simeon II” (NDSV) he participated in the
1 Generally about Bulgarian history see e.g. R.J. Crampton, ‘Historical Foundations’, in K.-D.
Grothusen ed. Südosteuropa-Handbuch, Vol. VI, Göttingen 1990: 27-55.
2 B. Koen, ‚Die monarchofaschistische Oberschicht, Hitlerdeutschland und die Judenfrage, in
Bulgarische Akademie der Wissenschaften. Institut für Geschichte (ed.), Bulgarisch-deutsche
Beziehungen und Verbindungen, Vol. 4, Sofia 1989: 20-41 (20-2).
3 About Bulgarian “Para-Historiography” see I. Iliev, ‘On the history of inventing Bulgarian history’,
IWM Working Paper 5, 2000: 13. One of the most prominent representatives of this movement is
Bozhidar Dimitrov, head of the National Historical Museum in Sofia.
4 M. Wien, ‚Ab heute ist Bulgarien nicht mehr dasselbe Land’. Die Parlamentswahlen vom 17. Juni
2001’, Südosteuropa. Zeitschrift für Gegenwartsforschung, 4/2001: 13-32 (13).80
parliamentary elections of 17 June and, by winning 43% of the votes and 50% of the
seats in Parliament, he achieved an overwhelming victory. Paradoxically, he now had
to become prime minister, i.e. take a position within a republican government. It is
rather debatable whether he had actively aimed at this ‘career’, since he hesitated for
more than three weeks after the elections before he took this step. Now, as prime
minister, Simeon, who had never abdicated as king, found himself in the republican
hierarchy below the President, the Vice-President and the President of Parliament.
5
However, his success in the elections would have been impossible, if the general
attitude of the Bulgarian public towards the monarchy had not fundamentally changed
since 1989 – even if other reasons, such as deep public disappointment with
Aleksandăr Kostov’s UDF government, might have played an important role as well.
This attitude towards the monarchy, which directly focussed on Simeon’s public
appearance, was, nevertheless, from a historical perspective, related rather to the
monarch as an individual than to the monarchic institution itself, i.e. its constitutional
relevance. This was true not only after 1989, but also before.
Adventurism and monarcho-fascism
As regards the historical evaluation of the Bulgarian monarchy, the country’s socialist
historiography focussed primarily on the person of Boris III and his government.
Compared to him, relatively little attention was paid to the previous monarchs, least of
all to the first Prince of Bulgaria, Alexander von Battenberg.
6 His successor, King
Ferdinand, was portrayed, by both socialist as well as post-socialist historiography
including public memory, as a monarch who failed.
7 The most important reason for
this is, of course, Bulgaria’s defeat in the First World War, which resulted in
Ferdinand’s abdication and his return to Germany, his country of origin. A positive
aspect in this portrait was, however, the liberation of Bulgaria from Ottoman rule in
1908 and the country’s advancement to the status of a kingdom. Under Ferdinand,
however, Bulgaria participated in three wars between 1912 and 1918, which finally
resulted in the so-called “National catastrophe”.
8 Although there is no dissent as to the
disastrous character of these events, new tendencies in the evaluation of the motives
of Ferdinand’s policy emerged after the system change of 1989 – in contrast to
Marxist historiography, which had blamed the king for political and military
adventurism.
9 Since then, academic historiography as well as journalists and other
non-academic publishers have shown an increasing understanding, if not sympathy,
for the decision taken by Ferdinand’s regime to wage war. The revival of evaluative
patterns, known from the interwar period, is characteristic for such tendencies. One of
their most prominent representatives is the clearly nationalist historian Božidar
Dimitrov, known from many appearances on TV. His works enjoy a broad public
reception and, thus, have a significant influence on public images of history.
According to him, the Balkan Wars and the First World War were not military
5 Ibid.
6 About Alexander v. Battenberg see, e.g. J. Geševa, ‚Režimăt na pălnomoštijata (1881-1881) –
svoeobrazna forma na upravlenie na dăržavata’, in Bălgarska akademija na naukite. Institut po istorija
ed. 120 godini izpălnitelna vlast v Bălgarija, Sofia 1999: 91-103.
7 M. Petrov, ‚Nacionalnijat văpros v politikata na bălgarskite pravitelstva (1879-1919)’, in: 120 godini,
128-47.
8 About the Bulgarian independence see: C. Todorova, ‚Die europäische Diplomatie und die Erklärung
der Unabhängigkeit Bulgariens im Jahre 1908’, in Bulgarisch-deutsche Beziehungen, Vol. 4, 127-52.
9 See e.g. G. Markov, ‚Germanija i učastieto na Bălgarija v balkanskite vojni (1912-1913)’, in
Bulgarisch-deutsche Beziehungen, Vol. 4, 153-80.81
adventures, but wars for national unification supposed to integrate those Bulgarian
territories which were still under foreign, i.e. Ottoman, rule into their motherland. The
only mistake Ferdinand made in Dimitrov’s view was diplomatic dilettantism. In this
context, the wars for “National Unification” were nothing but an expression of
Ferdinand’s aim to fulfill his national mission, i.e. the unification of all ethnic
Bulgarians within one state. Therefore, the critique of the king’s policy, as it is
articulated by the representatives of this view, as well as by a substantial part of the
Bulgarian public, does not contain a fundamental rejection, especially as far as war is
concerned, but rather focuses on “technical” mistakes made by the monarch.
10
For the most part, Bulgarian historical public interest, however, is devoted to King
Boris III. The monarchic idea is mainly associated with his person. In most cases, the
debates about this form of government do not deal with the constitutional
consequences of monarchy but rather concentrate on Boris’s concrete policy, which is
then taken as a basis either for accepting or rejecting the monarchy in general.
Historical attention is mainly directed to the last third of his time in power, i.e. the
years between 1935 and his unexpected death in 1943. During this period, the king
ruled the country in an autocratic way and, thus, was responsible for all important
political decisions. This fact becomes even more relevant, since at that time the
Second World War began and forced Boris to take fundamental decisions not only as
regarded Bulgarian foreign policy but also the internal configuration of the country.
11
Due to the authoritarian regime Boris introduced in 1935 because of his
dissatisfaction with the “Zveno”-government and due to Bulgaria’s accession to the
Tri-Partite-Pact in 1941, socialist historiography unambiguously labelled this era as
‘monarcho-fascist’.
12 It thus positioned the king’s government within its ideologically
determined patterns of historical interpretation. It was the characterisation of the
system as ‘fascist’, which provided the necessary legitimacy of the ‘antifascist’ illegal
communist dominated resistance movement, the “Fatherland Front”. Post- or non-
socialist Bulgarian historiography, however, has clearly rejected the term ‘monarcho-
fascist’ to characterise Boris’s regime, pointing out a number of fundamental
differences between his rule and the ones of Hitler and Mussolini in Germany and
Italy respectively.
13
However, before, as well as after 1989, one historical event during Boris’s
government attracted and still attracts most of the attention connected with debate on
monarchy in Bulgaria: the survival of the 48,000 Bulgarian Jews during the Second
World War. Given the German-Bulgarian alliance this fact has caused astonishment,
but the debate about it has always been focussed on the question ‘who was
responsible for the salvation of the Jews?’ Before 1989, there was only one clear
answer: the communist resistance within the framework of the “Fatherland Front”.
14
10 B. Dimitrov, Bulgaria in the wars for national unification, in www.bulgaria.com/history/wars.html, last
accessed: July 2002.
11 N. Poppetrov, ‚Autoritarismus und Autoritäres Regime in Bulgarien’, in E. Oberländer, R. Jaworski
et al. eds .Autoritäre Regime in Ostmitteleuropa 1919-1944, Mainz 1995: 181-95 (195). V. Migev,
‚Formirane na koncepcijata za parlamentarnija model na bălgarskata monarchofašistka dăržava (1937-
1938)’, in Bălgarska Akademija na Naukite. Institut po istorija ed. Obštestveno-političeskijat život na
Bălgarija 1878-1944 (Izsledvanija po bălgarska istorija, Vol. 10), Sofia 1990: 289-326.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
14 I. Dimitrov, ‚The Main Factor of the Salvation of the Bulgarian Jews’, in Jahrbuch der jüdischen
Kulturorganisation in Bulgarien, 24, 1989: 242. Also: M. Wien, Antisemitismus in Bulgarien im
Spiegel der Parlamentsdebatten zum „Gesetz zum Schutze der Nation” 1940, MA-Thesis, Munich
1999: 1.82
Even after 1989 public discourse about the fate of the Bulgarian Jews during the
Second World War did not become much more differentiated. Since political life in
the country became increasingly polarised, the answer to the question who had saved
the Jews was equal to a revelation of one’s own political orientation – either towards
the ‘red’ socialist or the ‘blue’ oppositional movement “Union of Democratic Forces”
(UDF). In contrast to the socialists, the blue movement claimed the merit of the
salvation of the Bulgarian Jews from the death-camps for King Boris himself.
15 Thus,
Boris turned from a fascist oppressor of the people into a responsible father of his
nation, who had managed not only to save ‘his’ Jews from deportation, but also to
keep his country out of the German campaign against the USSR.
16 Now he was no
longer an irresponsible politician who, betraying his own national interests, had aimed
at an alliance with Germany, but rather a clever tactician or even a ‘fox’, as he was
frequently labelled, who had made the best out of the unavoidable cooperation with
the Nazis.
17 From this point of view and arguing in a very pragmatic way, also the
annexation of Southern Dobrudža from Romania, which was achieved in 1940
cooperating with Nazi-Germany, is booked positively in the balance of Boris’s
government. Generally, the positive way in which he is remembered by the Bulgarian
public today is decisively influenced by his clever policy towards Germany and the
avoided deportation of 48,000 Jews. The fascist elements of his regime are
increasingly neglected by the public memory.
18
This discourse is important not only for the re-evaluation of the monarchic
institution itself and its most prominent representatives. It is also motivated by a broad
request for a figure of national identification. In this sense, Boris becomes not only
the personified evidence that a monarchy can also achieve positive results, he also he
embodies good pre-socialist Bulgaria and, thus, provides for the possibility of the
country’s ‘return’ to its history after 45 years of communist dictatorship.
On the other hand, the old historical terminology is still broadly in use. Especially
the period between 1935 and 1944 is still commonly labelled as “fascist”, which
actually does not necessarily mean that the users of this term can give a precise
definition of it. Correspondingly, the forces of the “Fatherland Front”, i.e. the
partisans are called ‘antifascist’.
19 Thus, a parallel presence of contradictory historical
images within large parts of Bulgarian society must be noted. In this context, one and
the same person might characterise the era of Boris III, viewed as a responsible leader
who guided his nation amidst the dangers of his time, by using the terms he has
learned during decades of communist rule. Attempts at a more balanced evaluation of
Boris’s regime, coming from outside the daily political confrontations, have hardly
had any impact beyond the academic discourse. This, however, does not mean that the
academic discourse itself was not influenced by party politics. Apparently the latter
have a stronger impact on academics than vice versa, and it might be wrong to draw a
clear separation line between these two contexts.
Authors like Nikolay Poppetrov or Evgeniya Kalinova and Iskra Baeva have
elaborated on the authoritarian features of Boris’s regime as well as its differences
15 Ibid.
16 See e.g. H. Bojadžiev, Spasjavaneto na bălgarskite evrei prez Vtorata svetovna vojna, Sofia 1991.
17 Ibid. See also G. Nissim, Der Mann der Hitler stoppte, Berlin 2000.
18 Poppetrov, Autoritarismus, see above and B. Dimitrov, ‘Bulgaria in the interim between bourgeois
democracy and fascism’, in www.bulgaria.com/history/bulgaria/interim.html, last accessed: July 2002.
19 B. Dimitrov, Bulgaria in the interim, see above. More differentiated arguments can be found in: E.
Kalinova, I. Baeva, Bălgarskite prechodi 1944-1999, Sofija 2000: 13 and P.S. Cvetkov,
‘Demokracijata i nejnite alternativi v Bălgarija mežu dvete svetovni vojni’, in 120 godini, 177-87.83
from fascist regimes of the same time. Especially Poppetrov, who published articles
about this topic already during the 1980s in West-German periodicals, has presented a
clear and differentiated picture of the King’s government between 1918 and 1943. As
mentioned above, instead of the ideologically discredited term ‘monarcho-fascism’ he
characterised the regime as ‘monarchic-authoritarian with single fascist elements’.
According to him, several anti-constitutional actions taken by Boris during the years
of his government are most typical of his political style.
20
His Majesty the prime minister
Nevertheless it is exactly this ‘straightforward’ style of policy-making, which makes
monarchy attractive to its Bulgarian supporters. The reference to King Boris, who,
according to this view, had conducted an intelligent foreign policy, ended domestic
political confrontations and proved to be humane by saving the Jews, serves as a
foundation for the protests of large parts of Bulgarian society against the obvious
corruption and incompetence of Bulgarian politicians. Moreover, this disposition of
the electorate opened the opportunity to Boris’s son, Simeon II, formally the last king
of Bulgaria, to appear on the country’s political scene in spring 2001. Even though the
results of opinion polls proved that in the Bulgarian public there was no majority for
the reintroduction of monarchy, the great popularity Simeon achieved during his
campaign seems to be inexplicable without the above mentioned change in the
historical image of the monarchic idea after 1989.
21 He profited from his father’s
royal aura, which in many cases resulted in a transformation of the sympathies he
experienced in large parts of the country into a quasi-religious admiration. Thus, the
people’s expectations towards Simeon became clear: following in his father’s
footsteps he would come to Bulgaria like a messiah, take things into his hands, and
solve the problems, which mainly are of a social nature, from a position above the
level of everyday politics.
22
These expectations were certainly not an expression of deep anti-democratic feelings
among the people of Bulgaria, but they showed great disappointment about the
achievements of parliamentary democracy after 1989. Neither the Socialists nor the
Union of Democratic forces, having been in power since 1997, had realised a
significant increase in the standard of living. Moreover, they had been discredited by
many cases of corruption. Therefore, Simeon had a double advantage when he started
his election campaign in spring 2001: first, he had the aura of a king, second, he came
from ‘outside’ and, thus, was not compromised by any Bulgarian political intrigues.
23
In addition to his royal appearance, however, he made some concrete promises and
programmatic statements during his campaign, which also played an important role
for his overwhelming victory in the elections of June 2001. The most remarkable one
certainly was the promise to raise the general standard of living within 800 days. At
the time when his election programme was published, it was, on the other hand,
unclear, if, in case of a victory, Simeon himself would become prime minister, i.e. he
would be responsible for the realisation of this policy.
24
20 See above.
21 M. Wien, Parlamentswahlen: 13-5.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid. 30.
24 Simeon’s electoral programme: Bălgarija - dobăr dom za svoite graždani. Predizborna programa na
koalicija “Nacionalno dviženie Simeon Vtori”, Sofija 2001.84
The extremely personalised character of his campaign which presented Simeon as a
‘King’ functioned as an indicator of the attraction of the monarchic idea to the
Bulgarian public. As the results of the election prove, he successfully used his royal
status in manifold ways. First of all, there was the naming of his ‘movement’, created
on the basis of two small parties, since Simeon had been forbidden by a decision of the
Supreme Court to participate in the elections with his own party. The movement was
named “The National Movement Simeon the Second”.
25 Thus, Simeon made clear that
he was not only the central, but also the constituting figure of the movement, i.e. its
personified legitimacy. Using his royal name including the number – ‘the Second’ –
instead of his actual family name ‘Sakskoburggotski’, he implicitly laid claims to the
throne. This impression was underlined by the fact that his staff called him “Your
Majesty”, and that he resided in his old royal castle ‘Vranya’ outside Sofia.
Additionally, he made ambiguous public statements concerning the question of the
reintroduction of monarchy. Being asked about this issue he usually replied that this
question was not on the agenda “at the moment” or that it would be decided as soon as
the time came.
26 In addition to this, there were speculations that he might participate in
the presidential elections in autumn 2001, and that afterwards, based on the
parliamentary majority of his movement, he would try to change the constitution in
favour of a reintroduction of the monarchy. Those who made these speculations forgot,
however, that such a plan, if it existed, was impracticable, since the constitution
requires that candidates must have had their residence in Bulgaria for at least five years
in order to be admitted to the presidential elections, which was not the case with
Simeon.
27 Nevertheless, speculation continued to the effect that what Simeon was
aiming at was not the kind of political responsibility a prime minister assumes, but
rather the monarchic role of the father of the nation. After his triumph in the elections
he seemed to confirm these assumptions. In a manner which appears to be unusual for a
parliamentary democracy he made the public wait for about three weeks, before he
decided to declare his readiness to become prime minister. Apparently he did so very
reluctantly and claiming not to have foreseen this development of events. Obviously he
found the post of prime minister inappropriate for himself as he now had to run the risk
that daily political problems might damage not only his personal reputation, but also the
monarchic idea, which, in the public view, was associated with him.
28
Notwithstanding the possible future success of his government, the elections suggested
that royal aura, such as Simeon’s, fascinated the electorate and was able to influence the
voting significantly, even though, according to the above mentioned opinion polls, the
elections cannot be interpreted as support for his re-enthronisation. Nevertheless, the
public notion of the monarchy had become to a large extent connected to Simeon –
similar to the change in its historical image, which almost completely was associated
with Boris III. The increasing respect he, i.e. his memory, enjoyed during the 1990s was
beneficial for his son Simeon, too. Occasionally, it resulted in the naïve assumption that
Simeon had inherited his father’s political capabilities and, thus, was able to guide his
country through the uncertainties of the future.
29
25 Ibid.
26 M. Wien, Parlamentswahlen, 27. Also: F. Nienhusen, ‚Im Reich des schüchternen Königs’, in
Süddeutsche Zeitung (Munich), 16 July 2001: 10.
27 Konstitucija na Republika Bălgarija, 13.7.1991, čl. 93 (2). See: <www.parliament.bg/const.html>, last
accessed 7 May 2001.
28 M. Wien: Parlamentswahlen, 31f.
29 Ibid. 13-5.85
The image of the monarchy in connection with political and ideological convictions
The way in which the historical image of the Bulgarian monarchy changed after 1989
indicates that, as described above, this development basically consisted of a
politically, as well as socially, motivated re-evaluation of its leading representatives.
This transformation ranged from the obligatory rejection of the ‘fascist’ monarchy
before 1989 to a situation at the turn of century, when the possibility of its re-
introduction was openly discussed. These discussions were for the most part
associated with the son of Boris III, Simeon II.
The Union of Democratic Forces made clear to which extent the relation of the
political parties to the monarchy depended on political interests and strategies of
election campaigns. As mentioned above, until the end of the 1990s the position of the
UDF was friendly towards the monarchy – they had invited Simeon to Bulgaria
several times to gain political profit from his image and that of the monarchy - ,
though the UDF were not monarchist, and this was only part of their anti-communist
attitude. Representatives of the party, such as Prime Minister Kostov or President
Stoyanov, showed up in public together with Simeon and re-introduced the royal code
of arms.
30 As soon as Simeon revealed his political ambitions in spring 2001, they
started to downgrade him to the status of a political parvenu, without success, as the
elections proved.
31 In contrast, the Bulgarian Socialist Party tried to remain distant,
even indifferent to Simeon and the confrontation between him and UDF. Seemingly,
BSP focussed on mobilising their genuine electorate – still trying to overcome the
consequences of the defeat of 1997. Generally, they remained out of the focus of
public attention which clearly focussed on Simeon.
The voting, the events associated with it and the following months and years made
clear, however, that the Bulgarian attitude towards the monarchy and its historical
image depends on political developments. After the first two years of Simeon’s
government the public enthusiasm for him as well as for the monarchy seemed to
decline. The sympathy he had enjoyed at the beginning had been grounded in two
factors: firstly, the generally miserable living conditions in connection with political
disorientation and, secondly, the fact that he was a man of the right age, who
embodied the monarchic idea and at the same time was at least apparently capable of
taking political responsibility. This could be a possible explanation as to why he was
the only former East European monarch who managed to regain considerable political
influence in his country after decades of communist dictatorship.
32 This influence,
however, declined again after the elections of 2005, which brought the socialists back
to being the strongest party. Still, they were forced to form a broad coalition with a
number of other parties, including Simeon’s NDSV. ‘His Majesty the Prime Minister’
had to abdicate and turned into a ‘normal’ Bulgarian politician as the chairman of his
party.
30 J. Gruber, ‚Bulgarien im ersten Jahr der Regierung von Ex-König Simeon Sakskoburggotski.
Handwerkliche Fehler des Kabinetts oder Beginn einer krisenhaften Entwicklung?’, in
www.kas.de/publikationen/2002/ai/03_gruber.pdf, 2., last accessed: July 2002
31 Wien: Parlamentswahlen 13.
32 See also: H.-J. Hoppe, ‘Saison für Könige! Macht das bulgarische Modell Schule?’, in Südosteuropa
Mitteilungen, 3, 2002: 54-67.87
Emerging institutional order? National Investment Funds in Poland
Maria Aluchna
1
(Warsaw School of Economics)
This paper analyses the mass privatisation programme (MPP) implemented in Poland
in the mid-1990s from the perspective of transition reforms and the development of
corporate governance systems. Although the programme covered only 512 companies
the collected evidence provides a unique opportunity to compare the Polish MPP to
the schemes implemented in other post-socialist economies of the Czech Republic,
Slovakia and Russia as well as to other privatisation methods applied in Poland. The
Polish MPP created intermediaries in the form of National Investment Funds (NIF),
which were granted the leading and minor status in the ownership of their portfolio
companies. The clear ownership and the incentive structure appeared to be important
mechanisms that helped minimse the control vacuum and stimulated restructuring and
privatisation of the portfolio companies. Despite the restructuring efforts the financial
results remain relatively blurred and the performance of privatised companies as well
and the funds appear to be disappointing.
Introduction
Since 1989 Poland has been grouped with the transition economies shifting from
central planning to a market economy. The transition process includes significant
changes in the political, social and economic system. Although the political changes
are indisputably an important part of the transition, the development and direction of
change can be only sustained and reinforced by economic success, or at least
improvement. It is agreed that the creation of more efficient governance mechanisms
is a crucial aspect of transition reforms.
The privatisation process is one of the most important reforms from the perspective
of transition as well as for the development of corporate governance structures. At the
end of 2006 the private sector generated 80% of GDP. Out of 8,453 state owned
companies in 1990, 7,147 were privatised by the end of 2004.
2 A total of 2,885
companies were privatised via direct privatisation, which appeared to be the dominant
ownership transformation scheme, 1,545 companies were commercialised, 352
underwent indirect privatisation, 512 were included in the mass privatisation
programme and 1,853 were covered by liquidation procedures. However, in the
register of January 2005 there were 1,306 state enterprises and the state still is
involved in 15% of privatised companies in Poland.
The goal of this paper is to present the mass privatisation scheme introduced in
Poland in mid-1995 in the form of National Investment Funds and on the basis of
collected evidence to answer questions on the effectiveness of the mass privatisation
programme in Poland. The assessment of the Polish MPP will include two levels of
analysis: a comparative analysis of the NIF programmes versus other privatisation
methods applied in Poland such as direct sale to foreign and domestic investors,
1 Corresponding author: Maria Aluchna, Ph.D., Department of Management Theory, Warsaw School of
Economics, Al. Niepodleglosci 164, r. 1102, 02-554 Warszawa, Poland, tel.: 0048 22 564 82 60, fax:
0048 22 564 3941, email: maria.aluchna@sgh.waw.pl Comments welcome.
2 Ministerstwo Skarbu Państwa (State Treasury), Ocena przebiegu prywatyzacji majatku Skarbu
Panstwa w 2004 roku (The report on privatisation reforms in 2004), Warsaw 2005:10.88
Management and Employee Buyouts (MEBO) and sub-stage of commercialisation;
and an international comparative analysis of mass privatisation programmes
implemented in other Central and East European countries: Russia, the Czech and
Slovak Republics as well as East Germany and Estonia. On the basis of previous
research as well as the most common problems of transition economies the criteria for
assessing the NIF scheme will be the following:
1. Shifting ownership of assets from state to private hands;
2. Enhancing the performance of companies by privatisation to strategic
investors, restructuring of the companies and reducing the control vacuum and
looting carried out mostly by powerful opportunistic insiders;
3. Acceleration and increasing the scope of the privatisation process;
4. Reducing the costs of ownership change from the perspective of the state;
5. Distribution of, at least part of, the ‘national’ wealth to Polish citizens;
6. Development of corporate governance mechanisms;
7. Boosting public interest and participation in the stock market.
The remainder is organised as follows. In the first section the paper discusses the
programme designing process, the goals and the stages of the programme. The
second section analyses the functioning of the NIFs and their role in corporate
governance. The third section discusses the results of NIFs restructuring activity. The
fourth section concludes the paper with an overall assessment of the mass
privatisation and its contribution to the development of the corporate governance
system in Poland.
1. The mass privatisation programme
After 1989 Poland applied the radical approach to macroeconomic reforms (so-called
shock therapy). The mass privatisation programme was, however, significantly
delayed. The main reasons behind this delay were rooted mostly in political changes
and the unwillingness of political parties to formulate the goals of the mass
privatisation scheme precisely
3. The authors of the Polish MPP could rely on the
experience of other countries, especially Russia, Slovakia and the Czech Republic and
prevent the privatised companies from mushrooming and expropriation by insiders.
Political turmoil and insecurity, however, did not provide a good environment for
foreign investors. The delay also affected the attitude of workers in the companies
chosen to join the programme and led to the further deterioration of NIFs portfolio
companies, which were in desperate need of capital and restructuring.
The main goal of the programme was to assist the shifting of assets from state-
owned companies to private ones and to intensify and extend the range of ownership
transformation. The initial plan was to create open public investment funds for the
mass privatisation programme, which would then become private funds. The mandate
of the NIFs was to promote the development of profitable and valuable companies
operating in Poland and to permit the public to participate by enabling them to acquire
shares in the NIFs. Moreover, selling companies through an intermediary and not
directly by the state reduced the costs of the ownership change. Finally, in many cases
the government realised there were not enough investors with substantial capital
interested in buying out state-owned companies.
3 Stanisława Teresa Surdykowska, Prywatyzacja, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warszawa 1997: 140.89
1.1. The scheme
The Polish MPP covered 512 large and medium, mainly manufacturing, state-owned
enterprises (SOEs) with about 10% of industrial sector sales to participate in 15
National Investment Funds. Each SOE was incorporated as a joint stock company,
60% of the shares were allocated to the NIF scheme, 15% was given free to
employees and 25% was retained by the state
4.
The NIF privatisation stage
In December 1994 the supervisory boards of NIFs were officially appointed and
started negotiations with management companies. By July 1995, NIFs established as
companies by Company Act with capital of 100,000 PLN provided by the state as
subsidy selected their fund management companies and signed 10-year agreements
with them
5. In March 1995 portfolio companies were distributed amongst NIFs on a
random basis to ensure that all funds would end up with approximately equal amounts
of assets under their control. The distribution of the share was carried out in a number
of rounds on four occasions. As a result many funds ended up with diversified
portfolios not concentrated on any particular industry. In the end each NIF gained the
lead status in 34-35 firms and minority status (of 1.93% shares) in around 477 firms.
NIFs held 60% of a company’s shares and were to manage the sale of the shares
6. In
order to ensure that NIFs would play an active role in the companies they had in their
portfolios, provisions in the MPP stipulated that leading stakes had to be sold only as
a whole, whereas the minority stakes were the subject of unrestricted trading. Figure 1
illustrates the structure that each NIF ended up with.
Figure 1: Illustration of the initial NIF structure
lead status
minority status
Source: based on www.magnapolonia.com.pl
4 Wolfgang Aussenegg, ‘Going public in Poland: Case-by-case privatisation, mass privatisation and
private sector initial public offerings’, William Davidson Institute Working Paper, no. 292, 1999,
http://wdi.umich.edu/files/Publications/WorkingPapers/wd292.pdf, [accessed on 2 April, 2002] (para. 8
of 44).
5 Malwina Szczepkowska, ‘Funkcjonowanie przedsiębiorstw w ramach grup kapitałowych na
przykładzie Narodowych Funduszy Inwestycyjnych’, Uniwersytet Szczeciński 2001: 5.
6 Szczepkowska, ‘Funkcjonowanie przedsiębiorstw w ramach grup kapitałowych na
prezykładzieNarodowych Funduszy Inwestycyjhnych’: 6.
1 National Investment Fund
35 companies in which NIF has the lead
status, i.e. holds approximately 33% stake in
each company
477 companies in which NIF has the
minority status, i.e. holds approximately
1.9% stake in each company90
From November 1995 until November 1996 the state-owned bank PKO BP started to
distribute the ownership certificates for a fee of PLN 20 ($7-8). The certificate
functioned as a claim to the ownership of funds. Each adult Pole could take a
certificate and then convert it into 15 shares (1 share per each NIF)
7. Figure 2 presents
the pace of certificate distribution.
Figure 2: Pace of certificate distribution
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Source: Source: Ministry of State Treasury, ‘Report of NIF programme 1997-2003’
Funds commercial phase
In March 1997 NIFs shares were listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange. The Treasury,
which held 100% of shares of NIFs at this point, began to transfer 85% of these shares
to certificate holders who applied for the conversion of their certificates through a
brokerage house. The remaining 15% was kept by the Treasury for the payment of
performance and loyalty fees by the fund management companies. In June 1997 the
certificates and shares of NIFs were listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange. Certificate
prices went significantly up starting from PLN 50, reaching PLN 175 (the highest
price) by February 1997 and then falling back to about PLN 150 by June 1997.
During the last day of quotation (last session in December 1998) a certificate was
worth 62 PLN which makes it 40% lower than the IPO price. The NIF index reached
its top value during the first weeks of quotation and since then NIF shares prices fell
reaching around 1/3 of that value in 2005. Figure below presents NIF index 1997-
2005.
7 The initial public interest in the mass privatisation programme was striking: 25 855 417 out of 27 395
000 eligible Poles (94.5%) took part in that programme, although the authors of the MPP predicted a
far lower participation of about 10 million citizens.91
Figure 3: NIF index (points) 1997-2003
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Source: own calculations based on reports of NIF programme and database of Bank
Ochrony Środowiska (available at www.bossa.pl)
As shown in figure 1 the value of the index fell after the listing date. The increase in
2004 and 2005 was connected to the dividend payout and the upward trend of the
stock exchange. Since 2006 the Warsaw Stock Exchange has not produced a NIF
index due to the end of the programme.
1.2. Companies selected for MPP
According to the estimates of the Ministry of Ownership Transformation there were
around 1100 companies, which could join the programme at the time the scheme was
under construction. However, the anti-privatisation lobby was strong and many
companies were not included in the scheme due to political reasons. Additionally, the
delay in the introduction of the programme also affected the number of companies
selected. Some of the potential company candidates were being privatised or had a
different status including large companies such as PKP (Polish railways) or LOT
(Polish airlines) and therefore did not qualify for the programme
8. Additionally,
alcohol and tobacco manufacturers, power plants, wood processing companies and
sugar manufacturers were excluded from the MPP mostly for political reasons and the
pressure of the anti-privatisation lobby. In August 1992 an estimated 600 companies
valued at PLN 150 billion (15% of the value of state-owned companies) were to join
the programme since that number was meant to be the ‘breakeven point’ of the
scheme. Since the 16 largest companies were excluded, the value of companies in the
MPP dropped to 6.56% of state-owned companies. As a result, many companies
selected for the programme represented “problematic” sectors such as food processing
or textile industries.
Companies selected for the NIF programme were, by Polish standards, large and
medium, though not the largest in size and were recruited mostly from the industrial
sector.
8 Szczepkowska, ‘Funkcjonowanie przedsiębiorstw w ramach grup kapitałowych na przykładzie
Narodowych Funduszy Inwestycyjnych’, 6; Surdykowska, Prywatyzacja, 239-40.92
Table 1: Characteristics of companies involved in NIF programme
Number of employees Sector Percentage
Up to 200 201-500 501-1000 More than
1000
Industry 80.5 9.2 23.6 25.8 21.9
Construction 14.6 1.4 6.1 5.9 1.2
Others 4.9 2.8 0.9 1.1 0.2
Total 100 13.4 30.6 32.8 23.2
Source: Szczepkowska, Funkcjonowanie przedsiębiorstw w ramach grup
kapitałowych na przykładzie Narodowych Funduszy Inwestycyjnych”, Uniwersytet
Szczeciński, p. 7
In terms of financial conditions the bottom line was profit equal to zero, with a
minimum turnover of $10 million. As a matter of fact, however, the financial position
of the companies varied significantly ranging from highly profitable to loss making:
while 1/5 of the portfolio companies were sound enough to be listed on the Warsaw
Stock Exchange in a short period of time, 31% of them were recording losses
9. The
approximate book value of their assets was over PLN 7 billion ($3 billion at the end
of 1994) although varying again from more than $43 million to $4.3 million.
1.3. Fund management companies
Fifteen case fund management companies sponsored by institutional investors, both
Polish and foreign, were usually contracted for two years with the option of contract
extension for up to 10 years. The compensation of the fund managers was based on:
1. One fixed fee paid annually in dollars and adjustable annually for inflation and
certain changes in the portfolio of the NIF. It was fixed for the 10-year life of the
fund management agreement. The management fee was fixed for each fund
separately via negotiations between the supervisory board and the fund
management company and it usually accounted for 2-3% of the asset value. The
aggregate fee for all funds was $42 million per annum
10.
2. Fees for a performance-based bonus included the annual performance fee from the
sale of 1% of the NIF’s assets and a loyalty fee of 5 % of the NIF’s assets at the
end of the 10-year contractual period.
The total remuneration of fund managers accounts for approximately 3.5-4.5% of the
value of the assets, which by Western standards is rather generous,
11 to enable the
fund managers’ to focus on the value of their portfolio companies and on value-
increasing policies.
9 Iraj Hashi, “The Polish National Investment Fund Programme: Mass privatisation with a difference”,
Working Paper no. 99.5, Staffordshire University, 1999,
http://www.staffs.ac.uk/schools/business/economics/papers/ec1999-05.pdf, [accessed 15 April 2002]
(para. 10 of 37).
10 Hashi, “The Polish National Investment Fund Programme: Mass privatisation with a difference”,
(para. 15 of 37).
11 Hashi, ‘The Polish National Investment Fund Programme: Mass privatisation with a difference’,
(para. 16 of 37).93
2. Corporate governance in the MPP
Mass privatisation by definition leads to diffused ownership (shares/ vouchers
distributed amongst millions of citizens) and results in a vacuum of monitoring and
supervision and the increased discretion of managers who are likely to pursue self-
dealing at the expense of shareholders. The Polish mass privatisation programme was
designed to create a dominant owner for enterprises and to provide the appropriate
incentives for them which would in turn lead to the restructuring of the companies and
speeding up their transfer to the private sector. Thus the Polish MPP tried to overcome
the potential problems of investment funds identified in the case of Czech and Slovak
MPPs.
12 The characteristics and the role of investment funds participating in mass
privatisations in Central and East European counties received harsh criticism for
lacking incentives to restructure. Funds in the Czech and Russian MPP, during the
early stages before concentration in hands of insiders, usually owned 20-30% of the
company and were likely to utilise their power without restructuring. The fund
management companies went for self-dealing such as tunnelling and siphoning.
13 This
was done through a set of special contracts and non-transparent side deals with firms
related to the fund management companies. In Poland the leading funds were
monitored by other minority funds and were considered important to the reputation of
the fund management company. Governance as well as the incentive structure of the
MPP was believed to reduce the principal–agent problems at the company level and
thus in the Polish programme the corporate governance problem was partly shifted
from the ‘enterprise level’ to the ‘fund level’, in other words, how funds monitored
and controlled themselves
14.
2.1. The ownership of the portfolio companies
Portfolio companies faced significant differences between the initially dispersed and
those with more concentrated ownership, in enabling funds to pursue their strategies.
To improve the efficiency of their governance structure NIFs decided to enter into
mutual agreements for the consolidation of shares:
 The first consolidation took place in October 1996 and six funds joined the
agreement
15– V NIF SA Victoria, VI NIF SA Magna Polonia, VIII NIF SA
Octavia, X NIF SA Foksal, XI NIF SA, XII NIF SA Piast. It referred to shares
of leading companies – the exchange included five different packages of
1.93% in different companies for one of 9.65% of one company focusing on
sectors in which they already owned companies. All together 162 companies
were subject to this exchange process. As a result the six funds had two types
of minority stake: 9.65% (the so called super-minority) in 27 companies and
12 Coffee John C. Jr., ‘Inventing a Corporate Monitor for Transitional Economics: The Uncertain
Lessons from the Czech and Polish Experiences’ in Frydman Roman, Gray Cheryl W., Rapaczynski
Andrzej (eds.), Corporate Governance in Central Europe and Russia , World Bank/CEU Press, 1996,
1, chap. 4, 134.
13 David Ellerman, ‘Voucher privatisation with investment funds: An institutional analysis’, World
Bank, 1997,
http://www.worldbank.org/html/dec/Publications/Workpapers/WPS1900series/wps1924/wps1924.pdf
[accessed on 11 April, 2002] (para. 3 of 12).
14 Hashi, “The Polish National Investment Fund Programme: Mass privatisation with a difference”,
(para. 17 of 37).
15 Szczepkowska, ‘Funkcjonowanie przedsiębiorstw w ramach grup kapitałowych na przykładzie
Narodowych Funduszy Inwestycyjnych’, 10.94
1.93% in the rest of them. The ownership structure of these 162 companies
underwent significant concentration: one leading NIF (33%), one fund with
9.65% stake and nine minority fund-owners with stakes of 1.93%. From the
perspective of NIFs super-minority holdings were expected to have a premium
value over minority holdings as they would reduce the monitoring as well as
transaction costs. The reduction was probably insufficient as they still had
minority holdings in about 350 companies and as a result funds tended to sell
these minority stakes.
 In February 1998 the same six NIFs signed another agreement for share
consolidation aimed at further reducing the number of minority companies in
their portfolios.
2.2. The ownership of the NFIs
Additionally there was a trend towards ownership concentration at the fund level.
16
Financial institutions appeared to prefer the gradual purchasing of NIFs’ shares and
opted in many cases for concentrated ownership in the NIFs. One move toward the
trend was the merger of III NIF SA and XI NIF SA into Jupiter NIF on 31 December
2000. Researchers note that it is expected that over time the ownership of NIFs will
become more concentrated. The NIF formula created financial intermediaries
managing entrusted shares in the privatised companies in the name of the owners and
the costs of heavily dispersed ownership were substantial.
17 As a result, NIFs were
controlled by powerful financial groups.
Table 2: The dominant shareholders of NIFs
The dominant shareholder Shares in NIF The management company
PEKAO SA NIF Jupiter – 32,76% Trinity Management
BRE BANK SA I NIF – 14,2%
V NIF – 15%
XIII NIF – 9,8%
XIV NIF – 5%
BRE Private Equity
PZU S.A. II NIF – 20,2%
IV NIF – 21,34%
IX NIF – 21,71%
PZU NIF Management
WBK AIB
CA IB
VI NIF – 21,57%
XV NIF – 53,73%
AIB WBL Fund
Management
CA IB Management
Copernicus/ NIF Fund
Holdings
VIII NIF – 32%
XII NIF – 25,5%
KP Consortium Ltd.
Source: Hashi The Polish National Investment Fund Programme: Mass privatisation
with a difference’, p. 8 and own research.
16 Considering the depth of Polish financial markets and the relatively small size of investment funds,
the law has provided some degree of protection against hostile takeovers in the first four years of NIFs
public trading. According to the provisions no single shareholder may own more that 5% of shares of a
fund in the first two years of the programme. The proportion was increased to 10% and 20% in the
third and fourth year. Some institutions predicted takeovers of many NIFs within six months after
listing funds on the Warsaw Stock Exchange. However for the whole period of time, there was no sign
of a takeover attempt.
17 Izabela Koładkiewicz, ‘The institutional shareholder – best practice: the National Investment Funds’
experience, Corporate governance, 10, 2002, 3, 183.95
2.3. Supervisory boards of portfolio companies
The funds together usually controlled the supervisory boards of the companies since
the two other stakeholders who were entitled to representation on the board had a
modest number of seats. It was in their interest if NIFs coordinated their actions and
in that way gained an effective voice on supervisory boards. Thus, from the
beginning, there was an implicit agreement amongst NIFs that the lead fund should
also nominate the representative of minority funds. Since the Treasury was a passive
investor, the likelihood of opportunistic behaviour by the lead fund increased.
Although the role of the minority NIFs might seem to be marginal, they appeared to
monitor the lead funds to some extent and therefore enhanced the governance
structure, demanding for instance the disclosure of detailed financial information
about portfolio companies. Their importance decreased as the funds disposed of
minority shareholdings.
3. Assessment of the programme
The results of the NIF scheme with respect to the restructuring and enhancement of
the companies’ value remains relatively blurred and inconclusive. The research
evidence differs significantly: some researchers criticise the scheme heavily claiming
that the Polish mass privatisation programmes failed to provide the expected results,
18
while others, however, express positive opinions towards the goals that were to be
achieved.
19 The assessment of the programme is analysed below according to the
criteria listed in the introduction to the paper.
3.1. Shifting the ownership form state to private hands
From the beginning of the programme until the end of 2001 the State Treasury sold its
stakes in 115 companies for over $195 million and in the case of 112 companies the
state withdrew completely. At the end of 2001 the state was still involved in 381
companies, standing at 74.4% of the initial portfolio with an average stake between
10.7%-16.1%. This number is far from impressive and in the opinion of some
researchers it contributed to the negative aspects of the Polish MPP. The Table shows
state involvement in NIF at the end of 2004.
18 Irena Grosfeld, Thierry Tressel, ‘Competition and corporate governance: Substitutes or
complements? Evidence from the Warsaw Stock Exchange’, William Davidson Institute Working
Paper, no. 369, 2001, http://wdi.umich.edu/files/Publications/WorkingPapers/wd369.pdf [accessed on
10 April 2002], (para. 20-1 of 41).
19 Simon Commander, Mark Dutz, Nicholas Stern, ‘Restructuring in transition economies: Ownership,
competition and regulation’, World Bank, 2001,
http://www.worldbank.org/research/abcde/washington_11/pdfs/stern.pdf [accessed on 6 April, 2002]
(para. 30-2 of 43).96
Table 3: State involvement in NIFs (December 2004)
Fund Number of shares Stake (%)
Fund I NIF 471,800 3.14
Jupiter NIF 2,972,527 5.71
NIF Progress 591,314 2.49
V NIF Victoria 917,036 6.10
NIF Magna Polonia 1,947,719 6.48
NIF Octava 4, 418,755 18.36
NIF Foksal 3,018,153 14.06
NIF Fortuna 1,071,922 7.13
Zachodni NIF 1,297,141 6.08
Source: Source: Ministry of State Treasury, ‘Report of NIF programme 1997-2003’,
p. 52-3.
3.2. The privatisation to strategic investors and restructuring of the companies
Fund management companies carried out restructuring by assigning each 5-6 portfolio
companies to a small team of their employees. Each team was directed by an
investment director or a portfolio manager who assisted the companies in preparing
their strategic plan
20. As far as the restructuring activity is concerned evidence shows
that labour shedding amounted to 10 and 20% between 1996 and 2000. Fund teams
pursued significant changes especially in strategic management, production lines and
product designs as well as budgeting, accounting and the compensation system.
Approximately 300 companies that joined the NIF programme were subject to deep
organisational and financial restructuring, including debt conversion, the
reorganisation and implementation of new accountancy rules and improvements to the
top management teams.
The NIFs’ investments in portfolio companies between 1996-1997 is estimated at
PLN 293 million in lead companies and PLN 203 million in minority companies.
Additionally, strategic investors invested PLN 173 million. The data as of 30
September 2001 shows that NIFs invested 898.2 million PLN in the restructuring
programmes in leading companies and 241.8 million PLN in minority companies.
Altogether NIFs invested 1,140.3 PLN million which accounts for 62.4% of the gains
realised from the sale of the companies. Meanwhile the sale of companies to strategic
investors generated around 639 million PLN for NIFs, whereas the average income of
NIFs from the disposal of portfolio companies in 1996-98 is estimated at PLN 143
million.
Due to the poor economic situation, portfolio companies entering the liquidation and
bankruptcy process accounted for 20% of the overall number. At the end of 2001 16%
of these cases were completed. Seven were revoked, whereas thirteen companies were
subject to liquidation. The decisive strategy of the NIFs towards bankruptcy and
liquidation proceedings may be linked to a more favourable position for the
implementing of these politically unpopular procedures for companies that were
considered to be financially unviable. The funds were simply better placed, as
compared with the state, which was constrained by political pressures, to pursue the
closure of unprofitable companies. Until 30 September 2001 NIFs sold 325 out of 512
20 Hashi ‘The Polish National Investment Fund Programme: Mass privatisation with a difference’,
(para. 24 of 37).97
companies (63% of their portfolios). More than half of the NIF portfolio companies
found strategic investors and in two thirds of cases these were industrial-related
investors. Some companies, mostly those in poor financial conditions were sold to
insiders while at the end of 2001 shares in 26 companies were traded on the Warsaw
Stock Exchange and ten on off-exchange market (CTO). At the end of September
2001 187 companies were still under the management of NIFs. The recent report of
the State Treasury (2005) summarised NIF privatisation scheme indicating that out of
512 companies covered by the programme at the end of 2004:
 in 232 companies (46%) privatisation was fully completed;
 130 companies were liquidated;
 5 companies were merged in other units;
 135 were actively controlled by the state.
The table below presents the breakdown of all the NFIs portfolios.
Table 4: Leading companies in NIFs portfolios
NFI Number of leading
companies in
portfolio as of 1998
Number of leading
companies in
portfolio as of Sept
30, 2001
Number of leading
companies in portfolio as
of Nov 2006
01 NIF 35 10 Closing its activity
02 NIF 34 19 Closing its activity
03 NIF 34 11 0 (fund holds bonds and
shares in 4 companies)
04 NIF 35 16 Closing its activity
05 NIF 35 7 Closing its activity
06 NIF 35 10 5
07 NIF 34 28 4
08 NIF 34 8 0 (fund holds in 5 real
estate-related companies)
09 NIF 34 11 Closing its activity
10 NIF 33 13 Closing its activity
11 NIF 33 11 0 (merged with 03 NIF)
12 NIF 34 10 New strategy specialising
in real estate
13 NIF 34 4 0, fund is closing its
activity
14 NIF 34 12 Closing its activity
15 NIF 35 13 New strategy specialising
in management of non-
food consumer brands
Source: own calculations based on data from NIF annual reports and websites.
However, the strategy of the NIFs with respect to their role differs significantly. Some
of the NIFs actively searched for strategic investors and carried out the reorganisation,
whereas some others perceived themselves as purely financial investment funds98
focusing more on trading shares and other securities on domestic and foreign markets.
As the evidence shows many funds decided to pursue a very easy strategy – instead of
actively restructuring portfolio companies they sold the most attractive assets to other
investors and purchased bonds or other financial instruments. The quick liquidation
assets strategy is the biggest disappointment of the NIF scheme.
3.3. Increase in firm value, improvement in productivity, investment, and sales
Approximately, 30% of portfolio companies were recording losses at the time of
joining the programme. Most of them represented problematic sectors such as: meat,
clothing, coal mining and steel. Despite significant restructuring efforts,
improvements in profitability (or reductions in losses) and labour, the productivity of
portfolio companies showed significant long-turn market underperformance.
21
However, other research evidence shows that the firms included in the mass
privatisation programme showed rapid improvements in their profitability before
these companies were virtually privatised.
22 The proportion of the leading companies
recording losses increased in 1996 before dropping to 29% in 1998. 71% in 1999 and
48% in 2000 of the leading companies generated net profits.
Despite important restructuring efforts carried out by the NIFs, their performance
has been rather disappointing. The dividend paid by the funds was very small if any.
The net assets value of most NIFs has not kept up with inflation.
23 Compared to 1997
the net asset value plummeted significantly which is perceived as opposite to the goals
of the programme and government laws (figure 4).
Figure 4: Value of NIF assets (bln PLN)
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Source: Ministry of State Treasury, ‘Report of NIF programme 1997-2003’, p. 16.
21 Aussenegg, ‘Going public in Poland: Case-by-case privatisation, mass privatisation and private
sector initial public offerings’, para. 25 of 44).
22 Commander, Dutz, Stern, ‘Restructuring in transition economies: Ownership, competition and
regulation’ (para. 31-2 of 43).
23 Hashi, ‘The Polish National Investment Fund Programme: Mass privatisation with a difference’,
(para. 34 of 37).99
The breakdown of the asset value of individual NIFs is presented in table 5.
Table 5: Net assets value of NIFs (million, PLN)
NIF End 1996 1
st quarter
1997
End 2000 End 2001 End
2003
I NIF S.A. 440 412 190 184 155
II NIF S.A. 470 459 155 146 140
IV NIF S.A Progress 390 405 230 190 175
V NIF S.A Victoria 340 299 150 135 120
VI NIF S.A Magna
Polonia
350 328 240 200 180
VII NIF S.A im.
Kazimierza
Wielkiego
390 378 100 107 98
VIII NIF S.A Octava 380 347 340 331 250
IX NIF S.A im. E.
Kwiatkowskiego
390 370 350 318 280
X NIF S.A Foksal 500 464 170 146 100
XII NIF S.A Piast 410 382 130 101 45
XIII NIF S.A
Fortuna
500 378 200 185 160
XIV NIF S.A
Zachodni
380 374 220 211 170
XV NIF S.A Hetman 410 401 270 131 70
NIF Jupiter (II NIF
and XI NIF merged)
760 746 500 414 230
Source: based on Szczepkowska, ‘Funkcjonowanie przedsiębiorstw w ramach grup
kapitałowych na przykładzie Narodowych Funduszy Inwestycyjnych’, p.12-13;
Ministry of State Treasury, ‘Report of NIF programme 1997-2003’, p. 17.
The loss of investment activity tends to be the major weakness of the NIFs. Despite
the intensive sale of shares, the majority of capital was allocated in risk-averse bonds
and debt securities which were unable to cover the losses of the portfolio companies.
The loss on investment activity reached 16.42 million PLN at the end of 2001. The
total profit of the NIFs in 2001 was negative as well and accounted for 51.2 million
PLN,
24 which amounts to thirty-seven percent of the previous year’s loss.
25 Figure 5
presents the net profit generated by NIFs during the period 1996-2003.
24 Hashi, ‘The Polish National Investment Fund Programme: Mass privatisation with a difference’,
(para. 26 of 37).
25 Nevertheless ca. half of the NIFs generated positive profits at the end of 2001.100
Figure 5: Net profit (loss) generated in NIFs, 1996-2003, mln PLN
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Source: Source: Ministry of State Treasury, ‘Report of NIF programme 1997-2003’,
p. 21.
3.4. The pace and scope of privatisation
The mass privatisation programme definitely contributed to the acceleration and the
increasing scope of the privatisation process although it covered merely 512
companies and when compared to other CEE countries this appears to be minimal.
For instance the MPP covered 1,800 companies in the Czech Republic and 15,000
companies in Russia. On the other hand the long duration of the scheme
implementation raises questions as to whether the pace of privatisation could have
been slower or faster if alternative methods had been used.
3.5. Lower costs of ownership change
It is extremely difficult to judge if the mass privatisation programme led to the
reduction of the costs of ownership transformation. During the transition period
Poland relied mostly on case-by-case privatisation, while on the other hand in cases of
direct sale to investors allowed the generation of revenues needed for reforms. The
mass privatisation programme was not costly since it was to a large extent financed by
the World Bank. The sale of stakes in only 115 companies generated over 745 million
PLN (approximately $195 million) for the state which remains pretty moderate for
privatisation revenues. Table 6 compares privatisation by three main methods.101
Table 6: Comparison of privatisation by indirect, direct and NIF method
Element Indirect
privatisation
(1990-2003)
NIF programme
(1995-2003)
Direct
privatisation
(1990-2003)
Investment (mln PLN) 69, 655 6, 014 4, 955
Investment in
environment protection
(mln PLN)
4, 662 674.5 225
Employment 217, 097 63, 631 87, 747
Average salary (PLN) 2, 929 2, 270 2,130
Source: Source: Ministry of State Treasury, ‘Report of NIF programme 1997-2003’,
39.
3.6. Distribution of the ‘national’ wealth and boosting the public interest in the stock
market
The mass privatisation programme played a marginal role in Polish transformation.
26
The NIF scheme did not manage to encourage interest in the stock market. Public
interest in the programme peaked during the certificate distribution and conversion
then dropped afterwards. The average Pole did not feel any significant impact of the
distribution of the wealth accumulated during socialism as the value of the certificate
was very low. The majority of citizens decided either to sell the certificates even
before they were converted into the 15 NIF shares or the NIF shares in the very first
weeks of their trading and therefore interest in the stock market as such, was
significantly limited.
3.7. Development of corporate governance mechanisms
Avoiding a control vacuum
The NIF structure is characterised by the dominant position of one leading fund, the
incentive of compensation for the fund management companies, the participation of
the reputational foreign investors and the regulatory framework of the scheme,
provided monitoring mechanisms and avoided a control vacuum (no dispersed
ownership structure). The available data on the mass privatisation programme
delivered evidence that the NIF structure did not suffer from a control vacuum which
was common in the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Russia. Just the opposite: it created
a complicated and multi-level structure that caused the overlapping of competence of
various agents and might in effect have led to higher transaction costs.
Designing a structure of sound governance mechanisms
The NIF structure may appear to be relatively successful with respect to the active
role of funds, monitoring, incentive structures and restructuring results, yet some
26 Michał Federowicz , ‘Corporate governance and industrial relations in Poland’, Centre for the Study
of Economic and Social Change in Europe, School of Slavonic and East European Studies, Working
Paper, no. 28, 2003, [accessed on 8 May 2005] (para. 17 of 22).102
researchers claim that more attention should have been given to managerial incentives
and supervision.
27 An MPP scheme that from the start adds one level of intermediary
institutions as in the Polish case produced a complicated, multi-level structure that is
associated with the problem of ‘who monitors the monitors’.
28
Additionally the trend towards increasing the concentration NIF ownership was
accompanied with the extensive buy back programmes introduced by many funds.
Therefore authors claim we can observe the phenomenon of ‘disappearing’ NIFs.
Data shows that investors involved in the NIF structures tended to merge or buy back
its shares and dissemble the funds. On average the NIFs bought back more than 10%
of their own shares
29. Investors (mostly foreign, powerful financial groups) that
dominated the NIF ownership tended to be involved in other Polish companies but
outside the NIF structure.
Evolvement of active institutional investors
The current NIF involvement in new Polish companies is marginal and in the non-
MPP companies appears to be relatively modest. Funds are de facto in legal and
organisational terms diversified conglomerates acting as closed investment funds
30.
3.8. NIF scheme versus other privatisation methods applied in Poland
Privatisation is an indisputable positive for the companies.
31 There is however no
agreement about the scheme and the pace of the process.
32 Comparative studies of
privatisation schemes in Poland show that the identity of the owner matters
significantly. Outsider-owned privatised firms noted significantly higher annual
revenue growth than either state or insider-owned firms. Firms privatised to outsiders,
particularly to foreigners, tended to perform better in terms of labour productivity and
investment.
33 Privatisation to investment funds is five times more productive as
27 Grosfeld, Tressel, ‘Competition and corporate governance: Substitutes or complements? Evidence
from the Warsaw Stock Exchange’ (para. 15 of 41).
28 Estrin, ‘Competition and corporate governance in transition’, (para. 12 of 42).
29 Hetman NIF bought 50% of its shares, Kwiatowski NIF bought 25% of its share, NIF Progress –
20%, NIF Octavia – 19%, Drugi NIF and NIF Jupiter 9-13%. Apparently, the tendency toward
increasing ownership concentration results also from the ending time of the programme and associated
payoff from the State Treasury and thus the ownership block enjoys higher premia. Some observers
claim that the new, more concentrated structures evolving currently show higher efficiency since they
eliminate one layer of agents in the corporate governance structure as noted by Maciej Samcik ‘Wokół
parkietu: NFI Hetman może zniknąć’,2002, Gazeta Wyborcza – on line resources,
http://www2.gazeta.info/elemnty/druk.jsp?xx=1121702&plik=/htm/1121/a1121702.html; Maciej
Samcik ‘Czy Prokom zainwestuje w fundusze NFI należące do PZU?’ 2002; Gazeta Wyborcza – online
resources,
http://www2.gazeta.info/elemnty/druk.jsp?xx=1131064&plik=/htm/1131/a1131064.html
30 Szczepkowska, ‘Funkcjonowanie przedsiębiorstw w ramach grup kapitałowych na przykładzie
Narodowych Funduszy Inwestycyjnych’, 11-2.
31 Estrin, ‘Competition and corporate governance in transition’, (para. 24 of 42)
32 Svejnar, ‘Transition economies: Performance and Challenges’ (para. 8 of 45); Gerald Mc-Dermott,
‘Network restructuring and firm creation in East-Central Europe: A public-private venture’, William
Davidson InstituteWorking Paper, no. 361, 2000,
http://wdi.umich.edu/files/Publications/WorkingPapers/wd361.pdf [accessed on 10 April 2002] (para.
7-8 of 56).
33 Commander, Dutz, Stern, ‘Restructuring in transition economies: Ownership, competition and
regulation’ (para. 15-16 of 43); Roman Frydman, Cheryl W., Gray, Marek Hessel, Andrzej
Rapaczynski, ‘The limits of discipline’, Economics of Transition, 8, 2000: 579.103
privatisation to insiders, whereas privatisation to foreigners and blockholders is three
times more productive as privatisation to insiders. Concentrated ownership is
beneficial
34 but as shown by Grosfeld and Tressel
35 the controlling shareholder in
Poland has a negative effect, when a CEO, bank or NIF controls the company.
36
Relative to MEBOs, mass privatisation and direct sales more than double the
productivity change recorded over the subsequent two years, with the effect slightly
stronger for direct sales. Insider privatisation has been mostly associated with low
investment, limited managerial change and product innovation.
37 Table 7 presents
performance of companies privatised by the NIF scheme as compared companies
privatised by other methods.
Table 7: Performance of privatised companies in 2003
Method No Loss
making
(net)
Cost
ratio
Operating
ration
Net
operating
ratio
Liquidity
ratio
Total 2,434 34.7 93.5 5.9 4.4 24.4
Sole State
Treasury
companies
337 39.5 87.3 10.9 9.8 28.8
NIF 367 43.3 98.4 1.9 0.6 13.2
Indirect
privatisation
275 32.4 94.0 6.0 3.9 30.3
Controlled
by the state
174 35.6 102.7 -2.7 -4.0 14.7
Debt swaps 12 58.3 106 -5.7 -5.8 16.9
EBO 1092 25.7 96.9 3.1 1.9 32.6
In process
of direct
privatisation
18 83.3 90.2 9.6 17.0 1.0
Source: Source: Ministry of State Treasury, ‘Report of NIF programme 1997-2003’,
35.
As shown in the table performance of companies privatised by the NIF scheme
remains disappointing.
34 Estrin, ‘Competition and corporate governance in transition’, (para. 25 of 42).
35 Grosfeld, Tressel, ‘Competition and corporate governance: Substitutes or complements? Evidence
from the Warsaw Stock Exchange’ (para. 20-1 of 41).
36 In the Czech Republic ownership concentration is associated with better performance as long as
strategic investor other than investment fund is the author of this concentration as noted by Andrew
Weiss, Georgiy Nikitin, ‘Performance of Czech companies by ownership structure’, William Davidson
Institute Working Paper, no. 186, 1998,
http://wdi.umich.edu/files/Publications/WorkingPapers/wd186.pdf [accessed on 3 April 2002], (para. 3
of 45).
37 Commander, Dutz, Stern, ‘Restructuring in transition economies: Ownership, competition and
regulation’ (para. 15-6 of 43).104
3.9. Polish NIFs versus the MPP in other Central and East European countries
Research shows that 19 out of 25 transition countries used some form of mass
privatisation as either a primary or secondary method,
38 although the applied schemes
varied significantly in terms of structure, pace and governance mechanisms that
eventually evolved. In most of the Central and East European countries mass
privatisation programmes were implemented earlier and faster than in Poland. A total
of 512 Polish companies privatised via 15 investment funds amounts to a marginal
share of all companies as opposed to many of Central and East European countries:
some 600 funds were created for 2,352 privatised companies in the Czech scheme
39
whereas the Russian MPP covered 14,000 medium and large enterprises accounting
for two thirds of the industrial labour in terms of employment.
Russia and Ukraine implemented rapid mass privatisation and relied mostly on
management-employee buyouts, whereas the Czech Republic, Lithuania and to a
lesser extent Slovakia based their programmes upon equal-access voucher distributing
the shares among the society
40 and privatising the companies via investment funds.
41
The rapid mass privatisation was crucial from the perspective that it used the window
of opportunity and eliminated the threat of reform regression. On the other hand, the
equal-access voucher privatisation allowed for speedy and relatively fair distribution
of the nation’s wealth. However, neither method contributed to the emergence of new
investment funds nor generated resources for government. Moreover, both led to a
poor corporate governance structure.
42 Rapid mass privatisation failed to provide the
existing management with incentives or the tools for improving efficiency. The equal-
access voucher privatisation resulted in dispersed ownership since the programme
usually involved the whole population of a country. Researchers argue that the failure
of the voucher mass privatisation to provide effective governance structure is rooted
in the structure of long agency chains since a citizen who receives a privatisation
voucher cannot provide appropriate incentives for corporate control.
43 From this
perspective the voucher investment funds provided a ‘vehicle for high abuse’
44. The
dispersed ownership resulted in a control vacuum which in turn led to tunnelling
carried out by managers or majority shareholders at the expense of minority
shareholders
45. Moreover, the Czech case shows that the investment privatisation
funds acted more like agents than owners since they were receiving a management fee
but did not benefit from any increase in the equity value. Additionally since the stock
38 Estrin, ‘Competition and corporate governance in transition’, (para. 12 of 42).
39 Coffee, ‘Privatisation and corporate governance: The lessons from securities market failure’, (para.
22 of 71).
40 Svejnar, ‘Transition economies: Performance and Challenges’ (para. 31 of 45).
41 Coffee, ‘Inventing a corporate monitor for transitional economics: The uncertain lessons from the
Czech and Polish experiences’, 122.
42 Estrin, ‘Competition and corporate governance in transition’,(para 12-4 of 42); Coffee, ‘Privatisation
and corporate governance: The lessons from securities market failure’, (para 24 of 71).
43 Joseph Stiglitz , ‘Whiter reform?’, ABCDE Conference Washington D.C., World Bank 1999; Joseph
Stiglitz, ‘Quis custodiet ipsos custodes? Corporate governance failures in the transition’, ABCDE
Conference, Paris, World Bank, 1999 as quoted in Estrin, ‘Competition and corporate governance in
transition’, (para. 14 of 42).
44 Joseph Stiglitz, ‘The role of government in economic development’, in Michael Bruno, Borin
Pleskovic (eds.) Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics, Washington D.C.,
World Bank, pp. 11-23 as quoted in Estrin, ‘Competition and corporate governance in transition’,
(para. 14 of 42).
45 Coffee, ‘Privatisation and corporate governance: The lessons from securities market failure’, (para 23
of 71); Svejnar, ‘Transition economies: Performance and Challenges’, (para. 12 of 42).105
market was small, institutional investors were locked in without a choice of either exit
or voice.
46 However, in principle it was possible for financial intermediaries to
concentrate their voucher holdings and carry out the effective monitoring as happened
in Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia and to some extent in the Czech Republic, although
the ‘who monitors whom’ structure was not always clear
47.
Further research indicates the crucial role of the regulatory and institutional regime
that created the framework for privatisation
48. In the Czech case regulations allowed
for trading the shares for companies subject to privatisation outside the stock
exchange and trading on the Prague Stock Exchange (PSE) did not require
contemporaneous price reporting which contributed to the systematic looting of Czech
companies by their controlling shareholders (IPFs) and the expropriation of the
remaining minority shareholders.
49 As result of these problems between 1995 and
1999 the number of companies listed on the PSE fell by more than 80% (from 1,716
to 301). Therefore, the quality of the regulation appears to be a crucial element in the
privatisation programme and the efficiency of new ownership structures.
Conclusions
The results of the Polish MPP are highly controversial and relatively blurred. Despite
a lot of criticism one can conclude the main goals were achieved. Restructuring was
carried out in most of the portfolio companies. Many of the NIF companies were sold
outside, mostly to strategic and industrial-related, investors. The financial results,
although still highly disappointing, improved. Comparative analysis shows that the
Polish MPP as opposed to the Czech, Slovak or Russian schemes provided a relatively
adequate control structure. It is however, harder to say to what extent looting was
reduced. The structure which introduced one additional level of agents turned out to
be complicated and costly. The investors involved in the NIF scheme were present in
the Polish market but outside of the NIF structure. The NIF structure was not as
efficient as one tailored by market institutions. It is however highly disputable
whether the MPP contributed to the development of governance mechanisms in
Poland. The NIFs were hardly involved in the ownership of Polish companies, they
evolved towards purely investment activity and ownership concentration appeared to
be the most significant control mechanisms used by the funds. The NIFs’ stake
accounted for between 10 to 16% ranging from an average of 21% of some privatised,
to 6% of new set companies.
50 Besides foreign and domestic companies, and to a
lesser extent banks, it is questionable whether other institutional investors would be
willing to engage in the active governance of Polish companies. On the other hand,
the change in the ownership and governance structures of both portfolio companies
and the NIFs indicates that ownership concentration is very important in transition
economies. Additionally, these changes show how the development and importance of
capital networks and shareholdings tended to play a crucial role in the Polish
governance system.
46 Coffee, ‘Inventing a corporate monitor for transitional economics: The uncertain lessons from the
Czech and Polish experiences’, 125
47 Estrin, ‘Competition and corporate governance in transition’, (para 12 of 42).
48 Edward Glaesser, Simon Johnson, Andrei Shleifer, ‘Coase versus Coasians’, Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 116, 2001, 3, 894.
49 Coffee, ‘Privatisation and corporate governance: The lessons from securities market failure’, (para.
31-2 of 71).
50 Grosfeld, Tressel, ‘Competition and corporate governance: Substitutes or complements? Evidence
from the Warsaw Stock Exchange’ (para. 18-9 of 41).106
Comparatively the Polish scheme is ‘the least mass’ of the MPPs in the transition
economies. Poland was the only country so far that administratively structured its
investment funds. Many experts indicate the deficiencies and negative aspects of mass
privatisation programmes across the CEE which may lead to the conclusion that the
scheme is wrong from the outset.
51 From this perspective the Polish model, although it
did not lead to efficient restructuring or emergence of corporate governance, was able
to minimise, but not fully eliminate, the most problematic aspects of mass
privatisation.
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